Market evolution: Aluminium stranded wire (CN 7614) — 2015–2025

Introduction

The EU market for aluminium stranded wire, cables, plaited bands and the like (CN 7614), excluding electrically insulated products, has undergone a profound structural transformation over the 2015–2025 period. What began as a market in approximate trade balance—with a modest deficit of €3.9 million in 2015—ended with the EU posting a trade shortfall of €158.1 million by 2025. Import values grew more than fivefold while export values merely doubled; import volumes nearly quadrupled while export quantities barely changed. At the same time, EU domestic production expanded significantly, yet it could not keep pace with surging demand for external supply. This report examines the main dynamics behind this shift across three dimensions: the overall trade balance, the geographical reconfiguration of trade partners, and the production–demand gap that underpins the EU's rising vulnerability.

1. The Import Surge: A Structural Shift Toward External Dependence

1.1 Diverging trajectories of imports and exports

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the near-total divergence between EU import and export growth. Between the first and last year of the data window:

Source: General Overview — trade

EU exports grew in value primarily because of rising unit prices rather than rising volumes. Export volume increased by just 7.2 % over the decade, while export prices climbed 93.3 % (from €2,858/t to €5,525/t). By contrast, imports surged in both volume (+258 %) and price (+43.0 %, from €2,494/t to €3,568/t). The sheer magnitude of the volume increase on the import side is the fundamental driver of the widening deficit.

1.2 A brief surplus, then a rapid deterioration

The trade balance did not deteriorate in a straight line. By cross-referencing the product segment data, we can reconstruct the annual trajectory:

Source: Product Segment Breakdown

The EU registered a brief trade surplus peaking at around €6.1 million in 2017, when import volumes dipped to their lowest point. From 2018 onward, however, imports accelerated sharply, and the deficit widened year after year, reaching its maximum of €158.1 million in 2025. The net import reliance metric confirms this inversion: moving from −16.7 % (indicating the EU was a net exporter relative to its domestic market) to +22.8 %, a shift of 237 % (net import reliance).

1.3 A widening export–import price premium

A secondary but noteworthy trend is the growing gap between export and import unit prices:

Export prices consistently exceeded import prices throughout most of the period, widening from a 15 % premium in 2015 to 55 % in 2025. This indicates that the EU's exports are concentrated in higher-value products or destined for higher-price markets, while imports increasingly consist of more standardised, lower-unit-value goods. The 2022 exception, when the two prices briefly converged, coincides with the commodity price spike driven by the energy crisis and post-pandemic supply chain disruptions.

2. A Reconfigured Trade Map: New Suppliers Rise as Traditional Partners Recede

2.1 The emergence of Gulf and Asian import suppliers

The geographical composition of EU imports has shifted dramatically. While Norway was the EU's largest import source in 2015 (€18.2 M), its share collapsed by 2025 (€6.1 M, −66.5 %). In its place, a set of new suppliers—principally from the Gulf region and Asia—grew to dominate:

Source: Partners — top by value

China is the single largest driver of import growth, rising from €9.3 M to €96.0 M and accounting for 38 % of EU imports by value in 2025. Bahrain's trajectory is equally striking: from near-zero to €59.9 M, making it the second-largest supplier. The appearance of Bahrain (and to a lesser extent Oman) reflects the development of aluminium wire and cable manufacturing capacity in the Gulf, leveraging low-cost smelter feedstock from the region's aluminium smelters. India and South Korea also emerged as major suppliers, their combined share growing from €4.3 M to €44.3 M over the period.

2.2 Export destinations: diversification alongside a stable core

On the export side, the United Kingdom remained the EU's single largest export market throughout the period, though its share declined from €14.8 M to €12.7 M (−13.8 %). The most dynamic export growth came from several emerging or fast-growing destinations:

Source: Partners — top by value

Mexico saw the most dramatic growth (+2,505 %), rising from a marginal destination to the EU's second-largest export market at €19.7 M. Norway (+744 %) and Switzerland (+202 %) also grew strongly. These three markets—Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland—collectively accounted for €50.9 M of exports in 2025, surpassing the UK. Export market concentration (HHI by value) eased from 1,353 to 1,307 (−3.4 %), reflecting this diversification.

2.3 EU member states: hubs, producers, and growing importers

Within the EU, the trade data reveals differentiated roles across member states. On the import side, the Netherlands experienced the most explosive growth (from €0.28 M to €38.4 M), consistent with its role as a major logistics gateway for goods entering the EU through Rotterdam. Other large importers include Sweden (€35.4 M), Greece (€25.8 M), Finland (€23.1 M), and Italy (€21.7 M), each having grown substantially.

On the export side, Austria emerged as the EU's largest exporter to non-EU markets (€30.6 M, +433 %), followed by Italy (€21.8 M, +647 %) and Belgium (€15.6 M, +103 %). Austria's leading position aligns with its revealed comparative advantage (RSCA of 0.48), while Hungary (RSCA 0.77) and Portugal (RSCA 0.70) show even higher specialisation in this product, though their absolute export volumes are smaller.

