Market evolution: Quartz watches (CN 910211) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of the European Union's external trade in quartz watches with mechanical displays (Customs code 910211) from 2015 to 2025. The period was characterized by a profound contraction in trade volumes, a strategic shift towards higher-value products, and a significant restructuring of supply chains. While overall trade value declined, the data reveals a narrative of the EU moving upmarket, even as its dependence on foreign suppliers deepened. The analysis is based on official trade data and will explore the main dynamics of value, volume, partner concentration, and strategic vulnerability.
1. A Decade of Strategic Upmarket Shift Amidst Contracting Volumes
The EU's trade in quartz watches underwent a fundamental transformation over the decade, defined by a sharp decline in the physical volume of trade and a simultaneous rise in unit values. This points to a market pivot away from mass-market products towards higher-end, specialized segments.
1.1. Drastic Reduction in Trade Quantities
The volume of watches traded collapsed dramatically. EU imports measured by quantity fell by 53.7%, from 8,059 tonnes in 2015 to 3,733 tonnes in 2025. Exports saw an even steeper decline of 60.1%, falling from 1,601 tonnes to 639 tonnes. In terms of unit count, the contraction was similarly severe: import units dropped by 60.3% (from 83.8 million to 33.3 million pieces) and export units by 67.3% (from 10.3 million to 3.4 million pieces) (General Overview).
1.2. Resilient and Rising Unit Values
Despite falling volumes, the average value per unit (EUR per piece) surged, indicating a trade in more expensive watches. Import prices per piece increased by 62.8%, reaching €36.24. Export prices per piece rose by an even more impressive 134.3%, from €59.55 to €139.51. This divergence highlights that while the EU bought and sold far fewer watches, the watches it did trade were significantly more valuable, suggesting a focus on luxury or technologically advanced products (General Overview).
1.3. Narrowing of the Trade Deficit
The overall trade deficit in value terms improved. Although the EU consistently ran a deficit, it narrowed from €1.25 billion in 2015 to €738 million in 2025, a 41.1% reduction. This was not due to export growth but to a steeper decline in import values (-35.3%) compared to export values (-23.4%), reinforcing the narrative of a contraction skewed towards lower-value segments (General Overview).
2. Reconfiguration of Supply Chains and Increased Market Concentration
The geographical landscape of the EU's watch trade was reshaped, with traditional hubs losing ground and import dependency becoming more concentrated among fewer key suppliers.
2.1. Decline of Traditional Hubs and the Rise of New Players
The dominance of China and Hong Kong as import sources diminished significantly. Chinese imports fell by 50.4% to €415 million, while Hong Kong's plummeted by 81.5% to just €26 million. In contrast, imports from Japan grew by 43%, and those from the Philippines surged by 166.3%. For exports, the United Kingdom's share collapsed by 70%, while exports to Türkiye increased by 70.8% (Top partners by value).
2.2. Growing Concentration of Import Dependency
The market for imports became more concentrated. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import value increased by 17.2%, from 3,844 to 4,505, indicating a less diverse supplier base. Switzerland solidified its position as the leading high-value supplier, with its import share shrinking only slightly (-11.7%), while the share of others eroded more rapidly (Market Structure).
2.3. Internal EU Rebalancing of Trade
Within the EU, trade flows shifted. Germany's role as the bloc's largest importer and exporter diminished dramatically (import value -55.5%, export value -78.7%). Conversely, Ireland saw explosive growth in both imports (+1,481%) and exports (+13,985%), while the Netherlands also grew as a trade hub, with exports up 517.7%. This suggests a potential re-routing of trade flows through logistics hubs or changes in intra-EU reporting (Top reporters by value).
3. Strategic Vulnerability and a Retreat from Mass Production
The EU's structural position in the global watch industry has become more specialized yet more vulnerable, with domestic production focusing on high-value niches while import reliance intensified.
3.1. Heightened Import Dependency and Trade Intensity
The EU's net import reliance remained consistently high, edging up from 93.2% to 95.3%. The export propensity—the ratio of exports to domestic production—skyrocketed by 90.5%. This indicates that the EU's production is almost entirely geared towards the export market, leaving it highly exposed to international demand shocks.
3.2. Domestic Production: Fewer Units, Higher Value
EU production data tells a clear story of specialization. The quantity of watches produced plummeted by 78%, from approximately 2.05 million units to just 450,000 units. However, the total value of this production increased by 44%, from €125 million to €180 million. This confirms a strategic exit from mass-market production, with remaining EU manufacturing focused on the premium or luxury segment (Market Structure).
3.3. Supply Chain Volatility and Concentration Risks
Certain trade flows exhibited high volatility, notably exports to Saudi Arabia (CV: 1.19) and Singapore (CV: 1.12), and imports from the United Kingdom (CV: 0.98). Price shocks were detected, such as a 239.6% price spike for exports to Saudi Arabia in 2023. The increasing concentration of imports (rising HHI) alongside persistent high import reliance creates a structural vulnerability to disruptions in key supplying nations.
Conclusion
The period 2015–2025 was transformative for the EU's quartz watch sector. The data reveals a strategic pivot rather than a simple decline: the EU retreated from competing in the volume-driven, mass-market segment, where units are plentiful but margins are thin. Instead, its trade and production became heavily specialized in high-value watches. This upmarket shift allowed the EU to narrow its trade deficit and increase the value of its domestic production, even as unit counts collapsed.
However, this specialization has come at the cost of increased strategic vulnerability. The EU is now more dependent than ever on a concentrated set of foreign suppliers for the vast majority of its watch consumption, while its own production is almost exclusively export-oriented. The restructuring of supply chains, with a move away from Asian hubs and fluctuations in member state roles, adds another layer of complexity. The market has effectively bifurcated: the EU now produces and exports a high-value niche, while relying on imports for a broader, albeit shrinking, market—a dynamic that presents both opportunities for branding and risks of supply chain disruption.