Market evolution: Base metal watches (CN 9102) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report analyses the evolution of EU external trade in base metal watches under Combined Nomenclature code 9102 over the period 2015–2025. The product heading encompasses wrist-watches, pocket-watches, and stop-watches that are not made of precious metal or metal clad with precious metal, spanning both mechanical and electrical models across seven subcategories. The European Union is a major consumer market for these products but relies overwhelmingly on imports, with a net import reliance consistently above 93% throughout the period. Over the decade, the market has undergone a profound structural transformation: volumes of both imports and exports have fallen dramatically, yet trade values have been far more resilient or even grown, pointing to a decisive shift toward higher-value, premium-positioned products. At the same time, EU domestic production has collapsed in volume terms, and the geographic composition of trade has been reshaped by post-Brexit disruptions, the rising dominance of Switzerland, and the emergence of new Asian sourcing hubs.

I. The Premiumisation of EU Watch Trade: Falling Volumes, Rising Values

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the simultaneous decline in physical trade volumes and the resilience—or outright growth—of trade values. This pattern, observable on both the import and export sides, signals a fundamental premiumisation of the market.

Import values held steady or grew while quantities more than halved

Between 2015 and 2025, EU imports of CN 9102 watches in net mass fell from 12,300 tonnes to 6,658 tonnes, a decline of 45.9%. In supplementary unit terms (number of pieces), the decline was steeper still: from approximately 129.8 million pieces in 2015 to 59.2 million pieces in 2025 (–54.3%). Yet over the same span, import value rose from €4.52 billion to €5.04 billion (+11.6%), reaching a peak of €5.04 billion in 2025. This divergence implies a near-doubling of the average import price per piece, from €34.8 in 2015 to €85.0 in 2025 (+144.2%), while the average price per tonne rose from €367,074 to €756,133 (+106.0%).

Export volumes collapsed even more sharply, but average unit prices surged

EU exports tell a similar but more dramatic story. Total export value fell from €1.73 billion to €1.38 billion (–20.6%), while export quantity in tonnes declined by 56.4% (from 2,215 to 965 tonnes) and the number of pieces exported fell by 63.3% (from 13.9 million to 5.1 million). The average export price per piece, however, nearly doubled from €124.9 to €270.1 (+116.3%). This means the EU is exporting far fewer watches but commanding significantly higher prices per unit—consistent with a shift toward premium mechanical timepieces.

Automatic-winding watches became the undisputed core of premium imports

The product-level breakdown reveals where the premiumisation is concentrated. Among imports, sub-heading 910221 (wrist-watches with automatic winding) has become the dominant segment by value. In 2025 it accounted for €3.15 billion—62% of total import value—up from €2.04 billion (45%) in 2015. Its unit price per piece rose from €595 to €1,228 over the period. By contrast, the mass-market electrical segment 910211 (electrical, mechanical display only) saw its import volume fall from 83.8 million to 33.3 million pieces, though its value remained broadly stable at around €1.2 billion, indicating a shift from high-volume, low-price to lower-volume, higher-price sourcing.

EU domestic production shifted from volume to value

EU production data corroborates this premiumisation. The number of watches produced within the EU fell from approximately 2.05 million pieces in 2015 to just 450,000 in 2025 (–78%). Yet the production value rose from €125 million to €180 million (+44%), implying that EU manufacturers have abandoned volume production and concentrated on high-value mechanical timepieces.

II. Geographical Shifts: Switzerland's Dominance, the UK's Disruption, and Emerging Asian Sources

The decade has seen a significant reconfiguration of the EU's trading partners, driven by the structural premiumisation of the market, the United Kingdom's departure from the EU single market, and the gradual emergence of new Asian manufacturing hubs.

Switzerland consolidated its position as the EU's overwhelmingly dominant import source

Switzerland's share of EU watch imports grew steadily over the period. In 2015, Swiss imports were valued at €2.93 billion (65% of total imports); by 2025 this had risen to €3.91 billion (78%). The 33.3% increase in value occurred alongside the broader trend of falling volumes, reflecting the high unit prices commanded by Swiss-made mechanical watches. This concentration is also visible in the import HHI, which rose from 4,877 to 6,296 (+29.1%), indicating that import sourcing became significantly more concentrated over the decade.

The United Kingdom's exit from the EU single market caused a dramatic collapse in bilateral watch trade

The UK's departure from the EU customs union, effective from January 2021, had severe consequences for watch trade flows in both directions. EU imports from the UK fell from €116 million in 2015 to just €16 million in 2025 (–85.8%). More dramatically, EU exports to the UK declined from €365 million to €112 million (–69.2%). The UK had been the EU's single largest export market for base metal watches in 2015; by 2025 it had been overtaken by Switzerland (€320m) and Hong Kong (€262m). The export volatility for the UK (coefficient of variation of 0.91 for imports, 0.48 for exports) reflects the turbulence of this transition period.

