Market evolution: Wire rod coils (CN 72139141) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the trade dynamics of EU customs code 72139141 — low-carbon (≤ 0.06% C), hot-rolled wire rod coils in irregularly wound coils, of circular cross-section under 14 mm — over the period 2015 to 2025. The product sits within the broader iron and steel family (CN 7213) and is an important intermediate good used in wire drawing, fastener manufacturing, and other downstream applications. Over the decade under review, the EU's position in this market has undergone a profound structural transformation: the bloc has shifted from a modestly self-sufficient producer–exporter to a significantly import-dependent market. Production volumes declined by over a quarter, exports virtually disappeared, and the trade balance widened from €−32 million in 2015 to €−212 million in 2025. The following sections explore the main drivers behind this shift.

1. From Net Exporter to Net Importer: The Collapse of EU Wire Rod Exports

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the near-total evaporation of EU exports of CN 72139141, accompanied by a steady rise in imports.

1.1 Export volumes and values collapsed while import demand proved resilient

Source: General Overview — trade

EU exports of this wire rod grade fell by 97.8% in volume terms over the decade. While the unit price of the remaining exports more than doubled (from €412/t to €1,008/t), this rise reflects a composition effect — surviving export flows are likely niche, higher-value shipments rather than bulk sales — rather than a genuine pricing power gain. In contrast, import volumes proved resilient, rising by 7.4% to 393,172 tonnes despite a 32.2% increase in unit price, suggesting sustained downstream demand that domestic production could no longer fully meet.

1.2 Domestic production shrank in volume even as its value rose, signalling a structural retreat

Source: Production volumes

EU production of CN 72139141 dropped from 8.62 million tonnes in 2015 to 6.30 million tonnes in 2025 — a 26.9% contraction in volume. Yet production value increased by 40.8% (from €2.56 billion to €3.60 billion), implying a unit production value rise of roughly 92% over the period. This disconnect points to two concurrent forces: (i) higher raw-material and energy costs passed through to finished-goods prices, and (ii) the exit of higher-cost, lower-value production capacity — the same facilities that once supplied export markets. The result is a smaller but more price-intensive production base, increasingly oriented toward the domestic market and unable to sustain export flows.

1.3 The EU's export capacity became heavily concentrated and then disappeared

The export concentration index (HHI) for value fell from 6,844 in 2015 to 5,225 in 2025, indicating some diversification of the remaining — and now very small — export base. However, this apparent diversification masks the underlying reality: the absolute collapse of the top export destinations. Algeria, which absorbed €100.3 million of EU exports in 2015, received only €1.1 million in 2025 (−98.9%). Bosnia and Herzegovina fell from €4.6 million to €22,124 (−99.5%), and Tunisia from €3.8 million to €2,230 (−99.9%). These markets effectively closed for EU wire rod over the decade. The top EU exporters tell the same story: Italy's exports plunged from €112.0 million to €211,366 (−99.8%), and Czechia's from €2.0 million to €9,393 (−99.5%).

2. A New Import Landscape: Geographic Shifts and the 2021 Price Shock

As EU exports collapsed, the import side of the market underwent its own transformation — one shaped by both long-term supplier realignment and a sharp, synchronous price shock.

2.1 Import origins shifted decisively toward Eastern Europe and Turkey

Sources: Top partners and Top reporters

The three fastest-growing import suppliers over the decade were Norway (+450.1%), Ukraine (+218.6%), and Türkiye (+142.7%). Ukraine's rise is particularly notable: from €20.8 million in 2015 to €66.1 million in 2025, it became the single largest import partner by value. This growth likely reflects both competitive pricing from Ukrainian mills and the EU's policy of facilitating Ukrainian trade access, especially after 2022. Norway's surge (from €6.7 million to €37.1 million) points to the growing role of Nordic steel producers in supplying low-carbon wire rod, possibly benefiting from proximity and energy-cost advantages. Türkiye, a major global steel exporter, also increased its share significantly.

Conversely, several traditional suppliers contracted. Moldova's shipments fell by 64.6%, Bosnia and Herzegovina's by 95.4%, and the United Kingdom's by 50.6% — the latter potentially reflecting post-Brexit trade friction. Within the EU, Sweden emerged as a major intra-EU importer (from €12.6 million to €42.6 million, +237.2%), and Spain's intra-EU imports rose from €3.7 million to €22.4 million (+512.1%), suggesting growing regional redistribution of wire rod supply within the single market.

