Market evolution: Coal and coal briquettes (CN 2701) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in coal and coal briquettes (CN 2701) over the period 2015–2025. The product heading covers anthracite, bituminous coal, other non-agglomerated coal, and coal briquettes. The decade under review witnessed a profound transformation: EU coal import volumes fell by 62.5%, from 156.9 million tonnes in 2015 to 58.8 million tonnes in 2025. Yet this was not a smooth decline — the period was punctuated by the COVID-19 demand shock of 2020 and, most dramatically, by the 2022 energy crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which upended established trade flows and sent unit prices soaring. The following three sections trace the main dynamics: the secular contraction in import volumes, the violent restructuring of supply relationships, and the evolving price and concentration landscape that resulted.

1. A Decade of Contracting Import Volumes — From Structural Decline to Policy-Driven Phase-Out

EU coal imports have fallen steadily, accelerating after 2020

The volume of coal entering the EU from non-EU countries declined in almost every year of the period. The trajectory can be summarised as follows:

Source: General Overview — trade data

The 2020 trough (78.5 Mt) reflected the pandemic-induced collapse in industrial activity and power demand. The partial recovery in 2021–2022 was itself driven by an energy crisis rather than renewed appetite for coal — Europe scrambled for alternative supplies after cutting ties with Russia. From 2023 onward the contraction resumed in earnest, falling to just 58.8 Mt in 2025, the lowest level in the entire series.

Bituminous coal dominates but has shed the most volume

The product segment breakdown shows that bituminous coal (CN 270112) accounts for roughly three-quarters of all import tonnage. Its decline was dramatic:

Anthracite and "other coal" categories declined even more sharply in proportional terms. The only sub-product that saw a temporary volume spike was anthracite imports, which rose modestly in 2018–2020 before collapsing.

The EU trade deficit narrowed as import values fell faster than export values

The EU's coal trade balance remained deeply negative throughout, reflecting the EU's structural dependence on imported coal. However, the deficit shrank from €10.9 billion in 2015 to €7.9 billion in 2025 (a 27.8% improvement). The narrowest deficit was recorded in 2020 (€5.9 billion) during the pandemic. The 2022 energy crisis produced the widest deficit on record at €29.6 billion — almost entirely a price effect, as volumes were actually below 2015 levels but unit values had tripled.

2. Sanctions, Substitution and the Reshaping of EU Coal Supply Chains

Russia's collapse as a supplier is the single most dramatic event in the dataset

In 2015, the Russian Federation was the EU's largest coal supplier, with imports valued at €3.1 billion. By 2022, Russian coal imports had peaked at €6.0 billion in value terms — even as the EU began imposing sanctions following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The EU's embargo on Russian coal took full effect in August 2022. By 2025, imports from Russia had fallen to just €62,000 — effectively zero. The value change over the full period was −100.0%.

This represents one of the most complete trade disruptions ever recorded for a major commodity between large economic blocs.

Alternative suppliers filled the gap unevenly

The partner data reveals divergent trajectories among the EU's remaining coal suppliers:

Australia and the United States emerged as the principal beneficiaries of Russia's exit, with Australia becoming the EU's single largest coal supplier by 2025 (€3.0 billion). Kazakhstan's growth was spectacular in percentage terms (+1,009.4%), rising from a marginal supplier to a significant one (€640 million in 2025), reflecting its role as a land-based alternative to seaborne Russian coal routed through Central Asian and Caspian corridors.

By contrast, Colombia, South Africa, and Indonesia all saw their EU sales contract — partly because the overall import pie shrank, and partly because longer-haul suppliers were less competitive once the initial scramble for non-Russian coal subsided.

Market concentration increased sharply as Russia was replaced

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU coal imports by value rose from 1,801 in 2015 to 2,515 in 2025 — a 39.6% increase. In volume terms, the HHI increased from 1,903 to 2,185 (+14.9%). The peak concentration by value was reached in 2022 (2,850), at the height of the supply crisis.

This is a counter-intuitive finding: although the EU lost its dominant supplier (Russia), the replacement was not a broad diversification but rather a shift toward a smaller number of large alternative suppliers (notably Australia and the United States). The supply base became more concentrated, not less.

