Market evolution: Rubber gloves (CN 4015) — 2015–2025
Introduction
CN 4015 covers articles of apparel and clothing accessories of vulcanised rubber — overwhelmingly rubber gloves for medical, surgical, industrial, and household purposes. It is a bundling heading that encompasses three subcategories: medical and surgical gloves (401512), other rubber gloves (401519), and other rubber apparel and accessories (401590). Over the 2015–2025 decade, the EU's external trade in this product class has been shaped by three defining dynamics: an extraordinary demand shock triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, a significant reconfiguration of global supply chains toward China and away from Malaysia, and a deepening structural reliance on imports amid the near-total disappearance of domestic production. This report examines each dynamic in turn, drawing on EU extra-EU trade data for the period 2015–2025.
1. The COVID-19 Demand Surge and Its Aftermath
Import values surged to over four times their pre-pandemic level
The most dramatic feature of the decade is the explosive growth in EU rubber glove imports during 2020–2021. Total import values for CN 4015 reached a peak of €5.21 billion, compared to a 2015 baseline of €1.20 billion and a 2016 trough of €1.18 billion. This means that peak pandemic imports were more than four times the pre-crisis norm. In volume terms, imports climbed from 266,269 tonnes in 2015 to a maximum of 438,994 tonnes — a 65% increase — before retreating.
The segment data confirms that the surge was driven overwhelmingly by rubber gloves, both medical (401512) and non-medical (401519). Although 401512 data is only separately available from 2022 onward, the gap between the reported segment totals and the overall 4015 figures strongly suggests that medical glove imports alone exceeded €2.2 billion at the 2021 peak. Non-medical gloves (401519) surged from €819 million in 2019 to €2.91 billion in 2021.
| Year | 401519 — Non-medical gloves (€M) | 401512 — Medical gloves (€M) | 401590 — Other apparel (€M) | 4015 Total (€M) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 731 | not separately reported | 29 | 1,203 |
| 2019 | 819 | not separately reported | 36 | — |
| 2020 | 1,811 | not separately reported | 98 | — |
| 2021 | 2,913 | not separately reported | 68 | 5,215 |
| 2022 | 1,064 | 1,265 | 60 | 2,389 |
| 2023 | 556 | 713 | 40 | 1,309 |
| 2024 | 667 | 973 | 32 | 1,672 |
| 2025 | 656 | 960 | 35 | 1,651 |
Prices spiked during the crisis before returning to baseline
The pandemic inflated not only volumes but also unit prices. Average import prices rose from €4,519 per tonne in 2015 to a maximum of €11,879 per tonne — a 163% increase. At the supplementary-unit level, the per-pair import price of non-medical gloves (401519) climbed from €0.048 in 2015 to a peak of €0.116 in 2021, while medical gloves (401512) entered at €0.054 per pair in 2022 before declining to €0.032 by 2025.
The data also reveals specific price shocks: Chinese import prices exhibited an abnormality score of 24.8 in 2020, with a year-on-year shift of +153.3%. This is consistent with global panic buying, hoarding, and supply chain disruptions that characterised the early pandemic period.
A rapid correction brought the market back to pre-crisis norms
From 2022 onward, the market underwent a sharp correction. By 2025, total imports stood at €1.65 billion — only 37.2% above the 2015 baseline but roughly 68% below the 2021 peak. Import volumes settled at 359,841 tonnes. Unit prices returned almost exactly to their starting point: €4,587 per tonne in 2025 versus €4,519 in 2015. The post-pandemic market also saw a notable price shock on the export side, with export prices to the United Arab Emirates and Türkiye showing abnormal shifts of +43.7% and +83.4% respectively in 2021, reflecting re-routing and arbitrage dynamics during the supply crunch.
The pattern is consistent with a temporary, largely one-off demand surge that has now fully unwound, leaving the market at a modestly higher structural level — likely reflecting permanently elevated baseline glove usage in healthcare settings.
2. Reconfiguration of Global Supply Chains
China emerged as the EU's leading supplier, displacing Malaysia
The decade saw a dramatic reshuffling of the EU's import sources for rubber gloves. In 2015, Malaysia was by far the dominant supplier, accounting for €719 million — roughly 60% of total imports. By 2025, Malaysian imports had fallen to €490 million (−31.8%), although they peaked at an extraordinary €2.94 billion during the pandemic.
