Market evolution: Concrete reinforcing rod coils (CN 72139110) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the trade dynamics of concrete reinforcing rod coils (CN 72139110) — smooth, hot-rolled bars and rods of iron or non-alloy steel in irregularly wound coils with a circular cross-section below 14 mm in diameter — traded between the European Union and non-EU countries over the period 2015 to 2025. The product, mapped to Prodcom code 24.10.61.30 ("Wire rod used for concrete reinforcing"), is a fundamental input for the construction industry and a bellwether for infrastructure activity and steel market conditions. Over this eleven-year window, the EU's trade in this product underwent a profound structural shift: exports collapsed while imports grew, trade deficits widened, partner landscapes were reshuffled by geopolitical events, and unit values surged — all against a backdrop of declining domestic production volumes. The report is organized around three main findings.
I. The EU's transformation from near-balanced trader to net importer
Exports fell by more than two-thirds in value and three-quarters in volume
Between the first and last years of the data window, the EU's exports of CN 72139110 declined from €86.6 million (210,974 tonnes) in 2015 to just €30.0 million (51,330 tonnes) in the latest reported year — a drop of 65.3% in value and 75.7% in volume. The volume trough was reached at 49,893 tonnes, indicating that the most recent year already saw a modest recovery from the nadir. Nonetheless, the EU's role as an outward supplier of this product has been dramatically diminished.
Import values rose by half even as volumes grew only modestly
Over the same period, imports grew from €119.3 million (297,791 tonnes) to €179.5 million (333,771 tonnes) — an increase of 50.5% in value but only 12.1% in volume. This divergence reflects the sharp rise in unit values: import prices climbed from €400/t to €538/t (+34.3%), while export prices rose from €411/t to €585/t (+42.6%). The price increases are consistent with the global steel price spikes of 2021–2022 and the broader inflationary environment, but they also reflect structural repricing of the product.
The trade deficit widened nearly fivefold
The combined effect of collapsing exports and growing imports transformed the EU's trade balance. The deficit moved from −€32.7 million in the base year to −€149.4 million in the latest period — a deterioration of 358%. At its worst, the deficit reached −€224.1 million, confirming that the most recent figure, while large, already represents a partial recovery.
EU production volumes contracted but production values surged
Domestic production data tell a complementary story: physical output fell from 2.55 billion kg to 2.24 billion kg (−12.5%), yet the value of that production rose from €722 million to €1.36 billion (+88.8%). This is a striking divergence that underscores how price increases more than compensated for volume declines, suggesting that EU producers focused on higher-margin production and that cost pass-through was substantial.
Net import reliance declined despite the widening deficit
Paradoxically, the net import reliance ratio — defined as (imports − exports) / (imports + exports) — actually fell from 14.5% to 6.7% (−54.0%). This is because the denominator shrank as exports collapsed faster than imports grew. The metric also briefly turned negative (reaching −11.9%), indicating that in at least one year the EU was a net exporter by this measure. The decline in net import reliance thus masks the underlying deterioration of the trade balance in absolute terms.
II. A reshaped partner landscape driven by geopolitics and market access
Import origins underwent dramatic shifts
The top import partners in 2015 and the latest year are substantially different:
| Partner | First-year value (€M) | Last-year value (€M) | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Türkiye | 11.1 | 13.4 | +20.9 |
| Norway | 22.0 | 11.5 | −47.9 |
| United Kingdom | 14.5 | 28.2 | +93.7 |
| Malaysia | 43.0 | 33.8 | −21.3 |
| Ukraine | 24.5 | 2.1 | −91.5 |
| Russian Federation | 5.6 | 24.8 | +338.8 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 8.3 | 0.002 | −100.0 |
Several dynamics stand out. Ukraine's share collapsed by 91.5%, almost certainly reflecting the disruption caused by the 2022 invasion. Bosnia and Herzegovina's imports fell to virtually zero (−100%). Conversely, imports from the Russian Federation surged by 339% over the period — though it is important to note that this data window ends in 2025, and EU sanctions imposed from 2022 onward on Russian steel products may have caused a sharp decline in later years that is not fully visible in the first/last snapshot. The United Kingdom's role as a supplier nearly doubled (+93.7%), consistent with post-Brexit trade reorientation and the UK's continued integration in European steel supply chains.
Export destinations shifted from North Africa and the Middle East toward continental Europe
The export partner landscape was even more volatile:
| Partner | First-year value (€M) | Last-year value (€M) | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Morocco | 30.5 | 0.6 | −98.0 |
| Algeria | 35.7 | 21.5 | −39.8 |
| United Kingdom | 12.9 | 5.1 | −60.4 |
| Switzerland | 1.7 | 11.4 | +561.4 |
| Israel | 1.4 | 0.1 | −93.1 |
| Kosovo | 0.4 | 3.4 | +782.2 |
| Australia | 0.002 | 0.005 | +127.3 |
Morocco, once the EU's single largest export market (€30.5M), saw purchases drop by 98%. Algeria also declined substantially. Meanwhile, Switzerland (+561%) and Kosovo (+782%) emerged as surprisingly significant destinations. These shifts likely reflect changing construction booms in North Africa, trade policy changes, and the re-routing of EU exports toward neighboring and Balkan markets.
