Market evolution: Tripods and supports (CN 9620) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of EU trade in Monopods, bipods, tripods and similar articles (Combined Nomenclature code 9620) over the period 2017–2025. Although the data window was defined as 2015–2025, usable annual data is available from 2017 onward.
The period under review witnessed a dramatic structural shift in the EU's trade position. What was a sector with a comfortable trade surplus in 2017 turned into a sector running a substantial deficit by 2025. Imports surged in both value and volume, driven overwhelmingly by Chinese supply, while EU exports contracted—particularly to the United Kingdom. At the same time, EU domestic production expanded significantly, suggesting a complex picture where some Member States doubled down on manufacturing even as the overall trade balance deteriorated.
The report is organised in three sections: the first addresses the macro-level trade balance reversal; the second focuses on the pivotal role of China; and the third examines the shifting internal structure of the EU market, including the redistribution of trade flows among Member States, specialisation patterns, and shocks.
1. From surplus to deficit: the structural reversal of EU trade
The most striking feature of the 2017–2025 period is the complete inversion of the EU's trade balance in CN 9620 products.
Exports declined while imports nearly doubled in value
In 2017, the EU exported €109.5 million worth of tripods and supports, compared to €78.0 million in imports—a surplus of €31.4 million. By 2025, exports had fallen to €74.0 million (−32.4%) while imports had risen to €157.1 million (+101.4%), producing a deficit of €83.1 million.
| Indicator | 2017 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exports (€M) | 109.5 | 74.0 | −32.4% |
| Imports (€M) | 78.0 | 157.1 | +101.4% |
| Trade balance (€M) | +31.4 | −83.1 | −364.4% |
Import volumes surged far faster than import values
The growth in imports was driven principally by volume rather than value. Import quantities rose from 3,895 tonnes to 13,256 tonnes—a 240.4% increase—while import values roughly doubled. This divergence is explained by a steep decline in the unit import price, which fell from €20,031 per tonne to €11,848 per tonne (−40.8%). This price compression strongly suggests a shift in the product mix toward lower-cost imports, consistent with the rising dominance of mass-produced Chinese goods.
| Indicator | 2017 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import quantity (t) | 3,895 | 13,256 | +240.4% |
| Import price (€/t) | 20,031 | 11,848 | −40.8% |
| Export quantity (t) | 3,204 | 2,077 | −35.2% |
| Export price (€/t) | 34,159 | 35,581 | +4.2% |
Export prices held up even as volumes fell
A contrasting dynamic is visible on the export side. Export quantities fell by 35.2%, yet the unit export price edged up by 4.2% to €35,581 per tonne—roughly three times the import price by 2025. This suggests that the EU continued to export higher-value, specialised products (professional photography equipment, industrial supports, etc.) even as it lost volume. The rising price gap between EU exports and imports underscores the bifurcation of the market: low-cost volume moving inward, higher-value niche products moving outward.
EU domestic production expanded dramatically
Despite the deterioration in trade flows, EU production value in this product category grew from €235.6 million to an estimated €1,128.6 million (+379.1%), with a peak near €1.6 billion. This enormous expansion—far outstripping the growth in exports or the decline in net exports—indicates that the EU's domestic market for tripod-type products grew substantially, likely driven by the content-creator economy, increased videoconferencing (accelerated by COVID-19), and expanding demand for camera stabilisation accessories. However, a larger share of this domestic demand appears to have been met by imports rather than EU-manufactured goods entering the export market.
2. China's ascent and the growing concentration of EU imports
The surge in EU imports is almost entirely explained by one bilateral relationship: China.
China became the overwhelmingly dominant supplier
Imports from China rose from €31.6 million in 2017 to €127.1 million in 2025—an increase of 301.8%. By 2025, China alone accounted for over 80% of the total EU import bill in this product category. No other partner came close: the next-largest supplier (the United States) contributed only €6.3 million.
| Partner | Imports 2017 (€M) | Imports 2025 (€M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 31.6 | 127.1 | +301.8% |
| United States | 2.6 | 6.3 | +144.4% |
| Switzerland | 2.9 | 4.7 | +60.6% |
| India | 1.1 | 2.1 | +84.3% |
| Taiwan | 0.3 | 1.7 | +431.9% |
| United Kingdom | 20.8 | 6.0 | −71.1% |
| Costa Rica | 15.6 | 2.1 | −86.3% |
The Taiwan figure, while small in absolute terms, also warrants attention: imports rose by 431.9%, suggesting some diversification of East Asian sourcing for higher-specification components.
Import concentration intensified sharply
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU imports by value rose from 2,785 to 6,703 (+140.7%). An HHI above 2,500 is generally considered to indicate a highly concentrated market; by 2025, the EU's import profile for tripods and supports was extremely concentrated by any standard. This concentration raises questions about supply-chain resilience: any disruption to Chinese manufacturing or logistics (as partly witnessed during COVID-19) would have outsized effects on EU supply.
Price shocks highlighted the China dependency
The volatility analysis detected a notable price shock in Chinese imports centred on 2020, with an abnormality score of 39.0 and a price shift of −16.6%. This coincides with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and likely reflects a combination of reduced global demand, disrupted logistics, and inventory destocking. Yet by 2021–2022, Chinese import volumes and values recovered and then accelerated further, indicating the resilience—and deepening—of the China–EU supply link in this sector.
