Market evolution: Rapeseed oil (CN 1514) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in rapeseed, colza, and mustard oils (customs code 1514) over the period 2015–2025. The product scope encompasses crude and refined oils from low- and high-erucic-acid rapeseed as well as mustard oil, but excludes chemically modified fractions. The analysis relies on annual trade data between the EU and non-EU countries, covering value (EUR), volume (net tonnes), and derived unit prices. The period under review was shaped by several transformative forces — the EU's green-energy ambitions (notably biodiesel mandates), the COVID-19 pandemic, and the geopolitical shock of Russia's invasion of Ukraine — all of which left deep marks on the rapeseed oil market.

Over the decade, EU imports of rapeseed oil grew by 133.8% in value (from €229 million to €535 million) and by 42.8% in volume (from 344,698 t to 492,353 t). Exports also rose, though more modestly: +77.0% in value (from €351 million to €622 million) and +17.7% in volume (from 437,957 t to 515,585 t). The EU thus remained a net exporter throughout most of the period, but its surplus narrowed from €122 million in 2015 to €87 million in 2025, having briefly turned negative during the 2022 energy crisis.

1. The post-2020 commodity super-cycle: soaring prices and volume adjustments

1.1 A prolonged price escalation culminating in a 2022 spike

The most striking feature of the decade is the dramatic rise in unit prices. EU export prices for rapeseed oil increased by 49.3% overall, from €802/t in 2015 to €1,197/t in 2025. Import prices rose even faster (+63.7%), climbing from €664/t to €1,086/t. The trajectory, however, was far from linear: prices accelerated sharply in 2021–2022 before partially correcting in 2023.

The 2022 peak was driven by the confluence of global supply disruptions — droughts in key growing regions, the pandemic's logistics aftershocks, and the energy crisis triggered by the Russia–Ukraine war, which lifted vegetable oil prices across the board as biofuel demand intensified and input costs surged. A price shock event centred on 2021–2022 pushed Ukraine import prices up by 67.9% with a statistical abnormality score of 80.9, confirming that the price surge was exceptional by historical standards.

1.2 Volume responses: imports surged while exports stagnated

Price signals altered trade flows. Export volumes remained volatile but barely grew overall (+17.7%), suggesting that EU producers faced rising domestic demand (from biodiesel blending mandates, among other factors) that competed with export availability. Import volumes, by contrast, expanded by 42.8%, reflecting the EU's structural need to supplement domestic rapeseed oil production with external supply. The year 2022 was a particular inflection point: import volume reached its peak of 494,818 t while the trade balance briefly flipped into deficit at -4.7% net import reliance, before recovering to -6.5% (net exporter status) by 2025.

1.3 Domestic production tripled, but not enough to match demand

EU domestic production of rapeseed oil grew spectacularly — from 3.06 billion kg in 2015 to 9.31 billion kg in 2025, a 204.5% increase in quantity and 272.7% in value (to €6.5 billion). This expansion, likely fuelled by investments in crushing capacity and the Renewable Energy Directive's increasing biofuel blending targets, underscores rapeseed oil's strategic importance. Yet even this tripling was insufficient to eliminate the EU's reliance on imports, as trade intensity — the ratio of trade to production — more than doubled from 7.7% to 16.2%.

2. A radical reconfiguration of the EU's supplier base

2.1 The collapse of Russian and Belarusian supply

The most dramatic structural shift in EU rapeseed oil imports was the near-total elimination of Russian and Belarusian suppliers. In 2015, Russia supplied €59.6 million and Belarus €39.1 million of EU rapeseed oil imports; by 2025, these figures had collapsed to €3.2 million (-94.6%) and €10.7 million (-72.5%) respectively. This decline accelerated sharply after 2021, coinciding with EU sanctions imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The combined loss of these two suppliers — which at their peak together represented over €300 million in annual trade — created a supply vacuum that other origins rushed to fill.

2.2 Ukraine's meteoric rise and its risks

Ukraine emerged as the most significant beneficiary of this reshuffling. EU imports from Ukraine surged from €55 million in 2015 to €321 million in 2025 — a 483% increase — making Ukraine the EU's single largest external supplier by value, accounting for nearly 60% of total import value. The EU's autonomous trade measures for Ukraine, which liberalised market access after 2022, amplified this trend. However, this concentration carries significant vulnerability: the import Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) climbed from 2,310 in 2015 to 3,977 in 2025 (+72.2%), moving well above the 2,500 threshold commonly associated with a highly concentrated market.

