Market evolution: Rapeseed oil (CN 151499) — 2015–2025

Introduction

CN 151499 covers high erucic acid rape or colza oil (HEAR oil) and mustard oil — refined or fractionated, but not chemically modified and excluding crude oil. This niche product within the broader rapeseed oil heading (CN 1514) serves both industrial applications (lubricants, slip agents, plasticizers) and limited food-related uses. It bundles two sub-categories: CN 15149910 for technical/industrial uses and CN 15149990 for other purposes (full product definition).

Over the 2015–2025 period, EU trade in HEAR oil underwent a profound transformation. The Union's trade surplus of €13.8 million in 2015 eroded to a marginal deficit of €112 thousand by 2025, driven by a 65.7% collapse in export volumes alongside a 26.8% rise in import volumes. This report identifies three principal dynamics behind this shift: the structural erosion of the EU's export position, a dramatic boom-and-bust cycle concentrated in the technical segment, and a fundamental reorientation of trade partnerships toward new suppliers.

1. From Net Exporter to Near Parity: A Decade of Trade Balance Erosion

1.1 Export volumes fell far more steeply than import volumes grew

The headline trend is unmistakable. Over the decade, EU exports of HEAR oil fell from 16,063 tonnes and €20.5 million in 2015 to just 5,510 tonnes and €12.3 million in 2025 — a decline of 65.7% in volume and 40.2% in value. Over the same period, imports rose from 5,108 tonnes (€6.8 million) to 6,478 tonnes (€12.4 million), an increase of 26.8% in volume and 83.2% in value. The result was a near-complete reversal of the EU's trade position:

Notably, unit prices rose substantially on both sides — export prices by 74.3% and import prices by 44.4% — meaning that the value decline on the export side was moderated by higher prices, while the import value increase was amplified by them.

1.2 Domestic production expanded even as exports declined

Paradoxically, EU production of HEAR oil grew substantially over the same period. Output rose from 3.06 million tonnes valued at €1,746 million in 2015 to 3.59 million tonnes valued at €2,990 million in 2025 — a volume increase of 17.4% and a value increase of 71.2%. This confirms that the export decline was not caused by a contraction in domestic supply. Rather, the additional production was absorbed by the domestic market or redirected within the EU, while external demand for EU-origin HEAR oil weakened.

Germany dominates EU production, accounting for 47.7% of output value in 2025, followed by a long tail of smaller producers. Among them, Croatia, Lithuania, and Finland stand out as the most specialised in this product (RSCA of 0.72, 0.68, and 0.63 respectively), while Germany's specialisation is more moderate (RSCA 0.38) given its diversified industrial base.

1.3 The EU crossed into net-import territory for the first time in 2025

Despite the dramatic trade balance shift, HEAR oil trade remains small relative to total EU production. Trade intensity rose from 7.7% to 12.0% over the decade, and export propensity increased from 6.6% to 10.9%, indicating that external trade became somewhat more important relative to output. The net import reliance remained negative throughout (indicating net exporter status relative to production), deepening from −5.6% to −10.7%. Yet in absolute trade-flow terms, 2025 marked the first year in which imports marginally exceeded exports — a symbolic threshold that underscores the structural nature of the shift.

2. Volatile Cycles: The Industrial Segment Boom, the 2022 Price Shock, and the Aftermath

2.1 The technical segment drove a spectacular but short-lived export surge

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the explosive growth and subsequent collapse of exports in the technical/industrial sub-segment (CN 15149910). This product surged from just 93 tonnes in 2015 to a peak of 63,397 tonnes (€48.0 million) in 2020, before collapsing to 76 tonnes in 2021 and remaining negligible thereafter (117 tonnes in 2025). Meanwhile, the non-technical segment (CN 15149990) followed a different trajectory, peaking at 76,078 tonnes in 2021 before declining to 5,393 tonnes by 2025.

The technical segment boom likely reflected surging industrial demand for HEAR oil as a feedstock for erucamide (a slip agent in plastics manufacturing) and specialty lubricants. The 2019–2020 timing coincides with pandemic-era disruptions that may have triggered stockpiling or supply-chain restructuring. The abrupt collapse in 2021 — from over 63,000 tonnes to under 100 — suggests this was a one-off demand event rather than a structural shift. The product segment breakdown confirms that by 2025, both sub-segments have returned to historically low volumes.

2.2 Prices surged from 2021 onward, masking volume declines

EU export prices hit a cyclical low of €817 per tonne in 2020 — dragged down by the large volume of lower-priced technical oil exported that year — before surging to €2,269 per tonne in 2022 and remaining elevated at €2,228 per tonne in 2025. Import prices followed a similar trajectory, rising from a trough of approximately €1,024 per tonne in 2018 to over €1,900 per tonne by 2025.

The price surge temporarily inflated trade values despite collapsing volumes. The EU exported a total of €75.0 million worth of HEAR oil in 2021 — the highest value in the entire dataset — even though the technical segment had essentially vanished. This was possible because the non-technical segment exported 76,078 tonnes at rising prices (€983/t). Similarly, the €44.3 million exported in 2022 reflected just 19,538 tonnes at much higher unit prices (€2,269/t).