Export concentration moved in the opposite direction
While imports became more concentrated, export concentration fell from an HHI of 2,508 to 1,280 (−48.9%). This reflects the decline of the United Kingdom as the dominant EU export destination and the partial diversification toward Switzerland, Norway, and other markets. The EU's export base became less dependent on any single partner, albeit partly because total export values shrank.
3. Internal restructuring: shifting roles of EU Member States and trade shocks
Beyond the aggregate figures, the period 2017–2025 saw significant redistribution of trade activity among EU Member States, as well as a series of geopolitical and macroeconomic shocks that left lasting marks on trade patterns.
The United Kingdom's exit reshaped both import and export flows
The United Kingdom was the EU's single largest export destination for tripods in 2017, absorbing €49.5 million (45% of EU exports). By 2025, this had collapsed to €12.1 million (−75.5%). Simultaneously, UK-sourced imports into the EU fell from €20.8 million to €6.0 million (−71.1%). The timing of this decline is consistent with the post-Brexit trade regime that took full effect in 2021, introducing customs formalities, regulatory divergence, and non-tariff barriers. The UK's departure from the EU single market effectively severed what had been the most important bilateral trade corridor in this product category.
Belgium and the Netherlands emerged as dominant EU import hubs
Within the EU, the import landscape shifted markedly. Belgium saw imports surge from €0.7 million to €31.2 million (+4,670.9%), while the Netherlands nearly doubled from €18.5 million to €36.6 million (+97.3%). Both countries' roles as logistics gateways—Antwerp and Rotterdam being Europe's principal seaports for containerised goods from Asia—likely explains this pattern: as Chinese imports surged, they disproportionately entered the EU through these ports. France (+507.0%) and Poland (+307.1%) also recorded substantial import growth, suggesting broader geographic spread of Chinese-sourced products across the EU.
| EU Importer | Imports 2017 (€M) | Imports 2025 (€M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Netherlands | 18.5 | 36.6 | +97.3% |
| Germany | 30.3 | 32.5 | +7.1% |
| Belgium | 0.7 | 31.2 | +4,671% |
| France | 1.5 | 9.1 | +507% |
| Poland | 2.0 | 8.2 | +307% |
| Italy | 7.7 | 7.0 | −10.0% |
| Sweden | 4.4 | 5.1 | +16.1% |
Italy retained its role as the EU's top exporter but lost ground
Italy remained the EU's largest exporter in this category throughout the period, but its exports fell from €51.8 million to €29.0 million (−43.9%). This is consistent with Italian manufacturers facing increasing competition from low-cost Asian producers in mid-range product segments. Germany (+146.8%) and Denmark (+915.5%) partially compensated, but the net effect was a decline in total EU export capacity.
Specialisation data confirms a niche European production model
The revealed comparative advantage analysis for 2025 shows that the Netherlands (RSCA: 0.31), Belgium (0.28), Denmark (0.23), Italy (0.18), and Sweden (0.14) have a revealed comparative advantage in this product. These countries account for a disproportionate share of EU exports relative to their overall trade, suggesting they host specialised manufacturers or niche brands (e.g., professional camera support equipment, firearm accessories). Conversely, smaller Member States such as Cyprus, Malta, and Ireland show no meaningful specialisation in this category.
Geopolitical shocks: Russia and the UK
Two partners stand out for the severity of their trade declines with the EU. Exports to the Russian Federation fell by 99.0% (from €2.0 million to virtually nothing), a collapse that aligns with the EU sanctions regime imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The coefficient of variation for this corridor (0.79) confirms extreme instability. Meanwhile, the UK corridor, while not geopolitically driven in the same way, exhibited a CV of 0.72 on the import side—reflecting the structural disruption of Brexit.
COVID-19 created a transient but detectable pricing disruption
The shock detection analysis identified a 2020-centred price shock in EU exports to the United Kingdom (abnormality: 13.0, price shift: +80.9%). This likely reflects a combination of pandemic-era demand spikes for home-office and content-creation equipment, supply chain disruptions, and the immediate pre-Brexit stockpiling effects. The shock was temporary: by 2021–2022, UK export flows had normalised at much lower levels due to structural (Brexit-related) changes rather than cyclical factors.
Conclusion
The EU market for tripods, monopods, and similar supports underwent a profound transformation between 2017 and 2025. The EU shifted from a net exporter to a net importer, with a trade balance swing of over €114 million. This reversal was driven overwhelmingly by the rapid growth of Chinese imports, which tripled in value and now account for the vast majority of EU import supply—creating a level of concentration that poses meaningful supply-chain risk.
Simultaneously, EU exports contracted, largely due to the loss of the UK market following Brexit and declining shipments to sanctioned Russia. Italy remains the EU's principal exporter, but at reduced volumes. A small cluster of specialised Member States (the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Sweden) continues to hold a comparative advantage in niche, higher-value segments.
The EU's domestic production grew substantially over the period, suggesting robust underlying demand—driven in part by new consumer use cases such as smartphone gimbals, vlogging equipment, and videoconferencing accessories. However, this growing demand has been increasingly served by imports rather than domestic output destined for export.
Looking ahead, the extreme concentration of EU imports in China, combined with ongoing geopolitical tensions and supply-chain reconfiguration efforts, suggests that diversification of sourcing will be a key strategic priority for this sector. The recent growth in imports from Taiwan, India, and the United States, while still small in scale, may represent early signals of such a shift.