Market evolution: Mineral fuels and oils (CN 27) — 2015–2025

Introduction

CN 27 covers MINERAL FUELS, MINERAL OILS AND PRODUCTS OF THEIR DISTILLATION; BITUMINOUS SUBSTANCES; MINERAL WAXES, a product group that includes crude petroleum, natural gas, coal, refined petroleum products, petroleum coke, and related commodities. It is by far the largest category in EU international trade by value, reflecting the bloc's heavy dependence on imported energy.

Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU's energy trade underwent a profound transformation. Total imports rose from €314.4 billion to €414.8 billion (+31.9%) while import volumes actually fell by 16.9%, from 1,013.3 million tonnes to 842.0 million tonnes. Exports grew from €88.2 billion to €116.7 billion (+32.3%). The resulting trade deficit widened from €226.2 billion to €298.1 billion, having reached a peak deficit of €650.4 billion in 2022 — the year of the most acute energy crisis in recent European history.

This report identifies three overarching dynamics that shaped the EU's mineral fuels trade over the decade: the dramatic reorientation of supply sources away from Russia, the severe price shock of 2022 and its aftermath, and a longer-term structural shift in the product mix toward gas and away from coal.

1. The Great Supply Reorientation: From Russian Dependence to Diversified Partnerships

Russia collapsed as the EU's primary energy supplier

The most dramatic single development in EU energy trade over this decade was the near-total withdrawal of Russian supply. In 2015, Russia was the EU's largest energy supplier, with imports valued at €87.8 billion. By 2025, this had fallen to just €17.4 billion — a decline of 80.1%. The data on partner trade shows that Russia's share of EU energy imports collapsed following the sanctions imposed after 2022.

Imports from Russia also exhibited the highest volatility of any major partner, with a coefficient of variation of 0.53 — reflecting the sharp, policy-driven cutoff rather than gradual market adjustment.

New suppliers filled the gap

The void left by Russia was filled by a combination of existing and new partners:

The United States experienced by far the largest absolute increase, growing nearly sevenfold as the EU turned to US LNG and crude oil. Norway and Kazakhstan roughly doubled their exports to the EU, while Algeria — a traditional gas supplier — grew more modestly.

The import structure became measurably more diversified

This reorientation is captured quantitatively by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of import concentration by value:

The HHI fell by 39.2% over the decade, indicating a meaningful shift toward a more diversified supplier base. The steepest drops coincided with the 2022 sanctions period. While this reduces single-source vulnerability, the EU's total import bill and volume dependency remain substantial.

2. The 2022 Energy Crisis: A Watershed in Prices and Trade Values

Prices surged across every product segment

The year 2022 stands out as an extreme outlier in price terms. Import unit prices for the main product segments spiked to levels far above any prior year in the series:

The data on product segments shows that natural gas prices experienced the most extreme spike, rising from €195/t in 2020 to €1,239/t in 2022 — more than a sixfold increase in two years. Coal prices quadrupled from their 2020 low.

The trade deficit reached record levels

The price surge drove the EU's trade deficit to an extraordinary €650.4 billion in 2022 — nearly triple the 2015 deficit of €226.2 billion. Total import value peaked at €831.4 billion, compared to €314.4 billion in 2015. This was driven almost entirely by price effects rather than volume increases; total import volumes in 2022 were actually below 2015 levels.

Specific supply shocks were concentrated in 2022

The shock detection analysis identifies three abnormal price events, all centered on 2022:

The Algeria shock reflects the surge in European gas prices as the continent scrambled for alternative pipeline and LNG supply. The export-side shocks to Ukraine and Canada likely reflect the EU's role in redirecting energy flows during the crisis.

Prices have since normalised but remain elevated

By 2025, prices across all segments had retreated substantially from their 2022 peaks — crude petroleum fell 31.4% from its peak to €476.3/t, and gas prices dropped 57.4% to €528.0/t. However, all major product prices in 2025 remained significantly above 2015 levels, suggesting that the energy crisis left a lasting mark on the price environment.

3. Declining Volumes, a Shifting Product Mix, and Deepening Import Dependency

Coal import volumes have been in structural decline

The most striking volume trend is the collapse in coal imports:

Coal import volumes fell by 62.5% over the decade, from 156.9 million tonnes to 58.8 million tonnes. The brief 2022 uptick to 101.4 million tonnes reflected emergency coal burn as gas supplies were disrupted, but this proved temporary. By 2025, volumes had fallen to their lowest point in the series — consistent with the EU's coal phase-out policies.

Gas has partially replaced coal in the import mix

In contrast to coal, petroleum gas imports (CN 2711, which includes LNG) grew from 119.0 million tonnes in 2015 to 143.9 million tonnes in 2025 (+21.0%). The value of gas imports more than doubled, from €40.1 billion to €88.0 billion, even after the 2022 price spike subsided.

Crude petroleum imports (CN 2709) declined modestly in volume from 503.0 million tonnes to 435.5 million tonnes (−13.4%), while refined petroleum products (CN 2710) fell more sharply from 131.5 million tonnes to 91.2 million tonnes (−30.6%).

EU domestic production expanded but remains far short of demand

EU production of CN 27 products grew substantially over the period:

However, even after this near-doubling, EU production of 121.4 million tonnes compares to imports of 842.0 million tonnes in 2025 — meaning domestic production covers only about 14% of import volumes. The net import reliance metric worsened from −1.3% in 2015 to −81.2% in 2025, reaching a trough of −93.8% during the crisis year.

The EU's role as an energy trading hub intensified

Despite declining import volumes, the EU's trade intensity in CN 27 surged from 31.4% to 83.0%, and export propensity rose from 19.1% to 77.4%. This indicates that the EU has become a far more active re-exporter and refiner of energy products. Major EU member states in this role include the Netherlands, Belgium, and Greece — the most specialised EU economies in CN 27 by revealed comparative advantage.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in mineral fuels and oils (CN 27) over the 2015–2025 decade was reshaped by three converging forces: geopolitical disruption, market crisis, and energy transition.

First, the forced decoupling from Russian energy — driven by sanctions after 2022 — triggered the most rapid supply reorientation in EU energy history. Russia's share of EU energy imports fell by 80.1%, while the United States, Norway, and Kazakhstan dramatically expanded their roles. The result was a meaningfully more diversified import base, with the HHI declining by 39.2%.

Second, the 2022 energy crisis produced an unprecedented price shock that nearly tripled the EU's trade deficit in a single year, reaching €650.4 billion. While prices have since receded, they remain well above pre-crisis levels, embedding higher energy costs into the EU economy.

Third, a longer-term structural shift is underway in the product mix. Coal imports have fallen by 62.5% by volume, consistent with decarbonisation goals, while gas imports have grown as a transitional fuel. EU domestic production has expanded significantly but covers only a fraction of total demand, leaving the bloc structurally dependent on imports.

Together, these dynamics point to an EU energy trade landscape that is more diversified in its supply sources, more exposed to price volatility, and still deeply reliant on external suppliers — even as it gradually shifts away from the most carbon-intensive fuels.