Market evolution: Sub-bituminous coal (CN 270119) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU-27 external trade in CN 270119 — a residual coal category covering sub-bituminous coal and lignite, excluding anthracite and bituminous coal — over the period 2015–2025. The decade under review spans two fundamentally different coal market regimes: a pre-2022 period of gradual decline driven by decarbonisation policies, and the acute disruption triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent EU embargo on Russian coal. Over this period, EU import volumes fell by 70.4% (from 36.1 million tonnes to 10.7 million tonnes), while the unit import price more than doubled (+106.0%). Three main dynamics emerge from the data: (i) a structural contraction in demand, punctuated by the 2022 price spike; (ii) a radical reconfiguration of supplier origins following the Russian coal embargo; and (iii) rising market concentration and price volatility as the trade shrank to a smaller, less diversified base.

1. A Structural Decline Punctuated by a 2022 Spike

Import volumes contracted steadily, with no sign of recovery

EU imports of sub-bituminous coal followed a pronounced downward trajectory over the decade. Import quantity fell from 36.1 million tonnes in 2015 to just 10.7 million tonnes in 2025, a decline of 70.4%. Notably, the first year of the series (2015) and the last year (2025) correspond to the maximum and minimum import volumes respectively, suggesting a broadly monotonic decline without significant intermediate recovery. This reflects the EU's progressive coal phase-out in power generation, driven by national coal exit plans, rising carbon prices under the EU ETS, and the rapid expansion of renewable energy capacity.

The 2022 energy crisis produced an extraordinary value spike

Despite the long-term volume decline, EU import value surged to a peak of approximately €7.51 billion during the 2022 energy crisis — more than triple the 2015 level and far above any other year in the series. This was driven by an extraordinary surge in global coal prices as European utilities scrambled to replace Russian natural gas with coal-fired generation, even as the EU simultaneously banned Russian coal imports from August 2022. The peak import unit price reached €269.71/t, more than four times the 2015 level of €61.95/t. By 2025, prices had retreated to €127.61/t — still roughly double the pre-crisis norm — and volumes had fallen to their lowest point in the series, confirming that the 2022 spike was a temporary shock within a longer structural decline.

The trade deficit narrowed substantially as imports collapsed faster than exports

The EU's trade deficit in this product improved from −€2.08 billion in 2015 to −€1.12 billion in 2025 (a 46.1% narrowing). While export values also rose (+56.7% to €243.8 million), this was almost entirely a price effect: export volumes fell slightly from 1.45 to 1.36 million tonnes (−6.1%). The narrowing of the deficit thus overwhelmingly reflects the import contraction rather than any export competitiveness gain.

2. A Radically Reconfigured Supplier Map

Russia rose to dominance and then vanished from the EU supply base

The most dramatic partner-level story is that of Russia. Russian sub-bituminous coal exports to the EU grew from €527.6 million in 2015 to a peak of €1.58 billion — the last year of significant bilateral trade before the EU's coal embargo took full effect. Russia's low coefficient of variation (0.20) confirms that this was a stable, high-volume relationship over many years. The embargo forced a rapid and complete reorientation of EU supply chains.

Last recorded value corresponds to the final year of bilateral trade before the embargo.

New and emerging suppliers filled the gap with varying degrees of reliability

Several supply relationships exhibited extreme volatility, reflecting their opportunistic or episodic nature:

• Kazakhstan emerged from near-zero imports (€30,271 in 2015) to a peak of €510.9 million, though with the highest volatility of any major partner (CV = 1.27). This reflects both the genuine redirection of Kazakh coal westward and the transit of Russian-origin coal through Central Asian routes.
• Australia grew from €201.6 million to €608.8 million (+202.0%), with a relatively low volatility (CV = 0.35), making it one of the more reliable alternative suppliers. However, an anomalous import price shock in 2017 (price shift of +97.3%, abnormality score 120.5) disrupted this relationship temporarily.
• Indonesia effectively exited the EU market, falling from €220.1 million to under €1,000 (−100%), with the highest volatility among historically significant partners (CV = 0.82).
• United States imports collapsed by 85.7%, from €454.2 million to €64.8 million, despite the transatlantic LNG and coal surge of 2022, suggesting that US sub-bituminous coal was not competitive on a sustained basis in the European market.