2.4 Price shocks and volatility

Trade with certain partners was marked by notable price shocks. The most significant events detected include:

• An import price shock from India in 2022: a +68.3 % price shift with an abnormality score of 57.3, coinciding with the commodity price spike of that year.
• An export price shock to China in 2018: a +452.4 % price shift (abnormality 28.1), suggesting a sharp change in product mix or a one-off high-value shipment.
• An export price shock to Pakistan in 2018: +82.4 % shift (abnormality 27.6).

Source: Volatility — supply shocks

Import volatility (coefficient of variation) was highest for partners with smaller, less regular trade flows—Brazil (CV 2.91), Mozambique (1.44), and Norway (1.40)—while the large-volume relationships with China (CV 0.75) and Türkiye (CV 0.29) were relatively stable, suggesting more predictable supply chains.

3. Production Growth Outpaced by Soaring Domestic Demand

3.1 EU production expanded but not enough to close the gap

EU domestic production of CN 7614 products grew robustly over the period:

Source: Production volumes

Production volume nearly doubled and its value more than tripled. However, this expansion was insufficient to keep pace with the combined growth of domestic consumption and export needs. While production grew by 37,042 t, imports grew by 50,856 t—meaning that all of the additional demand, and then some, was met from abroad.

3.2 Export propensity declined while trade intensity rose

Two key ratios capture the structural shift in the EU's position:

Source: Vulnerability indicators

Export propensity—the share of domestic production that is exported—fell from 33.1 % to 22.9 %, the most salient vulnerability indicator according to the data (salience score: 57.8). This decline reflects the fact that a growing share of EU production is being absorbed by domestic demand rather than being available for export. Trade intensity, measuring the overall openness of the market, rose modestly from 43.7 % to 49.4 %, indicating that the market has become more reliant on cross-border flows overall.

3.3 Steel-core products are the epicentre of the import surge

The product segment breakdown reveals that the import surge is heavily concentrated in one sub-product:

Imports by sub-product (volume):

Imports by sub-product (value):

Steel-core aluminium stranded wire (CN 761410), which is widely used in overhead power transmission and distribution lines, accounts for the bulk of the import surge. Its import volume quadrupled from 9,641 t to 44,771 t, and its import value grew nearly eightfold. By 2025, 761410 represented 63 % of total imports by volume and 62 % by value—up from 49 % and 41 % respectively in 2015. This likely reflects the EU's accelerating investment in electrical grid infrastructure, driven by the energy transition, renewable energy integration, and grid reinforcement needs.

By contrast, EU exports remained dominated by the non-steel-core sub-product (CN 761490), which accounted for 74 % of export volume in 2025 (12,582 t out of 16,940 t). Export volumes of 761490 were essentially flat over the decade (13,040 t → 12,582 t), while those of 761410 remained small (2,761 t → 4,358 t). This confirms that the EU's competitive strength lies in higher-value, non-steel-core aluminium wire products, while it is structurally dependent on imports for steel-reinforced conductors.

The pricing data reinforces this picture. In 2025, the EU exported 761410 at €6,401/t while importing it at €3,505/t—an 83 % premium that points to product differentiation, with EU exports serving niche or higher-specification applications.

3.4 Import concentration shifted but remains moderate

Import supply concentration by HHI (value) decreased slightly from 2,523 to 2,392 (−5.2 %), indicating a modest broadening of the supplier base as new entrants (Bahrain, India, South Korea) diluted the share of any single origin. However, by volume, import concentration actually increased (HHI from 2,664 to 2,994, +12.4 %), suggesting that while more partners contribute value, a smaller number of large suppliers dominate the physical flow of goods. China alone provided 96,000 t-worth of value by 2025, underscoring the risk of over-reliance on a single origin for a critical infrastructure input.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 decade, the EU's market for aluminium stranded wire (CN 7614) has been fundamentally reshaped. A market that was roughly in trade balance in 2015 ended the period with a €158.1 million deficit, driven by a fivefold increase in import value that far outstripped the doubling of export revenues. Three interconnected dynamics underpin this transformation:

1. Demand outpaced domestic supply. EU production grew by 86 % in volume, but this was insufficient to absorb the surge in consumption—particularly for steel-reinforced overhead conductors (CN 761410), whose imports quadrupled. This likely reflects the EU's accelerating infrastructure investment for its energy transition.

2. The import landscape was reconfigured. Norway, once the EU's top supplier, saw its share collapse, replaced by a cluster of Gulf and Asian producers—China, Bahrain, India, and South Korea—whose combined share grew from near-negligible to dominant. On the export side, the EU diversified away from the UK toward Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland, though export volumes remained largely stagnant.

3. Structural vulnerability has increased. Net import reliance flipped from −16.7 % to +22.8 %, export propensity fell from 33 % to 23 %, and the EU's competitive edge is now concentrated in higher-unit-value, non-steel-core products while it depends on external suppliers for the commodity-grade steel-core conductors needed for grid expansion.

These trends pose important questions for EU industrial policy. As the energy transition accelerates demand for power conductors, the EU faces a growing reliance on a concentrated set of non-EU suppliers for a strategically sensitive product category. The data suggests that without a significant expansion of domestic capacity—particularly for steel-core stranded wire—the import deficit and associated supply-chain risks will continue to widen.