By contrast, Chinese exports to the EU surged from just €83 million in 2015 to €715 million in 2025 — an increase of 765.9%. China's share rose from under 7% to become the single largest source of EU rubber glove imports by value. This shift reflects both China's aggressive expansion of glove manufacturing capacity during and after the pandemic and a broader structural realignment of global supply chains.
| Supplier | 2015 (€M) | 2025 (€M) | Change (%) | Peak (€M) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malaysia | 719 | 490 | −31.8% | 2,943 |
| China | 83 | 715 | +765.9% | 1,166 |
| Thailand | 203 | 193 | −4.7% | 557 |
| Indonesia | 57 | 44 | −23.4% | 145 |
| Sri Lanka | 44 | 102 | +135.3% | 115 |
| United Kingdom | 31 | 12 | −62.2% | 73 |
| Viet Nam | 30 | 27 | −8.3% | 139 |
Smaller Asian producers expanded their presence
Beyond the Malaysia–China shift, several smaller suppliers gained ground. Sri Lankan exports to the EU more than doubled from €44 million to €102 million (+135.3%), likely reflecting the expansion of domestic manufacturers who captured pandemic-era spillover demand. Among the EU's export destinations, the United Kingdom remained the largest but declined from €71 million to €37 million (−47.8%), partly reflecting post-Brexit trade friction. Switzerland (+92.1% to €39 million) and Türkiye (+30.6% to €10 million) gained importance as export markets, while Serbia emerged as a fast-growing destination (+179.5% to €5.1 million).
Import and export concentration declined substantially
The diversification of both import sources and export destinations is confirmed by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The import HHI by value fell from 3,952 in 2015 to 2,950 in 2025 (−25.3%), indicating a shift from a highly concentrated supply base toward a more diversified one. On the export side, concentration fell even more sharply (−49.1%), from 1,919 to 977, as EU exporters broadened their reach across multiple destinations. The coefficient of variation of import flows from China (0.82) and Malaysia (0.34) confirms that the newer Chinese supply relationship is more volatile, consistent with a market still in structural transition.
3. Structural Dependency and the Erosion of EU Manufacturing
Net import reliance remains stubbornly above 90%
The EU's net import reliance for CN 4015 stood at 92.0% in 2025, up from 90.0% in 2015 — a 2.2 percentage-point increase. This means that the EU satisfies barely 8% of its consumption through domestic production. The ratio remained remarkably stable throughout the period, including during the pandemic, when both imports and consumption surged in tandem. The trade deficit widened from €1.03 billion in 2015 to €1.45 billion in 2025 (+41.7%), underscoring the persistent and growing structural imbalance.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net import reliance | 90.0% | 92.0% | +2.2 pp |
| Trade balance (€bn) | −1.03 | −1.45 | −41.7% |
| Trade intensity | 103.2% | 103.8% | +0.6 pp |
| Export propensity | 136.2% | 153.1% | +12.5% |
EU domestic production has virtually disappeared
The most alarming trend in the data is the near-total collapse of EU production. Production volume fell from 7.61 billion pairs in 2015 to just 130 million pairs in 2025 — a decline of 98.3%. Over the same period, production value declined more moderately, from €231 million to €128 million (−44.5%).
The divergence between volume and value collapses is revealing. The implied per-pair production value rose from approximately €0.03 in 2015 to nearly €1.00 in 2025 — a roughly 30-fold increase. This indicates that the EU has essentially exited mass-market rubber glove manufacturing, which has been entirely offshored to Asia, while retaining a small residual production base focused on high-value, specialised products — likely certified industrial or medical gloves where quality standards, traceability, or proximity to European healthcare systems command a premium.
This collapse occurred despite heightened policy awareness during the pandemic of the strategic risks of import dependency for personal protective equipment.
The EU functions increasingly as a trade redistribution hub
Export propensity — the ratio of EU exports to EU production — rose from 136% in 2015 to 153% in 2025, meaning the EU exports substantially more rubber gloves than it manufactures. Trade intensity remained consistently above 100% (103.2% to 103.8%), confirming that the EU is deeply integrated into global rubber glove trade flows in a way that exceeds what domestic production and consumption alone would predict.
This apparent paradox is explained by the EU's role as a trade redistribution hub: imported gloves are channelled through major EU logistics centres — notably in Belgium (RSCA of 0.51, the highest specialisation in the EU), the Netherlands (€152 million in imports, +33.9%), and Germany (€420 million in imports, +24.9%, and the largest EU exporter at €68 million) — and re-exported to other European and global markets.
Conclusion
The EU rubber glove market over 2015–2025 has been defined by a single dominant shock and two persistent structural trends. The COVID-19 pandemic drove imports to €5.2 billion in 2021 — more than four times the pre-crisis norm — before a full correction brought the market back to €1.65 billion by 2025. In the longer term, China has replaced Malaysia as the EU's leading supplier (rising from €83 million to €715 million in imports), and supply concentration has declined significantly. Yet this diversification has not reduced the EU's fundamental vulnerability: net import reliance remains above 90%, and domestic production has collapsed by 98% in volume terms. With the EU now functioning more as a logistics and redistribution node than a manufacturing base for rubber gloves, the market remains structurally dependent on Asian supply chains.