Market evolution: Hot rolled wire rod coils (CN 72139149) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in hot-rolled wire rod coils classified under customs code 72139149 over the period 2015–2025. The product — smooth, round, hot-rolled bars and rods in irregularly wound coils with a carbon content between 0.06% and 0.25% and a diameter under 14 mm — is a key semi-finished steel product used as feedstock in downstream manufacturing sectors such as fasteners, springs, wire drawing, and automotive components.

Over the decade under review, the EU's trade position in this product underwent a profound structural transformation. EU exports of the product fell by more than half in volume terms, while imports remained comparatively resilient. As a result, the EU's trade deficit widened substantially, and its net import reliance more than doubled. Concurrently, the geographical composition of trade shifted markedly: traditional suppliers in Europe's neighbourhood were partially displaced by a surge in imports from Asia, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia. Price shocks in 2021–2022, linked to post-pandemic demand recovery and the energy crisis triggered by the Russia–Ukraine conflict, added further turbulence.

The report is structured in three sections. First, it analyses the structural shift in the EU's trade balance and production base. Second, it examines the dramatic realignment of trading partners. Third, it discusses price shocks and supply volatility that shaped the period.

1. A Structural Shift Toward Import Dependence

The EU trade deficit widened dramatically

The EU entered 2015 with a trade deficit of approximately EUR 156 million in CN 72139149. By 2025, this deficit had more than doubled to EUR 338 million, representing a deterioration of 116.9%. At its nadir, the deficit reached EUR 814 million, underscoring the severity of the structural imbalance at its peak.

The deterioration was driven by two simultaneous trends:

The collapse of EU exports was particularly striking: volume fell by more than half over the decade, while import volumes remained broadly resilient, growing by 12.9% despite significant year-to-year fluctuations.

Domestic production contracted while unit values rose

The decline in exports coincided with a contraction in EU domestic production. Output fell from 8.62 billion kg in 2015 to 6.30 billion kg in 2025, a decline of 26.9%. Yet production value rose by 40.8% over the same period, from EUR 2.56 billion to EUR 3.60 billion — indicating that unit production values increased substantially, likely reflecting higher energy and raw material costs as well as a shift toward higher-value product mixes.

EU net import reliance grew from 6.0% in 2015 to 15.7% in 2025 — an increase of 163.6%. The metric even turned negative briefly (reaching −3.3%), indicating a short-lived period of net export surplus, before climbing steeply. By 2025, the EU was materially more dependent on external suppliers of this product than it had been a decade earlier.

Export propensity declined while trade intensity rose

The EU's export propensity — the share of domestic production exported to non-EU markets — fell from 8.7% to 6.4% (−25.7%), confirming that the EU's role as an exporter of this product diminished. By contrast, trade intensity — the combined share of imports and exports in apparent consumption — rose from 20.6% to 25.2% (+22.5%), indicating that the EU market became more open overall, albeit primarily on the import side.

EU production remains geographically concentrated

Specialisation data for 2025 reveals that production within the EU is heavily concentrated in a small number of member states:

Germany and Poland together account for nearly two-thirds of EU output. Greece, despite its small total share, exhibits the highest revealed comparative advantage (RCA of 6.87), suggesting a strong niche specialisation.

2. A Dramatic Realignment of Trading Partners

Asian suppliers surged while traditional European partners lost ground

The most striking feature of the import side is the rapid rise of Asian suppliers. Indonesia's exports to the EU grew by 726% in value terms over the period, from EUR 19 million in 2015 to EUR 160 million in 2025. Malaysia followed a similar trajectory, with imports rising from EUR 12 million to EUR 41 million (+254%). These two countries alone accounted for a combined EUR 201 million of EU imports by 2025.

The surge from Indonesia and Malaysia likely reflects the broader expansion of electric arc furnace (EAF) steelmaking capacity in Southeast Asia, combined with competitive pricing enabled by lower energy and labour costs. Türkiye, a long-standing supplier, also expanded its share, though its year-to-year volatility was exceptionally high (coefficient of variation of 0.89).

Meanwhile, Ukraine — the EU's single largest import source in 2015 at EUR 85 million — saw its exports to the EU decline by 21.7%, likely impacted by the disruption of the Russia–Ukraine conflict beginning in 2022. The United Kingdom's share also fell, possibly reflecting post-Brexit trade friction and realignment of supply chains.

