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Market evolution: Coal gas and similar gases (CN 2705) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report analyses the evolution of EU trade with non-EU countries in product CN 2705 — Coal gas, water gas, producer gas, lean gas and similar gases (excluding petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons) — over the period 2015–2025. The data reveals a market that has undergone a near-total collapse in trade volumes, transitioning from meaningful commercial flows to residual, niche-level exchanges. Several structural shifts — including the near-disappearance of the United Kingdom as a trading partner following Brexit, the concentration of remaining activity in Italy, and extreme price dynamics — paint a picture of a product category whose relevance in EU external trade has diminished to marginal levels.

Full data and interactive visualisations are available on the Trade Dashboard overview page.


1. A Market in Near-Total Contraction

The most striking finding in the data is the virtually complete collapse of both exports and imports of CN 2705 over the decade. Trade has shrunk by more than 98% in value on both sides, and by essentially 100% in mass terms for exports.

1.1 Export volumes fell from over 56,000 tonnes to just 3 tonnes

EU exports of coal gas and similar gases recorded a first value (2015) of 56,755 tonnes and a last value (2025) of 3.042 tonnes — a decline of 100.0%. In value terms, this represents a fall from €14,216,876 to just €29,381, a drop of 99.8%. The market essentially ceased to exist as a meaningful export category.

Metric 2015 (first) 2025 (last) Change
Value (EUR) 14,216,876 29,381 −99.8%
Quantity (tonnes) 56,755 3.0 −100.0%
Price per tonne (EUR) 250.49 9,658.33 +3,755.7%
Supplementary quantity (1,000 m³) 282,357 781 −99.7%
Supplementary price (EUR/1,000 m³) 50.34 37.62 −25.3%

Source: Trade Dashboard — Overview

1.2 Import values declined by 98%, but supplementary volumes tell a different story

Imports followed a similar downward trajectory in value and mass: from €5,860,945 (25,255 tonnes) in 2015 to €97,161 (184 tonnes) in 2025. However, the supplementary quantity — measured in thousand cubic metres — fell by a much more moderate 34.5%, from 33,469 to 21,935. This divergence between mass and volume indicates a fundamental compositional shift: the EU is now importing gas that is physically much lighter per unit of volume (approximately 0.008 kg/m³ in 2025 versus 0.75 kg/m³ in 2015), consistent with a transition from heavier producer gases to lighter, lower-density gases such as lean gas or water gas mixtures.

Metric 2015 (first) 2025 (last) Change
Value (EUR) 5,860,945 97,161 −98.3%
Quantity (tonnes) 25,255 184 −99.3%
Price per tonne (EUR) 232.07 529.13 +128.0%
Supplementary quantity (1,000 m³) 33,469 21,935 −34.5%
Supplementary price (EUR/1,000 m³) 175.12 4.40 −97.5%

Source: Trade Dashboard — Overview

1.3 The EU shifted from trade surplus to marginal deficit

In 2015, the EU recorded a trade surplus of €8,355,932 in CN 2705, reflecting the dominance of large export volumes (primarily to the United Kingdom). By 2025, this had reversed to a small deficit of −€67,780. While the deficit is negligible in absolute terms, the reversal signals that the EU is no longer a net exporter of these gases. The underlying cause is the near-total collapse of exports — which fell far faster and further than imports.


2. Brexit Reoriented the Geography of Trade

The most consequential structural shift in the CN 2705 market was the reconfiguration of trading partners, driven overwhelmingly by the United Kingdom's changing role.

2.1 The United Kingdom was the dominant partner on both sides of the trade

In 2015, the UK was by far the EU's largest partner for both imports and exports of coal gas:

Flow UK share in 2015 (value) UK value (EUR)
Imports 93.3% of total 5,469,854
Exports 99.7% of total 14,169,550

Source: Trade Dashboard — Partners

This extreme bilateral dependency is consistent with cross-border pipeline gas flows between the UK and EU member states (notably Italy and the Netherlands), which were recorded under this customs code.

2.2 UK trade collapsed after Brexit, with residual flows remaining

By 2025, imports from the UK stood at just €95,587 (−98.3% from 2015) and exports at €12,751 (−99.9%). The UK still accounted for 98.4% of remaining EU imports by value, indicating that whatever small trade persists is still predominantly bilateral with the UK. However, the scale is negligible.

The timing and magnitude of this collapse are consistent with the UK's departure from the EU customs union and single market, which disrupted the regulatory and logistical framework for such cross-border gas flows. Prior to Brexit, these flows may have been facilitated by shared infrastructure and harmonised customs procedures; afterwards, new trade barriers and the reclassification of flows likely contributed to the decline.

