Market evolution: Aluminium sheets (CN 7606) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU external trade in aluminium plates, sheets and strip of a thickness exceeding 0.2 mm (excluding expanded products), classified under Combined Nomenclature code 7606, over the period 2015–2025. The product heading encompasses four subcategories: square or rectangular plates in non-alloy aluminium (760611) and aluminium alloys (760612), as well as non-rectangular forms in non-alloy (760691) and alloy (760692) variants. Of these, alloy square-or-rectangular products (760612) account for the overwhelming majority of both imports and exports.

Over the decade, the EU's trade in this product underwent three fundamental transformations: a dramatic price-driven inflation of trade values despite stagnating or declining physical volumes; a radical reconfiguration of trading partners driven by sanctions, supply disruptions, and competitive shifts; and a structural erosion of the EU's traditional trade surplus, raising questions about the bloc's long-term competitive position in this sector.

1. Price-Driven Growth: Rising Values in a Stagnant Volume Market

1.1 The persistent divergence between volume and value

The most striking feature of EU aluminium sheet trade over 2015–2025 is the divergence between value and volume trends. While export values rose by 14.7% (from €3.92 billion to €4.50 billion), export volumes simultaneously fell by 11.7% (from 1,180,384 t to 1,041,937 t). The reconciliation lies in unit export prices, which climbed 29.9% over the period — from €3,323/t to €4,317/t.

On the import side the pattern is similar, though less extreme. Import values grew by 29.8% (from €3.03 billion to €3.93 billion), while volumes increased only 5.9% (from 1,022,963 t to 1,083,219 t). Import prices rose 22.5%, from €2,959/t to €3,627/t.

These figures reveal that the apparent growth in trade values is almost entirely a price phenomenon. Physical trade volumes have been essentially flat on the import side and declining on the export side, suggesting underlying structural pressures on EU competitiveness in external markets.

1.2 The 2021–2022 price shock and its lasting imprint

The price trajectory was not linear. After a period of relative stability or decline between 2015 and 2020, prices surged dramatically in 2021–2022 before partially retreating and stabilising at elevated levels. Looking at the dominant sub-product (760612, alloy square/rectangular plates), import and export prices followed this trajectory:

The 2022 spike — import prices up 37.5% year-on-year, export prices up 36.2% — was driven by a convergence of factors: the global energy crisis following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, surging LME aluminium prices, and logistical disruptions. Prices have since stabilised at levels roughly 40% above their 2020 trough, indicating a structural repricing rather than a temporary spike.

Price shock detection confirms the severity of this period. The most extreme detected events include:

• A 54.4% price shift in EU exports to the United States in 2022 (abnormality score: 5.6; value share: 20.9%)
• A 39.9% price shift in imports from Türkiye in 2021 (abnormality score: 8.4; value share: 18.4%)
• A 43.4% price shift in EU exports to Canada in 2022 (abnormality score: 10.7; value share: 3.2%)

1.3 EU domestic production mirrors the price effect

EU domestic production tells a similar story. Production volumes grew modestly from 4,949,332 tonnes to 5,440,000 tonnes (+9.9%), but production values surged from €10.16 billion to €16.12 billion (+58.6%). The value-to-quantity ratio thus increased by approximately 44%, confirming that the price effect pervades not only trade but also domestic manufacturing.

This combination — modest volume growth but substantial value growth — suggests that EU producers have benefited from higher aluminium prices without significantly expanding their physical output. Combined with declining export volumes, this points to a market where EU producers are increasingly oriented toward domestic demand rather than expanding their international footprint.

2. A Rewired Trade Map: Sanctions, Substitution, and New Partnerships

2.1 Russia's complete exit from EU import channels

The most dramatic single shift in EU aluminium sheet imports over the decade was the complete collapse of imports from Russia. Starting from €160 million in 2015, Russian imports fell to virtually zero by 2025 (€1,214), representing a total elimination of what had been a significant supply source. The coefficient of variation for Russian imports stands at 0.72 — the highest among all import partners — reflecting the abrupt nature of this disruption.

This collapse is clearly linked to the EU's sanctions regime following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. However, the data suggests the decline may have begun before formal sanctions were fully in place, pointing to a role for self-sanctioning and reputational risk aversion among EU importers.

2.2 China's surge and volatile retreat

China's role in EU aluminium sheet imports followed a particularly volatile trajectory. Starting from €424 million in 2015, Chinese imports fluctuated significantly, reaching a peak of €1,278 million — a threefold increase — before retreating to €385 million by 2025, slightly below the 2015 starting point (−9.0%).

The timing of China's import surge coincides with the period when Russian aluminium was being excluded from EU markets, suggesting that Chinese-origin or Chinese-intermediated supply may have partially filled the gap. The subsequent decline may reflect EU trade defence measures, quality concerns, or a normalisation of supply chains as alternative sources were secured. China's import volatility (CV: 0.43) is among the highest of all EU import partners, alongside the United States (0.43) and the Republic of Korea (0.43).

2.3 Türkiye and Norway as key alternative suppliers

Against this backdrop of disruption, two partners emerged as stable and growing suppliers to the EU:

Türkiye more than doubled its exports to the EU, rising from €313 million to €741 million (+136.8%). At its peak, Turkish imports reached €827 million. Türkiye's emergence reflects its geographic proximity, growing aluminium smelting capacity, and strategic position bridging Asian and European supply chains.

