Market evolution: Arms and ammunition (CN 93) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of EU trade in arms and ammunition (Customs heading 93) over the 2015–2025 period. The product category encompasses military weapons, revolvers and pistols, sporting firearms, spring/air/gas guns, parts and accessories, ammunition, and edged weapons. The decade witnessed a fundamental transformation of the EU's position in global arms trade, driven primarily by the security reconfiguration following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While the EU maintained a structural trade surplus throughout the period, the nature and magnitude of flows shifted dramatically, reshaping partner relationships, production dynamics, and the EU's strategic posture in defence markets.
I. A structural shift: from net exporter to import-driven market
EU trade surplus has narrowed despite strong export growth
The EU's overall trade performance in arms and ammunition over the 2015–2025 period reveals a paradoxical trend: both exports and imports surged, but imports grew far more rapidly, eroding the EU's trade surplus.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exports (value, EUR) | 3.07 B | 7.54 B | +145.7% |
| Imports (value, EUR) | 0.85 B | 6.04 B | +610.7% |
| Trade balance (EUR) | 2.22 B | 1.50 B | −32.4% |
The EU's trade surplus, which stood at €2.22 billion in 2015, contracted to €1.50 billion by 2025 — a decline of 32.4%. This narrowing occurred despite export values more than doubling. The principal driver was a sevenfold increase in import values, which rose from €850 million to over €6 billion.
Rising unit prices amplified the value surge beyond volume growth
A closer look at volume and price dynamics shows that the explosive growth in trade values was partly a price phenomenon:
| Flow | Volume change | Price change (EUR/t) | Value change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exports | +30.0% | +89.3% | +145.7% |
| Imports | +93.7% | +267.4% | +610.7% |
Export volumes grew from approximately 98,700 tonnes in 2015 to 128,400 tonnes in 2025 (+30%), but average export prices rose from €31,034/t to €58,751/t (+89.3%). On the import side, the divergence is even starker: volumes nearly doubled (+93.7%), while unit prices more than tripled from €15,668/t to €57,571/t (+267.4%). This price inflation reflects both the shift toward higher-value military systems (such as heavy weapons and missile systems) and general inflationary pressures in defence supply chains.
The 2022 inflection point marks the onset of the Ukraine war effect
The data reveals a clear structural break around 2022. EU imports of arms and ammunition, which had fluctuated between €0.85 billion and €1.2 billion during 2015–2021, began accelerating sharply from 2022 onward, reaching €6.04 billion by 2025. This aligns directly with the security reassessment triggered by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which prompted EU member states to dramatically increase defence procurement — both for domestic rearmament and for transfers to Ukraine.
II. Geopolitical reorientation of partner relationships
Ukraine became the EU's primary arms export destination by a wide margin
The most dramatic shift in EU export partner relationships was the emergence of Ukraine as the dominant destination:
| Export partner | 2015 (EUR) | 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | 5.1 M | 2,341 M | +46,039% |
| Countries not specified* | 727 M | 2,533 M | +249% |
| United States | 928 M | 1,210 M | +30% |
| United Kingdom | 132 M | 180 M | +36% |
| Saudi Arabia | 162 M | 48 M | −70% |
| Türkiye | 27 M | 138 M | +416% |
For commercial or military reasons in extra-Union trade.
Ukraine went from a marginal €5 million in EU arms exports in 2015 to €2.34 billion in 2025 — an increase of over 46,000%. This single destination accounted for roughly 31% of total EU arms exports in 2025. Meanwhile, traditional Middle Eastern customers like Saudi Arabia saw their share decline significantly (−70%).
South Korea and India emerged as dominant new import suppliers
The composition of EU import partners underwent an equally dramatic transformation:
| Import partner | 2015 (EUR) | 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Korea, Republic of | 14 M | 1,821 M | +12,822% |
| Countries not specified* | 171 M | 1,095 M | +542% |
| United States | 190 M | 974 M | +413% |
| Türkiye | 48 M | 608 M | +1,171% |
| India | 6 M | 232 M | +3,567% |
| United Kingdom | 41 M | 158 M | +284% |
For commercial or military reasons in extra-Union trade.
South Korea's surge to become the EU's largest single identifiable import source (€1.82 billion, up from €14 million) is particularly noteworthy. This likely reflects large-scale procurement of Korean defence systems — such as K2 tanks and K9 howitzers — by EU member states (notably Poland). India's 3,567% increase to €232 million similarly suggests growing defence-industrial ties. The large "not specified" category (€1.1 billion) underscores the opacity inherent in military trade reporting.