China and Hong Kong declined as low-cost sourcing hubs, while Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines gained ground

China, the second-largest import source, saw its import value fall from €1.14 billion to €813 million (–28.7%). Hong Kong experienced an even steeper decline (–59.1%, from €203 million to €83 million). These declines largely reflect the contraction of the mass-market, low-price segment. Meanwhile, emerging Asian suppliers have gained share: Thailand's exports to the EU tripled from €18 million to €56 million (+210.6%), Japan's nearly doubled (+93.1%, from €43 million to €82 million), and the Philippines' grew by 81.4%. These shifts likely reflect the relocation of watch assembly and mid-range manufacturing within Asia.

EU export destinations diversified, with Turkey and Norway as bright spots

While the UK receded as an export market, several other destinations grew notably: Turkey (+103.5%, from €23 million to €47 million), Norway (+148.9%, from €21 million to €52 million), and the United Arab Emirates (+49.5%, from €56 million to €84 million). These developments partly offset the UK decline and contributed to a modest decrease in export concentration (HHI from 1,551 to 1,230, –20.7%).

At the Member State level, France became the EU's largest watch importer, while Ireland emerged as a surprising export hub

Among EU Member States, France overtook Germany as the largest importer of non-EU watches, with import value rising from €1.17 billion to €1.54 billion (+31.0%). Germany's imports fell by 9.9% to €1.16 billion. On the export side, Germany remained the largest exporter but saw its value decline from €510 million to €278 million (–45.5%). Ireland's exports surged from just €1.9 million to €162 million—a spectacular increase likely linked to the activities of multinational watch distribution or re-export operations based in Ireland.

III. Structural Vulnerability and the Deepening EU Trade Deficit

The combination of declining domestic production, rising import dependence on a single country, and an expanding trade deficit points to a structurally vulnerable position for the EU in base metal watches.

The EU trade deficit widened by nearly €900 million over the decade

The EU's trade balance in CN 9102 deteriorated from –€2.78 billion in 2015 to –€3.66 billion in 2025 (–31.6% in absolute terms). The deficit narrowed temporarily to –€1.85 billion around 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic depressed import demand, but subsequently widened to its largest ever level. This widening occurred despite the collapse in import volumes, because the shift to higher-value (principally Swiss) watches more than compensated in value terms.

Import reliance on Switzerland created concentration risk

With nearly 78% of import value sourced from Switzerland by 2025, the EU is exposed to significant concentration risk. The import HHI for value reached 6,296 in 2025, up 29.1% from 2015—a level indicating a highly concentrated supplier base. While Switzerland is a politically stable and reliable partner, any disruption to Swiss supply chains (whether from production bottlenecks, currency fluctuations, or trade policy changes) would have outsized effects on the EU market. The net import reliance ratio remained elevated at 95.3% in 2025, barely changed from 93.2% in 2015, confirming that domestic production offers no meaningful buffer.

France and Germany dominate intra-EU specialisation, but the bloc as a whole has limited export competitiveness

The specialisation analysis for 2025 shows that France has the highest revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA of 0.63) in CN 9102, followed by Germany (RSCA of 0.16). These two countries account for the bulk of EU production and exports. However, most other Member States display negative specialisation scores, indicating that the EU's export capacity is concentrated in a small number of countries. This structural asymmetry limits the bloc's overall resilience: if French or German watch exports were to face external shocks (tariffs, supply disruptions), there are few intra-EU alternatives to compensate.

Export market volatility remains elevated, with occasional price shocks detected

The volatility analysis reveals persistently high coefficients of variation for several EU export destinations, including the United Arab Emirates (0.80), Singapore (0.81), and Russia (0.66). The shock detection identified abnormal price spikes in EU exports to Morocco in 2023 (+206.5%), Andorra in 2020 (+107.0%), and Singapore in 2021 (+211.9%). While these shocks affected relatively small markets (value shares of 0.2–1.6%), they illustrate the fragility of EU export relationships beyond its core destinations.

Conclusion

The EU market for base metal watches (CN 9102) between 2015 and 2025 has been defined by a paradox: fewer watches are being traded, but more money is being spent. This premiumisation has restructured the market in profound ways. Import volumes have more than halved, yet import values have grown, driven by the rising dominance of high-value Swiss automatic watches. EU domestic production has all but abandoned volume manufacturing, pivoting to a smaller number of higher-priced timepieces. The trade deficit has widened to €3.66 billion, and the EU's import reliance on Switzerland has intensified to the point where nearly four-fifths of import value comes from a single country.

The UK's departure from the EU single market delivered a significant blow to bilateral watch trade, reducing it to a fraction of its former level. Meanwhile, the geographic landscape of Asian supply has shifted, with China and Hong Kong declining and Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines emerging as alternative sourcing points for mid-range products.

Looking ahead, the EU's structural dependence on Swiss imports, combined with the near-extinction of volume production within the bloc, represents a significant vulnerability. While the premium positioning of the remaining EU-based production may sustain export revenues in niche markets, the broader market dynamics suggest that the EU will remain a net importer of base metal watches for the foreseeable future, with limited capacity to influence global supply chains or mitigate concentration risk.