EU export destinations shifted from North Africa to the UK and US

On the export side, the most dramatic decline was in Algeria, which collapsed from EUR 59 million to virtually zero (−99.9%). This was partially offset by growth in other markets:

The United Kingdom became the EU's largest export destination, absorbing EUR 21 million by 2025. Exports to the United States more than tripled. Israel also emerged as a significant market, with exports rising from negligible levels to EUR 1.8 million, having peaked at EUR 63 million during the 2021 price spike.

Within the EU, the Netherlands became the dominant import gateway

Among EU member states acting as reporters of imports, the Netherlands saw the largest increase, from EUR 16 million to EUR 103 million (+556%), reflecting its role as a major port of entry for goods destined for the broader EU market. Romania (+123%), Belgium (+123%), and Spain (+100%) also registered significant increases.

On the export side, Germany remained the leading EU exporter, growing from EUR 34 million to EUR 43 million (+27%), while Italy and Spain experienced steep declines of −93% and −83% respectively, pointing to a concentration of export capacity in fewer member states.

3. Price Shocks, Volatility, and Geopolitical Disruption

The 2021–2022 period saw extraordinary price shocks

The data reveals severe price shocks centred on 2021, affecting EU exports to several key partners:

These anomalies — with abnormality scores above 9 (indicating extreme deviations from normal patterns) — correspond to the global steel price spike of 2021, which was driven by a combination of post-COVID demand recovery, supply chain bottlenecks, and surging energy costs. The 2022 energy crisis, triggered by the Russia–Ukraine conflict, compounded these dynamics.

EU export prices rose from EUR 427/t in 2015 to a peak of EUR 901/t (at some point in the period) before settling at EUR 600/t in 2025 (+40.3%). Import prices followed a similar trajectory, rising from EUR 394/t to EUR 533/t (+35.4%).

Supply-side volatility varied sharply by partner

The coefficient of variation — a standardised measure of year-to-year fluctuation — reveals that some supply relationships were far more volatile than others:

The high volatility of Malaysian and Indonesian imports is consistent with opportunistic or price-driven trade flows that can shift rapidly in response to global market conditions. By contrast, Russia and Ukraine displayed relatively stable (if geopolitically disrupted) supply patterns.

On the export side, Algeria exhibited the highest volatility (CV of 1.49), consistent with its near-total collapse, while the United Kingdom (CV of 0.29) and North Macedonia (CV of 0.26) represented more stable outlets for EU producers.

Import concentration increased modestly while export markets diversified

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import concentration rose slightly from 1,862 to 2,030 (+9.0%), suggesting a modest increase in supplier concentration. While still below the 2,500 threshold typically associated with a highly concentrated market, the upward trend is notable, driven by the growing dominance of Indonesia and the continued importance of Russia.

By contrast, export concentration fell sharply, from 3,076 to 1,683 (−45.3%). This reflects the collapse of the Algeria-dependent export pattern and a shift toward more diversified markets including the UK, US, Switzerland, and the Western Balkans. The reduction in export concentration suggests improved resilience on the outbound side, even as overall export volumes declined.

Conclusion

Over the decade 2015–2025, the EU's trade in hot-rolled wire rod coils (CN 72139149) underwent a fundamental transformation. The EU shifted from a position of moderate import dependence to one of significantly greater reliance on foreign suppliers, with net import reliance rising from 6% to nearly 16%. This was driven not by a surge in imports per se, but rather by a collapse in EU export capacity — volumes halved — coinciding with a 27% decline in domestic production.

The geographical composition of trade was reshaped by two forces. On the import side, the rise of Indonesia and Malaysia as major suppliers, alongside the continued importance of Russia and Türkiye, displaced traditional European partners such as Ukraine and the UK. On the export side, the loss of the Algerian market was offset by growth in the UK, US, and Western Balkan markets, resulting in a more diversified but smaller export base.

The 2021–2022 period represented a major inflection point, with extreme price shocks reflecting global supply chain disruptions and the energy crisis. These events exposed the EU's vulnerability on both the import and export sides, though the diversification of export markets has provided some buffer.

Looking ahead, the key structural question is whether EU producers can arrest the decline in competitiveness suggested by falling export volumes and rising import reliance, or whether the current trajectory — characterised by a shrinking production base, increasing dependence on Asian suppliers, and concentration of output in a few member states — will persist.