Market evolution: Baby carriages and parts (CN 8715) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in baby carriages and parts thereof (Combined Nomenclature code 8715) over the period 2015–2025. The product scope covers baby carriages and their parts, corresponding to Prodcom codes 30.92.40.30 and 30.92.40.50. Over the decade, the EU market for this product underwent a profound structural transformation: domestic production collapsed, imports from China consolidated their dominance, the EU's trade deficit more than doubled, and the bloc's net import reliance surged from roughly 10 % to over 78 %. The sections below dissect these dynamics in turn.

1. A Decade of Declining Exports and Expanding Deficit

1.1 EU exports shrank in both volume and value

Between 2015 and 2025, EU extra-EU exports of baby carriages fell sharply:

The quantity decline (−65.5 %) far outpaced the value decline (−39.9 %), indicating that the EU shifted toward higher-value, niche products — likely premium strollers and specialty items — as mass-market production migrated abroad.

1.2 Imports held broadly steady in volume while their value grew

EU imports tell a contrasting story:

Import volumes were remarkably stable (within a narrow band of 44,490–52,307 t over the period), while import values rose moderately, partly driven by price increases and partly by a slight volume uptick.

1.3 The trade deficit more than doubled

The combined effect was a dramatic widening of the EU trade balance:

The deficit reached its widest point around 2020–2021 (approximately −€356 M), coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic, when a spike in demand for baby products met constrained EU production capacity.

2. China's Dominance and a Shifting Export Geography

2.1 China consolidated its position as the overwhelmingly dominant supplier

China's share of EU imports by value grew steadily:

China alone accounts for approximately 97 % of EU extra-EU imports by value in 2025. The collapse of imports from the United Kingdom (−89.5 %) largely reflects the post-Brexit statistical reclassification of UK–EU trade as extra-EU flows as of 2021, although the persistent decline thereafter suggests genuine trade diversion. Ukraine's emergence as a minor import source (+2,827 % from a very low base) may reflect near-shoring trends and the expansion of Ukrainian manufacturing capacity prior to 2022.

2.2 EU export destinations underwent significant realignment

The EU's export partner landscape shifted considerably:

Three of the EU's formerly largest export markets — Russia, the UK, and the US — contracted sharply. The collapse in exports to Russia (−76 %) is almost certainly linked to EU sanctions imposed following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Meanwhile, exports to neighbouring European economies such as Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Belarus grew, suggesting a geographical reorientation toward closer, non-EU European partners.

2.3 Import concentration increased while export diversification improved

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) confirms diverging trends:

The import-side HHI, already high, rose further — reflecting near-total dependence on China. On the export side, HHI fell substantially, indicating that EU exporters spread their sales across a wider range of partners, partly offsetting the loss of traditional large markets.

3. Collapsing Domestic Production and Rising Strategic Vulnerability

3.1 EU production experienced a near-total collapse

EU domestic production data reveal the most dramatic shift in the entire dataset:

EU output of baby carriages fell by over 95 % in unit terms and 86.5 % in value over the decade. This points to a massive offshoring of manufacturing capacity, primarily to China, and the near-elimination of mid-range and mass-market production within the EU.

3.2 The remaining production base is concentrated in a handful of Member States

According to revealed comparative advantage data for 2025, only a few EU countries retain meaningful specialisation in baby carriage production:

The Netherlands and Germany together account for over 61 % of the EU's baby-carriage-related exports by production share, while most other Member States show no comparative advantage whatsoever (RSCA near or below zero).

3.3 Net import reliance surged, signalling growing strategic vulnerability

The EU's net import reliance rose from 10.4 % in 2015 to 78.4 % in 2025 (+652 %), while trade intensity climbed from 32.7 % to 109.4 % and export propensity jumped from 14.8 % to 158.4 %. The extreme rise in export propensity is a mathematical artefact of the collapsing production denominator rather than an indication of export dynamism: the EU is now exporting more units of baby carriages than it officially produces domestically, a pattern consistent with significant re-export activity and/or statistical measurement gaps.

Supply-side volatility data reinforce the vulnerability picture. Chinese export flows to the EU were extremely stable (coefficient of variation of just 0.05), but a notable price shock was detected in 2020 (an abnormality score of 6.7, with a −33.3 % unit-price drop), likely linked to pandemic-era disruptions. By contrast, several smaller partners showed very high volatility (Viet Nam CV 1.16, Ukraine CV 1.11, Türkiye CV 1.05), making them unreliable alternative sources.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU baby carriage market (CN 8715) underwent a structural transformation characterised by three converging dynamics: a near-total withdrawal from mass production within the EU, an overwhelming dependence on Chinese imports, and a dramatic widening of the trade deficit. Domestic production fell by over 95 % in volume, while China consolidated its position as the source of virtually all extra-EU imports. On the export side, EU shipments declined in both volume (−65.5 %) and value (−39.9 %), with the residual exports increasingly concentrated in higher-unit-value products and directed toward geographically proximate European markets, partly as a result of the loss of the Russian market due to sanctions. The EU's net import reliance rose from 10 % to 78 %, exposing the sector to significant single-source dependency risks. While the product is not strategically critical in the way that energy or semiconductors are, the degree of concentration — an import HHI approaching 9,500 — leaves the EU consumer market highly vulnerable to supply disruptions, trade-policy shifts, or cost increases originating in a single country.