2.3 Secondary partners remain marginal; Italy emerged as the residual import hub

No other partner has replaced the UK's former role. Switzerland, once a notable import source (€415,208 in 2015), has fallen to just €18. Norway, the United States, and other partners have remained at trace levels.

Among EU member states (Top reporters), Italy dominates the remaining import activity:

Member State 2015 Imports (EUR) 2025 Imports (EUR) Change
Italy 5,432,397 3,484,167 −35.9%
Ireland 25,299 90,630 +258.2%
Denmark 418,784 169 −100.0%
France 667 1,563 +134.3%
Netherlands 9 379 +4,111.1%

Italy's relatively moderate decline (−35.9%) in contrast with the overall −98.3% drop suggests that Italy retained some structural demand for these gases — possibly linked to specific industrial applications or pipeline connections. Ireland and the Netherlands recorded high percentage increases, but from negligible bases.


3. Extreme Price Volatility and Emerging Market Concentration

Despite the overall contraction, the data reveals notable price dynamics and a consolidation of market concentration patterns.

3.1 Export unit prices rose by 3,756% — a composition effect, not a price boom

The mass-based export price surged from €250.49/t in 2015 to €9,658.33/t in 2025. This does not represent a genuine price increase; rather, it reflects the fact that only negligible volumes now trade, likely in highly specialised or bespoke transactions. The supplementary price (per 1,000 m³) actually declined by 25.3%, from €50.34 to €37.62 — confirming that the underlying gas price did not rise dramatically. The mass-based price increase is an artefact of the shift toward much lighter gas compositions in residual trade.

3.2 Two major price shocks were detected in UK-related trade

The volatility analysis identified two significant price shock events:

Event Flow Year Price shift Abnormality score
UK import price spike Imports 2020 +2,014% 111.5
UK export price spike Exports 2023 +459.8% 28.5

The 2020 import shock (abnormality score of 111.5) coincides with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the beginning of the UK's post-Brexit transition period. The dramatic surge in import unit prices during that year — with the UK accounting for 100% of the shock value — suggests severe disruption to the flow, with only residual, high-cost transactions being recorded. The 2023 export price shock may reflect the reclassification of flows or a final burst of UK-bound exports at elevated prices.

3.3 Export concentration collapsed while import concentration increased

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) provides insight into market structure:

Metric 2015 (first) 2025 (last) Change
Import HHI (value) 8,675 9,770 +12.6%
Export HHI (value) 9,934 3,469 −65.1%

Source: Trade Dashboard — Concentration

The import market became more concentrated (HHI approaching 10,000 = perfect monopoly), with Italy now accounting for virtually all remaining value. The export market, by contrast, saw concentration collapse from near-monopoly levels (9,934) to a moderate 3,469 — paradoxically reflecting not diversification but the fragmentation of a vanishing market among many small, irregular exporters.

3.4 Estonia shows high specialisation but negligible market weight

Among EU member states, specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals that Estonia has the highest Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA = 0.98, RCA = 107.0), indicating a very strong specialisation relative to its overall trade profile. However, Estonia accounts for only 0.36% of EU production in this category and 0.34% of total EU trade — making it a niche player rather than a market mover. The Netherlands (RSCA = 0.63, RCA = 4.35) shows moderate specialisation with a more meaningful share (14.5% of total EU trade). Large economies such as Germany (RSCA = −1.00), France (RSCA = −1.00), and Belgium (RSCA = −1.00) show no comparative advantage whatsoever, confirming that this product category is economically insignificant for most EU member states.


Conclusion

The EU's external trade in coal gas, water gas, producer gas, and similar gases (CN 2705) has undergone a dramatic and near-complete collapse between 2015 and 2025. What was once a market defined by large bilateral flows — predominantly between the EU and the United Kingdom — has shrunk to residual volumes with aggregate trade values below €200,000.

The primary driver of this contraction is the disruption of UK–EU gas trade, likely linked to Brexit and associated changes in customs classification and regulatory frameworks. Italy has emerged as the sole EU member state retaining any meaningful import activity, while exports have fragmented across multiple partners at negligible volumes.

The extreme divergence between mass-based and volume-based metrics suggests that the physical composition of traded gases has shifted toward lighter, lower-density mixtures. Price volatility has been pronounced in the UK-linked flows, with two major shocks detected in 2020 and 2023.

Overall, CN 2705 has transitioned from a commercially relevant trade category to a statistical residual — a product whose EU external trade is now confined to trace-level, specialised transactions. Any future policy or market analysis of EU energy trade can safely deprioritise this customs code in favour of more significant product categories.

Generated on 2026-08-07. Figures reflect Eurostat data at generation time and do not include later revisions.

Auto-generated: this report is meant to accelerate, but not to replace, human analysis.

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