2.2 A synchronized price shock hit import markets in 2021

The shock detection analysis identifies three major price anomalies, all centred on 2021:

All three shocks occurred in 2021, all were price shocks in the import flow, and all involved price shifts of roughly 47–50% relative to trend. This synchronicity strongly suggests a common macro driver rather than idiosyncratic supply disruptions. The most plausible explanation is the global steel price surge of 2021, which was itself driven by the post-COVID demand recovery, surging raw-material costs (iron ore and coking coal), supply-chain disruptions, and — in Europe — the spike in energy costs. Moldova, which accounted for 26.7% of import value at the time of the shock, was the single most affected partner, contributing the largest share of the aggregate price spike.

2.3 Import concentration has increased, narrowing the supplier base

The import HHI (by value) rose from 1,588 in 2015 to 1,753 in 2025, indicating a moderate increase in concentration. In a market where imports have become structurally more important (as shown in Section 3), this rising concentration warrants attention. The base of reliable import suppliers has narrowed: some former major suppliers (Bosnia, Moldova) have sharply reduced shipments, while the market has become more dependent on a smaller number of larger suppliers — principally Ukraine, Norway, and Türkiye. On the export side, the HHI fell from 6,844 to 5,225, but this is largely an artefact of the collapse of Algeria-dominated exports rather than genuine diversification.

3. Growing Vulnerability: Rising Import Dependence and Declining Export Capacity

The structural changes documented above have materially altered the EU's trade position for this product, with implications for supply security and industrial competitiveness.

3.1 Net import reliance more than doubled, reaching its highest levels in the series

The net import reliance ratio — measuring the share of apparent consumption met by net imports — rose from 6.0% in 2015 to 15.7% in 2025, after briefly turning negative in one year (meaning the EU was a net exporter on a net basis). At 15.7%, it sits close to the period maximum of 17.2%, indicating that the current level is near the historical ceiling. Meanwhile, the EU's export propensity (exports as a share of production) fell from 8.7% to 6.4% — its lowest point in the series — confirming that the production base has become almost entirely inward-looking. Trade intensity (the sum of imports and exports relative to production plus imports minus exports) rose modestly to 25.2%, but this is driven entirely by the import side.

3.2 Germany remains the EU's most specialised producer, but the overall production map is thinning

The specialisation analysis for 2025 shows that Germany holds by far the highest revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA of 0.56) and accounts for 74.8% of EU production in this product. France is the only other member state with a positive RSCA (0.02), while Italy (RSCA −0.39), Spain (−0.22), and Czechia (−0.20) are all net importers of this wire rod grade. At the other end, Portugal, Greece, Slovakia, and Sweden have essentially no domestic production of this product (RSCA near −1.0). This extreme concentration of production in Germany creates a single-point-of-failure risk: any disruption to German capacity — whether from energy costs, regulatory changes, or industrial restructuring — would have outsized consequences for EU supply.

3.3 The competitive landscape is shifting: the EU is losing ground to emerging producers

Taken together, the data paint a picture of a market in structural transition. EU production is declining in volume, exports have virtually ceased, and the bloc has become increasingly reliant on imports from a small number of extra-EU suppliers — principally Ukraine, Norway, and Türkiye. The 2021 price shock demonstrated that this reliance carries vulnerability: a synchronous global steel price spike translated directly into a significant cost increase for EU downstream users, with import prices from key suppliers jumping by roughly 47–50% in a single year. Rising import concentration (HHI from 1,588 to 1,753) compounds this risk, as fewer suppliers mean less flexibility to redirect sourcing in the event of a disruption. The retreat of some traditional suppliers (Bosnia −95.4%, Moldova −64.6%) and the exit of the United Kingdom from the supply picture (−50.6%, likely linked to Brexit) have further narrowed the effective supplier base, even as new entrants like Norway and Ukraine have partially filled the gap.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 decade, the EU market for low-carbon hot-rolled wire rod coils (CN 72139141) has undergone a fundamental structural shift. The bloc has moved from a position of modest self-sufficiency — with net import reliance of just 6% — to one of significant import dependence (15.7%), driven by a 26.9% decline in domestic production volumes and a 97.8% collapse in exports. The import landscape has been reshaped: Ukraine, Norway, and Türkiye have emerged as dominant suppliers, displacing earlier sources such as Bosnia, Moldova, and the United Kingdom. The 2021 global steel price shock, which saw import prices from key partners spike by ~48–50%, exposed the cost consequences of this reliance. With production now heavily concentrated in Germany (75% of EU output) and import supply narrowing, the EU's strategic autonomy in this product segment has materially weakened. These trends are consistent with broader patterns in European steelmaking — rising energy costs, carbon-pricing pressures, and intensifying competition from producers in Eastern Europe and Turkey — and suggest that, absent significant policy or investment interventions, the EU's import dependence for this wire rod grade is likely to persist or deepen.