Norway, a long-standing partner with established smelting operations powered by hydroelectric energy, grew from €263 million to €472 million (+79.4%). Norway's role as a low-carbon aluminium supplier has become increasingly valuable in the context of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and broader sustainability requirements. Notably, Norway also exhibits the lowest import volatility among major partners (CV: 0.08).

On the export side, the top destination partners also evolved significantly:

The United Kingdom remained by far the largest export destination, absorbing €1.52 billion in 2025. However, the most dynamic growth occurred in the United States, Switzerland, Mexico, and Serbia — all of which more than doubled their purchases from the EU. The decline in exports to China (−37.1%) stands out against the general upward trend and may reflect increased Chinese domestic production capacity or competitive displacement.

2.4 Diversification and concentration: a paradox

Despite the apparent diversification of trade partners, concentration analysis reveals a more nuanced picture. The import Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) remained broadly stable, declining marginally from 1,224 to 1,204 (−1.6%), indicating that while the identity of suppliers changed, the overall degree of import concentration did not shift dramatically.

On the export side, however, the HHI increased from 1,447 to 1,671 (+15.4%), indicating growing concentration. This is consistent with the UK and US absorbing an increasing share of EU exports, making the export base more dependent on a smaller number of large markets. While both HHI values remain in the "moderately concentrated" range, the diverging trend — stable on imports, rising on exports — warrants attention from a risk-management perspective.

3. Structural Erosion: From Surplus to Vulnerability

3.1 The narrowing and occasional reversal of the trade surplus

The EU has historically maintained a positive trade balance in aluminium sheets. In 2015, this surplus stood at €895 million. By 2025, it had narrowed to €571 million — a decline of 36.2%.

More strikingly, the trade balance dipped into deficit at its worst point, reaching −€958 million. This occurred in 2022, when import values surged to a peak of €5.57 billion while export values reached €4.61 billion. The net import reliance correspondingly shifted from −11.8% (net exporter) to a peak of +4.7% (net importer) before settling at −4.2% in 2025.

The fact that the EU flipped from net exporter to net importer, even temporarily, marks a significant structural inflection. Although the balance has returned to positive territory, it remains well below historical levels.

3.2 Declining export propensity and trade openness

The erosion of the surplus is underpinned by a broader retreat in the EU's outward trade orientation. Export propensity — the share of domestic production exported to non-EU markets — fell from 32.3% to 25.7% (−20.5%). Trade intensity (total extra-EU trade as a share of production) also declined, from 44.4% to 38.9% (−12.3%).

The vulnerability analysis identifies export propensity as the most salient risk factor, with a salience score of 44.8 compared to 23.4 for trade intensity. This declining export orientation suggests that EU producers are finding it increasingly difficult to compete in international markets — a trend likely driven by elevated energy costs, regulatory burdens, and competition from producers in regions with lower production costs.

Notably, while export volumes fell 11.7% overall, the decline was most pronounced in non-alloy rectangular plates (760611), where volumes dropped from 63,074 t to 27,815 t (−55.9%). Exports of non-rectangular alloy plates (760692) actually grew from 25,322 t to 58,026 t (+129.1%), suggesting that EU producers retain a competitive edge in higher-value, more specialised product forms.

3.3 Internal EU shifts in production and trade leadership

Behind the aggregate EU figures, significant shifts occurred among member states. Germany, which accounts for approximately one-third of EU production (production share: 33.2%), experienced a marked decline in its export role:

Germany's export decline of €554 million was only partially offset by gains in France (+€299M), Greece (+€239M), and Austria (+€142M). The specialisation data confirms that Greece holds the highest revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA: 0.85), followed by Croatia (0.71) and Slovenia (0.44), while Germany's RSCA is a more modest 0.22 — reflecting its broader, more diversified industrial base.

On the import side, several member states sharply increased their intake:

Poland, Spain, and Sweden more than doubled their imports, reflecting growing demand in Central and Eastern Europe and the Iberian Peninsula, as well as Sweden's role as a hub for aluminium-intensive industries (automotive, packaging). Meanwhile, France's imports declined by 34.6%, potentially reflecting shifts in its industrial base or increased sourcing from within the EU single market.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in aluminium sheets (CN 7606) over 2015–2025 tells a story of apparent resilience masking structural fragility. Trade values grew on both the import and export sides, but this growth was almost entirely driven by price increases — particularly the dramatic 2021–2022 spike linked to the energy crisis and geopolitical disruption. Physical trade volumes, especially on the export side, declined meaningfully.

The decade witnessed a profound reconfiguration of the EU's trade relationships. Russia was completely eliminated as an import source, China surged and then retreated, and Türkiye and Norway emerged as key alternative suppliers. On the export side, the EU deepened its reliance on the UK and US markets while diversifying toward newer destinations such as Mexico and Serbia.

Most critically, the EU's traditional trade surplus in this product has eroded significantly — and was even temporarily reversed in 2022. Declining export propensity, reduced trade intensity, and growing export concentration all point to a sector under competitive pressure. While EU domestic production has grown modestly in volume and substantially in value, the bloc is becoming less outward-oriented in its aluminium sheet trade. The coming years, shaped by CBAM implementation, energy price dynamics, and intensifying global competition, will determine whether this erosion continues or stabilises.