Internal EU trade flows were also reconfigured
Among EU member states acting as importers, the shifts were equally dramatic:
| EU Importer | First-year value (€M) | Last-year value (€M) | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sweden | 22.0 | 0.02 | −99.9 |
| Spain | 9.9 | 43.2 | +337.8 |
| Belgium | 11.5 | 47.2 | +309.9 |
| Bulgaria | 14.2 | 24.9 | +75.4 |
| Romania | 23.5 | 4.2 | −82.2 |
| Netherlands | 12.2 | 0.0 | −100.0 |
| Ireland | 6.6 | 13.3 | +100.9 |
Sweden and the Netherlands virtually disappeared as importers of this product, while Spain and Belgium became dominant buyers. This redistribution reflects both differing national construction cycles and the evolving role of port-based logistics hubs (Belgium, Netherlands) in redistributing steel products.
On the export side, Portugal's exports collapsed from €69.9M to €5.7M (−91.8%), while Italy grew from €0.25M to €14.9M (+5,825%). France rose from €2.6M to €7.1M (+177%). These shifts suggest that Italy — the EU's most specialised producer after Portugal (RCA 6.33 vs. 13.54) — absorbed export market share as Portuguese capacity was redeployed or contracted.
III. Price shocks, volatility, and concentration patterns reveal a turbulent market
The 2021 global steel price spike left a pronounced mark
The shock detection analysis identifies three major price shock events, all centered on 2021:
| Entity | Flow | Abnormality score | Price shift (%) | Value share (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | Imports | 24.2 | +73.0 | 19.5 |
| Switzerland | Exports | 15.9 | +48.9 | 19.5 |
| Kosovo | Exports | 12.3 | +51.0 | 5.2 |
The 2021 period corresponds to the post-COVID-19 global steel price surge, when supply chain disruptions, energy cost spikes, and pent-up construction demand combined to push steel prices to historic highs. The United Kingdom — the EU's single largest import partner by value in the latest year — saw import prices jump by 73% in a single year, the most abnormal event in the dataset. Export prices to Switzerland and Kosovo rose by 49% and 51% respectively, suggesting that EU exporters were able to pass through cost increases to these buyers.
Import source volatility varies widely
The coefficient of variation for imports from key partners reveals vastly different degrees of supply reliability:
| Import Partner | CV |
|---|---|
| Malaysia | 0.15 |
| Norway | 0.36 |
| Türkiye | 0.60 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 0.74 |
| Russian Federation | 0.77 |
| United Kingdom | 0.92 |
| Ukraine | 1.05 |
| Belarus | 1.11 |
| Viet Nam | 1.39 |
Malaysia stands out as the most stable import source (CV 0.15), consistent with its role as a long-term, high-volume supplier. At the other extreme, Viet Nam (CV 1.39), Belarus (CV 1.11), and Ukraine (CV 1.05) exhibited highly volatile trade flows — unsurprising given the geopolitical turbulence affecting the latter two countries. The UK's high volatility (0.92) likely reflects post-Brexit trade adjustment and the 2021 price shock.
On the export side, volatility was similarly heterogeneous, with Australia (CV 1.56) and Israel (CV 1.43) showing the most erratic flows, while Switzerland (CV 0.48) and Algeria (CV 0.69) were more predictable destinations.
Import concentration remained moderate; export concentration eased
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value rose from 1,253 to 1,479 (+18%), remaining in the "moderately concentrated" range (1,000–2,500). The HHI for exports fell from 3,179 to 2,363 (−26%), moving from a "highly concentrated" level toward moderate concentration. This suggests that while import sourcing became slightly more concentrated — possibly reflecting the growing dominance of a few suppliers like the UK and Russia — export destinations diversified, with new markets like Kosovo and Switzerland reducing the historical dependence on North African buyers.
The EU's trade intensity declined, confirming structural insularity
The trade intensity ratio — measuring the openness of the EU market relative to production — fell from 16.9% to 12.2% (−27.7%), reaching a low of 11.1%. Meanwhile, the export propensity (exports as a share of production) rose from 1.5% to 3.2% (+108%), but from a very low base. The salience analysis flags export propensity as the most dynamic metric (score 155 vs. 65 for trade intensity), indicating that while the EU market became less trade-dependent overall, the small export segment showed notable relative growth. In absolute terms, however, the EU has become increasingly self-absorbed in this product segment, with production largely consumed domestically and imports filling supplementary demand.
Conclusion
Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU market for concrete reinforcing rod coils (CN 72139110) underwent a fundamental transformation. The EU shifted from a position of approximate trade balance to one of significant import dependence, with exports declining by over 75% in volume while imports grew modestly. This shift was accompanied by a dramatic reshuffling of trade partners: traditional North African export markets (Morocco, Algeria) contracted sharply, new European and Balkan destinations (Switzerland, Kosovo) emerged, and import sourcing was disrupted by Brexit, the war in Ukraine, and the pandemic-era steel price surge. Domestic production volumes declined even as production values nearly doubled, pointing to a repricing of the product rather than a simple loss of capacity. Price shocks in 2021 — affecting up to 19.5% of trade value with abnormality scores as high as 24.2 — left lasting marks on the market structure. Going forward, the combination of moderate import concentration (HHI ~1,479), declining trade intensity, and highly variable supply from geopolitical-risk partners suggests that the EU's vulnerability in this segment lies not in overwhelming dependence on a single source, but in the cumulative fragility of a diversified but politically exposed supplier base.