2.3 Canada as a strategic alternative supplier

Canada filled part of the supply gap left by sanctioned origins. EU imports from Canada grew explosively from €3.1 million in 2015 to €91.9 million in 2025 (+2,850%), making Canada the EU's third-largest supplier. Nevertheless, Canadian trade has been highly volatile (coefficient of variation: 1.82), reflecting the long supply chain and Canada's own competing domestic demand for biodiesel feedstock. Other smaller suppliers — Serbia (+106%), and even distant origins like Australia and Uruguay — saw sporadic increases, but none approached the scale needed to offset the Russia–Belarus withdrawal.

2.4 Shifts in EU export destinations: Norway and Israel displace China

On the export side, the EU's main destination also evolved. Norway became the dominant customer, with exports rising from €83 million to €247 million (+199%), while Israel grew from €24 million to €88 million (+264%). Meanwhile, exports to China declined from €61 million to €38 million (-37.6%), despite a 2017 price shock that briefly inflated bilateral trade values. The export HHI increased more moderately (+33.5%), from 1,748 to 2,333, indicating a somewhat more concentrated — but not yet highly concentrated — export base.

3. Internal EU realignment: production specialisation and shifting member-state roles

3.1 Production concentrated in northern and central Europe

Within the EU, rapeseed oil production and trade specialisation varies sharply across member states. In 2025, the most specialised exporters (measured by the Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage, RSCA) were Estonia (0.58), France (0.38), Denmark (0.38), Czechia (0.28), and Romania (0.24). France alone accounted for 17.6% of EU production, reflecting its large arable base and well-developed crushing infrastructure. At the other end, Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece, Italy, and Spain displayed strong negative specialisation (RSCA below -0.87), indicating they are net importers or negligible producers of rapeseed oil.

3.2 The Netherlands and Belgium emerged as import hubs

The role of individual member states as import gateways shifted markedly. In 2025, the largest importers by value within the EU were Poland (€71 million), the Netherlands (€106 million), and Belgium (€78 million). The Netherlands' import growth of over 1,000% — from €9.4 million to €106 million — is consistent with its role as Europe's primary oilseed trading hub (Rotterdam). Spain also became a major importer (€86 million in 2025, from virtually zero in 2015), likely reflecting its expanding biodiesel sector. Conversely, the Baltic states — Lithuania and Latvia — saw their import roles diminish sharply (down 84% and 88% respectively), as the Russia–Belarus supply routes they once facilitated were severed.

3.3 Product mix: crude low-erucic oil dominates, but refined fractions gaining ground

The product breakdown reveals that crude low-erucic-acid rapeseed oil (CN 151411) remained the dominant traded product, accounting for 77% of import volume and 55% of export volume in 2025. However, the refined low-erucic fraction (CN 151419) grew as an export category: its volume rose from 163,841 t to 226,710 t (+38%) and its value share in exports reached 48% in 2025, suggesting that the EU increasingly exports processed (higher value-added) rapeseed oil rather than crude. High-erucic-acid oils (CN 151491 and 151499) remain niche products with highly volatile trade patterns, consistent with their specialised industrial applications.

Conclusion

The EU rapeseed oil market over 2015–2025 underwent a profound transformation driven by three overlapping forces: the global commodity price cycle, the green-energy transition, and the geopolitical rupture of the Russia–Ukraine war. Despite a tripling of domestic production, the EU could not keep pace with demand — fuelled largely by biodiesel blending mandates — and became more, not less, reliant on imports. The supplier landscape was completely redrawn: Russia and Belarus were effectively sanctioned out of the market, while Ukraine surged to dominance, now supplying nearly 60% of import value. This concentration, reflected in an HHI approaching 4,000, represents a significant strategic vulnerability.

Prices, after the extraordinary spike of 2022, have partially normalised but remain structurally above pre-2020 levels. The EU's trade surplus, while still positive, narrowed considerably and briefly turned negative in 2022. Looking ahead, the sustainability of Ukraine as a dominant supplier will depend on the continuation of trade preferences, the evolution of the conflict, and Ukraine's own agricultural capacity. The EU's pursuit of renewable fuel targets will continue to underpin demand, making rapeseed oil a commodity of growing strategic importance — and one where supply-chain diversification will be increasingly critical.