EU member states bore the import contraction unevenly

Among importing member states, the Netherlands remained the largest importer throughout the period (from €1.37 billion to €741.9 million, −45.7%), benefiting from its port infrastructure and role as a coal transit hub. Spain, by contrast, virtually exited the market (−95.1%, from €283.0 million to €13.9 million), consistent with its accelerated coal plant closures. Poland stands out with a 278.7% increase (from €63.4 million to €240.3 million) and a peak of €2.66 billion in 2022, reflecting its continued reliance on coal for power generation and its post-2022 need to source non-Russian supplies.

3. Rising Prices, Concentration, and Volatility

Unit prices more than doubled and remain elevated

The EU's import unit price rose from €61.95/t in 2015 to €127.61/t in 2025 (+106.0%), peaking at €269.71/t in the crisis year. Even after the 2022 spike subsided, prices settled at roughly double the pre-crisis level. Export prices followed a parallel trajectory, rising from €107.47/t to €179.33/t (+66.9%), with a peak of €272.98/t. The persistent elevation of post-crisis prices above pre-2022 norms reflects structural factors: longer shipping routes (replacing Russian seaborne supply with Australian, Colombian, and Kazakh origins), the loss of Russia's price-competitive supply, and a general repricing of fossil-fuel energy in a tighter global market.

Market concentration rose sharply on both the import and export sides

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value increased from 1,986 to 3,167 (+59.5%), crossing from a moderately concentrated market into a highly concentrated one. The volume-based HHI tells a similar story, rising from 2,042 to 2,945 (+44.2%). This reflects the exit of several previously important suppliers (Indonesia, the US, South Africa) and the growing weight of fewer remaining partners.

Export concentration also increased significantly, with the Netherlands accounting for 57.3% of EU sub-bituminous coal exports and Poland a further 23.6% in 2025, as shown by the specialisation data. Both countries exhibit strong revealed comparative advantage (RSCA of 0.60 and 0.56 respectively), underlining the extreme concentration of EU export capacity.

Volatility is highest among opportunistic and newly established supply routes

The coefficient of variation of import values reveals a clear pattern: established, pipeline-like suppliers such as Russia (CV = 0.20) and Kyrgyzstan (CV = 0.22) showed the lowest volatility, while newly emerging or episodic suppliers such as Kazakhstan (CV = 1.27), Indonesia (CV = 0.82), and South Africa (CV = 0.67) were far more erratic. On the export side, Morocco (CV = 1.85) and Egypt (CV = 1.57) were the most volatile destinations, while the United Kingdom (CV = 0.42) and Iceland (CV = 0.36) offered more stable demand. Notably, a supply shock to Türkiye in 2017 (−100% shift) and a price shock on Moroccan exports in 2022 (+417.8% price shift) illustrate how thinner market segments are prone to abrupt disruptions.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in sub-bituminous coal (CN 270119) over 2015–2025 tells a story of structural decline overlaid with acute crisis-driven disruption. Import volumes fell by over 70%, consistent with the EU's broader coal phase-out trajectory. The 2022 energy crisis produced an exceptional but temporary spike in both volumes and values, after which the market resumed its contraction — reaching its lowest recorded import volume in 2025. The supplier landscape was fundamentally reshaped by the EU's embargo on Russian coal: long-established relationships with Russia, Indonesia, and the United States gave way to a smaller, more concentrated set of suppliers, with Australia and Kazakhstan gaining relative importance. This restructuring came at a cost: market concentration (HHI) rose sharply, and the unit import price in 2025 remained roughly double the pre-crisis level. With EU coal consumption continuing to decline and no PRODCOM production data available for this residual code, the remaining trade in this product is likely to shrink further, becoming an increasingly niche and concentrated segment of European energy commodity flows.