Central European states became the EU's main import gateways and export platforms
A striking feature of intra-EU reporter dynamics is the rise of Poland, Czechia, and Romania as major actors:
| Reporter | Imports 2015 | Imports 2025 | Change | Exports 2015 | Exports 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Poland | 83 M | 2,343 M | +2,712% | 74 M | 1,284 M | +1,638% |
| Czechia | 22 M | 718 M | +3,152% | — | — | — |
| Romania | 5 M | 234 M | +4,235% | 81 M | 406 M | +400% |
| Sweden | 83 M | 340 M | +308% | 171 M | 618 M | +262% |
| Italy | 150 M | 289 M | +93% | 803 M | 1,518 M | +89% |
Poland's transformation is the most dramatic: it became the EU's largest importer of arms and ammunition (€2.34 billion in 2025) while simultaneously growing into a major exporter (€1.28 billion). This dual role reflects Poland's position as both a frontline NATO state undergoing rapid rearmament and a transit/production hub for defence material destined for Ukraine. Czechia's 3,152% import surge and Romania's 4,235% increase follow a similar pattern of NATO eastern flank build-up.
III. Market concentration, production shifts, and structural vulnerabilities
Import concentration has intensified, raising strategic dependency concerns
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) reveals increasing market concentration, particularly on the import side:
| Flow | HHI (value) 2015 | HHI (value) 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imports | 1,345 | 2,070 | +53.9% |
| Exports | 2,444 | 2,852 | +16.7% |
The import HHI rose by 54%, moving from a moderately concentrated market into a more concentrated regime. This reflects the growing dominance of a small number of suppliers — notably South Korea, the United States, and the "not specified" category — in EU import flows. The EU's net import reliance worsened from −11.6% in 2015 to −28.0% in 2025 (negative values indicate a surplus), meaning the EU's export surplus as a share of total trade has diminished. The EU remains a net exporter, but its relative self-sufficiency in arms and ammunition has declined.
Ammunition and military weapons drove the product-level transformation
The product segment breakdown reveals which sub-categories accounted for the overall market evolution:
Imports by product heading (EUR, selected years):
| Heading | Description | 2015 | 2021 | 2025 | 2015–25 change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9306 | Ammunition, bombs, missiles, etc. | 262 M | 332 M | 2,403 M | +817% |
| 9304 | Spring/air/gas guns, truncheons | 80 M | 121 M | 904 M | +1,025% |
| 9301 | Military weapons | 15 M | 39 M | 1,150 M | +7,433% |
| 9305 | Parts and accessories | 134 M | 281 M | 334 M | +150% |
| 9303 | Sporting firearms, etc. | 52 M | 70 M | 85 M | +63% |
Military weapons (9301) imports surged by over 7,400%, from €15 million to €1.15 billion, reflecting large-scale procurement of heavy weapons systems. Ammunition (9306) remained the largest single import category and grew by 817% to €2.4 billion. On the export side, ammunition similarly dominated, with 9306 exports reaching €2.76 billion in 2025 (up from €491 million in 2015). Military weapons exports also grew substantially, reaching €391 million from €66 million.
Production volumes surged while the EU maintained concentrated export specialisation
EU production data shows a remarkable expansion in output volume, rising from 1.46 million items in 2015 to 1.21 billion items in 2025 — a staggering increase that suggests a massive ramp-up in ammunition production capacity. Production value grew more modestly, from €3.90 billion to €4.42 billion (+13.5%), indicating that much of the volume increase was in lower unit-value items (likely small-calibre ammunition).
The specialisation analysis for 2025 highlights which EU members have the strongest comparative advantage in arms production:
| Member state | RSCA | RCA | Share of national exports |
|---|---|---|---|
| Slovakia | 0.90 | 19.63 | 41.5% |
| Czechia | 0.57 | 3.65 | 17.5% |
| Finland | 0.43 | 2.49 | 2.5% |
| Croatia | 0.35 | 2.06 | 0.8% |
| Spain | 0.28 | 1.79 | 10.4% |
Slovakia stands out with an exceptionally high revealed comparative advantage (RCA of 19.63), meaning arms and ammunition represent a massively disproportionate share of its exports relative to the EU average. Czechia and Finland also show significant specialisation. By contrast, Ireland (RCA 0.0) and several smaller member states show no meaningful arms export activity.
Conclusion
The 2015–2025 period marks a watershed in EU arms and ammunition trade. The data tells a clear story of geopolitical shock translating into market transformation: Russia's invasion of Ukraine triggered a massive surge in both EU defence procurement (imports up 611%) and arms transfers to Ukraine (exports to Ukraine up 46,039%). While the EU retained a trade surplus, its relative self-sufficiency declined as import growth far outpaced export growth. The market became more concentrated on the import side, with South Korea emerging as the single largest external supplier — a development that raises questions about long-term strategic dependency. Central European states, particularly Poland, became critical nodes in the European defence supply chain, serving simultaneously as major importers, exporters, and likely transit points for material destined for Ukraine. The massive expansion of production volumes suggests a deliberate effort to rebuild industrial capacity, particularly for ammunition, though value growth has been more modest. Looking ahead, the sustainability of these elevated trade levels will depend on the trajectory of the Ukraine conflict, the implementation of EU defence industrial strategy, and the ability of European producers to reduce reliance on non-EU suppliers for critical military systems.