EU member states experienced the contraction unevenly

The top EU reporters show that coal import declines were widespread but far from uniform:

The Netherlands remained the EU's largest coal import gateway throughout, though its share declined modestly. Italy and Spain experienced the sharpest contractions (−58.5% and −56.7% respectively), consistent with aggressive coal phase-out policies in both countries. Poland is a notable outlier: its imports increased by 46.9%, reflecting the country's continued — and in 2022, temporarily intensified — reliance on coal for power generation, and its geographic need to replace Russian pipeline coal with seaborne imports. Poland's imports spiked to €4.9 billion in 2022 before subsiding.

3. Price Volatility, Export Growth and the EU's Niche Role in Global Coal Trade

Import unit prices more than doubled over the period, with an extreme spike in 2022

The average import price for coal entering the EU rose from €71.2/t in 2015 to €142.3/t in 2025, a cumulative increase of 99.8%. However, the path was far from linear. Prices were relatively stable at €69–72/t in 2015–2016, climbed to around €109–111/t in 2017–2019, collapsed to €81.7/t during the pandemic, and then surged to an extraordinary €306.5/t in 2022 — more than four times the pre-crisis level. By 2025, prices had receded to €142.3/t, still roughly double the 2015 baseline.

The product segment data reveals that the 2022 spike was broadly shared across sub-products:

Anthracite remained the most expensive sub-product throughout, while "other coal" was consistently the cheapest. Briquettes showed the most erratic pricing, consistent with their tiny volumes.

The 2022 energy crisis produced measurable supply shocks

The volatility and shock detection analysis identifies three significant price shock events:

1. Australia imports, 2017: A price abnormality of 87.5 with a +93.9% shift, capturing the sharp coal price rally of that year as Chinese demand tightened seaborne markets.
2. United Kingdom exports, 2022: A price abnormality of 64.8 with a +98.0% shift, reflecting the extraordinary tightening of European energy markets in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
3. Egypt exports, 2022: A price abnormality of 32.6 with a +296.7% shift, the largest proportional price jump in the dataset.

On the import side, the highest volatility (measured by the coefficient of variation of annual values) was recorded for Norway (CV = 1.30), Ukraine (CV = 1.01), and Kazakhstan (CV = 0.89) — all partners whose trade relationships were disrupted or newly established during the period.

EU coal exports grew, driven by Ukraine and a few other niche markets

Though the EU is a massive net importer of coal, its exports to non-EU countries grew from €254 million (2015) to €486 million (2025), a 91.2% increase in value and 30.2% in volume (from 2.3 Mt to 3.0 Mt). The destination data shows that Ukraine became the dominant export market:

Ukraine's surge is directly linked to the war: with its own coal-producing Donbas region occupied or under bombardment, Ukraine turned to EU neighbours (notably Poland) for coal supplies. The EU reporter data shows that Czechia's exports surged by 5,804.8% (from €1.9 million to €114 million) and Poland's by 54.8% (to €115 million), likely reflecting transit and re-export dynamics related to Ukrainian demand.

The Netherlands dominates EU coal exports, while specialisation remains concentrated

In 2025, the Netherlands recorded the highest revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA = 0.658) in coal among EU member states, followed by Poland (RSCA = 0.431). All other member states had negative RSCA values, indicating they are net importers or have no meaningful specialisation in coal. This is consistent with the EU's overall position as a structural coal deficit region, with only a handful of countries maintaining any export-oriented coal activity — typically involving re-exports, transit trade, or niche industrial coal products.

Export-side concentration also increased: the export HHI by value rose from 1,421 in 2015 to 2,333 in 2025 (+64.2%), as exports became increasingly concentrated in a small number of EU member states (the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Czechia).

Conclusion

The EU's coal trade over 2015–2025 tells a story of simultaneous contraction and upheaval. Import volumes declined by nearly two-thirds, consistent with the EU's climate policy trajectory and the accelerated coal phase-out commitments adopted by many member states. Yet the headline decline masks a decade of violent disruption: the 2022 energy crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine produced an unprecedented reordering of supply chains, eliminating the EU's largest coal supplier virtually overnight and pushing import prices above €300/t. The resulting shift to Australian, American, and Kazakh coal did not restore the prior supply diversity — on the contrary, import concentration increased. Meanwhile, the EU paradoxically expanded its own coal exports, particularly to war-affected Ukraine, even as it reduced its own consumption. By 2025, prices had receded from their 2022 peak but remained roughly double the 2015 level, and import volumes continued to fall, suggesting that the structural decline of coal in the EU energy mix has resumed its course — but on a trade landscape fundamentally reshaped by geopolitics.