2.3 The 2022 price shock marked an inflection point for EU export markets

The year 2022 stands out as a major price shock event. The data identifies three abnormal export price spikes, all centred on 2022:

These shocks are consistent with the broader commodity price spike that followed Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. For China, the +328% price shift is particularly striking, reflecting what was likely a one-off surge in demand or a supply squeeze. Norway and the United Kingdom — both long-standing EU export markets — experienced smaller but still significant price anomalies.

Volatility analysis shows that partner-level volatility varies enormously. Japan was the most stable export market (coefficient of variation of 0.15), while China (CV 1.79) and Malaysia (CV 1.93) were the most volatile. On the import side, trade with Norway was exceptionally volatile (CV 3.30), while the UK was more predictable (CV 0.50).

3. Shifting Geographies: Ukraine's Rise and the Decline of Traditional Partners

3.1 Ukraine emerged as the EU's dominant import source

The most dramatic geographic shift occurred on the import side. Ukraine went from a marginal supplier (€553 thousand in 2015) to the EU's largest import partner by value (€7.7 million in 2025) — an increase of 1,284%. India and Bangladesh also emerged as significant new suppliers, both growing from approximately €19 thousand in 2015 to €924 thousand and €669 thousand respectively by 2025. Norway, which peaked at €3.3 million in imports at some point during the decade, had returned to negligible levels by 2025.

Ukraine's rise likely reflects the country's expanding rapeseed crushing industry and growing integration with EU supply chains, facilitated by the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The emergence of India and Bangladesh as suppliers, though from very low bases, points to a broader diversification of the EU's sourcing away from its traditional European partners.

3.2 The United Kingdom's role diminished on both sides of the balance

The UK was the EU's top import partner (€6.0 million) and third-largest export market (€4.4 million) in 2015. By 2025, imports from the UK had fallen to €3.0 million (−50.6%) and exports to the UK to €1.0 million (−76.6%). This bilateral decline, which accelerated after 2020, likely reflects post-Brexit trade friction and the UK's growing sourcing from alternative suppliers.

On the export side, other traditional markets also contracted. Norway (the EU's largest export destination in 2015 at €2.9 million) saw exports decline 53% to €1.4 million, while the United States fell a similar 53% (from €6.0 million to €2.8 million). By contrast, Japan proved remarkably stable — growing 22.3% from €2.2 million to €2.7 million — and Switzerland held steady at approximately €690 thousand.

3.3 Within the EU, the Netherlands consolidated its role as the primary import hub

The internal redistribution of trade among EU member states was equally striking. The Netherlands surged from €618 thousand in imports from non-EU countries (2015) to €7.2 million (2025), becoming the dominant EU import gateway — most likely reflecting the role of Rotterdam as a logistics hub for Ukrainian and other third-country supplies. Conversely, Belgium's imports collapsed from €2.9 million to just €75 thousand (−97.4%), and Sweden's fell from €923 thousand to €47 thousand (−94.9%). Italy emerged as a notable importer (from €108 thousand to €675 thousand), and Ireland grew moderately (from €1.3 million to €2.5 million).

On the export side, the Netherlands remained the largest EU exporter but declined from €11.6 million to €5.2 million (−55%). Belgium (from €269 thousand to €1.4 million, +433%) and Denmark (from €133 thousand to €1.2 million, +818%) grew substantially, while France (−80%) and Poland (−78%) saw steep declines.

3.4 Import sourcing diversified substantially

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU imports dropped from 7,951 to 4,472 (−43.8%), indicating a substantial diversification of import sources. In 2015, the UK alone accounted for the vast majority of third-country imports; by 2025, Ukraine, the UK, India, and Bangladesh shared the market more evenly. Export concentration also declined, but more modestly (HHI from 1,745 to 1,412, −19.1%), reflecting the already broader set of export destinations the EU has historically served. This diversification reduced the EU's dependence on any single import partner, though Ukraine's growing share may eventually re-concentrate sourcing if current trends continue.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in high erucic acid rapeseed oil (CN 151499) underwent a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. The Union moved from a comfortable net exporter with a €13.8 million trade surplus to a marginal net importer — a shift driven not by production decline (which grew 17% in volume and 71% in value) but by a 66% collapse in export volumes and an 83% rise in import values.

Three dynamics defined this evolution. First, the spectacular boom and bust of the technical/industrial segment (CN 15149910) — which surged from 93 tonnes to over 63,000 tonnes of exports between 2015 and 2020 before virtually disappearing — introduced extreme volatility into the trade picture and temporarily inflated both volumes and values. Second, the 2022 commodity price shock, linked to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, sent export prices soaring to over €2,200 per tonne and temporarily masked the underlying volume decline. Third, a profound geographic reorientation took place: Ukraine emerged as the EU's dominant import source (from €553 thousand to €7.7 million), the UK's role eroded on both sides of the balance, and the Netherlands consolidated its position as the EU's primary import gateway.

Looking ahead, the EU's large and growing domestic production base (now valued at nearly €3 billion) provides a solid foundation. However, the near-disappearance of external export markets for the industrial segment, the increasing reliance on Ukrainian supply, and the elevated price environment warrant continued monitoring. The extreme volatility observed across multiple partners — with coefficients of variation exceeding 1.0 for several key relationships — underscores that this remains a niche, shock-prone market despite its relatively small trade footprint.