Market evolution: Mineral waxes and petroleum jelly (CN 2712) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in products classified under Combined Nomenclature code 2712, encompassing petroleum jelly, paraffin wax, microcrystalline petroleum wax, slack wax, ozokerite, lignite wax, peat wax, and other mineral waxes. The analysis covers the period from 2015 to 2025 and draws exclusively on trade overview data for the EU as a reporting bloc trading with non-EU partners. Over this decade, the EU's trade position in CN 2712 deteriorated markedly: the trade deficit widened from approximately €96 million in 2015 to nearly €394 million in 2025 — a worsening of over 311%. This shift reflects a combination of declining export volumes, surging import volumes, and a dramatic reconfiguration of supplier relationships driven largely by geopolitical shocks.

1. A Widening Structural Deficit

The EU shifted from a modest to a substantial net importer

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the growing imbalance between EU imports and exports of CN 2712 products. In 2015, the EU already ran a trade deficit of about €96 million; by 2025, this had ballooned to €394 million. This was not simply a price effect — volumes tell the same story in starker terms.

The asymmetry is notable: while export values fell only modestly (−13.5%), export volumes dropped by 42.6%. This implies that EU exporters managed to raise unit prices significantly — from €1,319/t in 2015 to €1,987/t in 2025, a 50.6% increase — which partially cushioned the revenue impact of shrinking physical shipments. Import prices, by contrast, rose only 6.5% over the same period (€1,061/t → €1,130/t), suggesting that the EU's growing import bill was overwhelmingly volume-driven.

The deficit peaked during the 2022 energy crisis

The trade balance hit its widest point in 2022, reaching a deficit of approximately €629 million. This coincides with the global energy price spike triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which affected petroleum-derived products across the board. Both import values (peaking at €920 million) and import prices surged that year. The subsequent partial normalisation — the deficit narrowed to €394 million by 2025 — reflects a cooling of commodity prices rather than a structural correction.

2. Geopolitical Realignment of Supplier Relationships

Russia's collapse as an EU supplier was the defining structural shift

Perhaps the most consequential development in this market was the near-total disappearance of Russian supply. In 2015, Russia was the EU's second-largest import partner for CN 2712 by value, supplying approximately €92 million. By 2025, Russian imports had fallen to virtually zero (€2). This represents a 100% decline and was clearly driven by the EU sanctions regime imposed following 2022.

Partner-level import data show that the Russian decline was abrupt: imports from Russia fell sharply from 2022 onward, removing roughly €90–120 million of annual supply from the EU market virtually overnight. The loss of this supplier created a vacuum that other origins sought to fill.

China emerged as the dominant replacement supplier

China's share of EU CN 2712 imports grew from €67 million in 2015 to €170 million in 2025 — a 154.6% increase. At its peak (likely around 2022, when the maximum value reached €300 million), China had become the EU's single most important source. This rapid ascent reflects both China's existing refining and wax-processing capacity and its ability to redirect exports toward Europe as Russian supply was withdrawn. The volatility data show moderate variability in Chinese imports (coefficient of variation of 0.33), suggesting that while volumes grew, the pattern was relatively steady rather than erratic.

Several smaller origins gained prominence

Beyond China, several other suppliers expanded their presence:

The UK's dramatic increase is almost certainly a statistical artefact of Brexit: trade that was previously intra-EU became extra-EU trade recorded under CN 2712 after the UK's departure. Egypt's fivefold growth, by contrast, appears to reflect genuine market expansion — possibly linked to new refinery or wax production capacity in the region. However, Egyptian imports showed high volatility (CV of 0.72), indicating that this supply stream was not yet fully stable.

The large residual category of "countries and territories not specified for commercial or military reasons" declined from €244 million to €141 million, which likely reflects improved reporting transparency rather than a real trade shift.

Import concentration increased, reflecting supplier consolidation

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports rose from 1,386 to 1,765 over the period, confirming that the EU's import base became more concentrated. With Russia exiting, the remaining supply was channelled through fewer, larger origins — principally China and a handful of others. From a supply-security perspective, this increased concentration could represent a vulnerability, as the EU became more dependent on fewer partners.

3. Shifting Internal Dynamics and Market Volatility

EU member states diverged in their import and export trajectories

The EU is not a monolithic trader; internal dynamics varied considerably across member states. Germany remained the dominant EU exporter throughout the period, with export values relatively stable at €133–137 million. However, other member states saw pronounced declines:

The Netherlands' sharp decline is notable given its role as a major trading hub and its strong specialisation in CN 2712 (RCA of 2.14). Spain's growth, meanwhile, suggests it may be capturing market share lost by France and others. The specialisation data identify Greece (RSCA 0.52), Hungary (0.39), and the Netherlands (0.36) as the most specialised EU exporters, while Germany, despite being the largest absolute exporter, has only moderate specialisation (RSCA 0.10).

On the import side, Germany and Poland were the largest recipients, with Germany's imports growing 64% to €172 million and the Netherlands' imports surging 167% to €132 million. Poland's imports were more stable (+16.8%), suggesting it had a more established supply base.

Product-level data reveal divergent sub-market trajectories

The product segment breakdown shows that CN 2712 is not a homogeneous market. Three sub-categories behave quite differently:

Imports by sub-product (2025):

Petroleum jelly (271210) is a niche product by volume but commands the highest unit price (€2,651/t in 2025). Import volumes of petroleum jelly were small and relatively stable. The major volume growth occurred in 271220 (paraffin wax), where imports surged to nearly 300,000 tonnes in 2022 before settling at 237,000 tonnes in 2025 — well above the 2015 baseline of 138,000 tonnes. The 271290 category (other mineral waxes) remained the largest by volume, growing from 238,000 to 344,000 tonnes.

Exports by sub-product (2025):

Export volumes declined across all three sub-categories. The sharpest decline was in 271290, where volumes fell from 152,000 to 76,000 tonnes (−50%). This is the product group most directly affected by the loss of re-export or processing activity that may have depended on Russian feedstock.

The 2022 energy shock was a defining price event

The volatility and shock analysis identifies three significant price shocks, all centred on 2022:

The US export price shock is particularly significant given the United States' role as a major EU export destination (17.9% of export value). A near-150% price increase in a single year reflects the extraordinary energy market conditions of 2022, when crude oil and refined product prices spiked globally. These shocks were not sustained at their peak levels — prices subsequently retreated — but they left a lasting imprint on average unit values, which remained elevated through 2025 compared to pre-2022 norms.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in CN 2712 products over 2015–2025 was shaped by three overriding forces: a structural widening of the trade deficit driven by rising import volumes and falling export volumes; a dramatic geopolitical realignment of supplier relationships following Russia's exclusion from the EU market; and the acute price shock of the 2022 energy crisis. The net result is an EU that is more reliant on extra-EU supply — particularly from China — while its own export capacity has diminished. Export prices have risen, but not enough to offset the volume decline. The increased import concentration (HHI rising to 1,765) suggests reduced supplier diversification, which may warrant attention from a supply-security perspective. Looking ahead, the key variables to watch include the stability of Chinese supply, the potential for new sources (such as Egypt) to scale, and whether EU exporters can recover lost volumes in an increasingly competitive global market.