Market evolution: Rubber gloves (CN 401519) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in vulcanised rubber gloves (excluding medical, surgical, dental and veterinary types) under Combined Nomenclature code 401519 over the period 2015–2025. The product covers a wide range of household, industrial and protective rubber gloves. The EU is overwhelmingly dependent on imports for this product category, with net import reliance consistently hovering around 96–97% throughout the entire period. EU production of rubber gloves is marginal — estimated at just 9 million pairs in the most recent year, down from 18 million pairs at the start of the period. Against this backdrop, the market experienced a dramatic disruption during the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by a reconfiguration of supplier relationships that has reshaped the import landscape heading into 2025.

1. The COVID-19 Surge: A Temporary Spike That Reshaped the Market

1.1 An unprecedented demand shock in 2020

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the massive import spike driven by the COVID-19 pandemic. EU imports of rubber gloves surged to €2.91 billion in value — nearly four times the 2015 level of €731 million and the maximum recorded over the entire window. Import volumes also peaked at approximately 237,894 tonnes and 25.17 billion pairs, compared to 170,405 tonnes and 15.10 billion pairs in 2015. This reflects the extraordinary global scramble for all categories of protective gloves during the pandemic, including industrial and household types captured under this residual heading.

1.2 A dramatic price spike accompanied the volume surge

The pandemic was not only a volume event but also a severe price shock. Average EU import prices per tonne reached a maximum of €12,245 — roughly triple the normal level of approximately €4,100–4,300. By pair, the supplementary price peaked at €0.116, more than double the usual €0.048–0.05 range. A specific price shock event centred on China in 2020 recorded a +104.4% price shift with an abnormality score of 17.1, reflecting severe supply-demand imbalances at the peak of the crisis. The EU trade deficit in this product ballooned to €−2.73 billion at its widest, compared to a more typical annual shortfall of €−458 million to €−632 million.

1.3 A rapid return to pre-pandemic levels

By 2025, EU import values had returned to €655.6 million and volumes to 152,035 tonnes — broadly in line with the 2015 starting point. The deficit narrowed back to €−556 million. This normalisation confirms that the pandemic-era demand was a one-off shock rather than a structural shift in the rubber glove market. However, the episode left lasting effects on sourcing patterns and supplier market shares, as detailed in the next section.

2. A Restructuring of Global Supply Chains

2.1 Malaysia: from dominant supplier to declining share

In 2015, Malaysia was by far the EU's largest supplier of rubber gloves, accounting for €425.1 million — more than half of total imports. By 2025, Malaysian imports had fallen to €163.5 million, a decline of 61.5%. While Malaysia experienced a spike during the pandemic (max import value of €1,567 million), its post-pandemic position has eroded substantially. This decline likely reflects a combination of capacity constraints during the crisis (prompting buyers to diversify), Malaysia's own glove industry challenges, and competitive pressure from China.

2.2 China's meteoric rise as a supplier

The most dramatic partner-level shift has been China's ascent. Chinese exports of rubber gloves to the EU grew from just €59.8 million in 2015 to €248.7 million in 2025 — a +316% increase. China went from being the fourth-largest supplier to the second-largest, and now accounts for the single largest share of EU rubber glove imports by value. This is consistent with the broader pattern of China expanding its share in personal protective equipment and industrial goods following the pandemic, leveraging scale and competitive pricing. However, volatility data shows that Chinese imports carry a relatively high coefficient of variation (0.59), suggesting the relationship remains somewhat unstable.

2.3 Diversification across Southeast Asia and beyond

Beyond the Malaysia-to-China shift, several other supply-side dynamics are noteworthy:

Sri Lanka doubled its exports to the EU, while Thailand remained remarkably stable. Indonesia and Viet Nam both lost ground. The UK's sharp decline (−74%) is likely related to post-Brexit trade reclassification and the transition of the UK from an intra-EU to an extra-EU partner. Overall, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports fell from 3,729 to 2,469 (−33.8%), indicating that the supplier base has become meaningfully more diversified, even as China has gained ground individually.

2.4 Export-side shifts: the UK and Switzerland dominate EU outward flows

EU exports of rubber gloves remained roughly stable in value (€99.3 million to €99.6 million) but collapsed in volume — down 47.3% by weight and 55.9% by pair count. This implies a sharp increase in the unit value of exported gloves, with the average export price rising from €8,156/t to €15,527/t (+90.4%). The UK remained the top export destination (€19.4 million, down from €41.2 million), followed by Switzerland (€16.3 million, up from €10.7 million). Exports to Russia fell by 68.2%, reflecting the impact of sanctions following 2022. The export-side HHI declined sharply from 1,984 to 932 (−53.0%), pointing to greater geographic diversification of EU outward flows as well.

3. Structural Vulnerabilities and Declining Domestic Capacity

3.1 EU production has halved

The EU's domestic production of rubber gloves has declined from an estimated 18 million pairs (valued at €26.0 million) in 2015 to just 9 million pairs (valued at €20.0 million) in 2025 — a halving of volume and a 23% decline in value. This widening gap between production and consumption means the EU's import dependence, already at 97%, has not meaningfully improved. The export propensity of the EU in this product is notably high (488.8% in 2025), reflecting that EU-based producers — likely specialised niche manufacturers — export far more in value than the domestic market consumes locally. This points to a market structure where remaining EU producers occupy high-value specialised niches while mass-market demand is entirely met by imports.

3.2 Belgium stands out as the EU's specialised producer

The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals that Belgium is by far the most specialised EU Member State in this product, with an RSCA of 0.65 and an RCA of 4.79. Belgium accounts for 40.6% of EU production volume despite representing only 8.5% of total EU trade in the product. Spain (RSCA 0.13) and France (RSCA 0.04) also show mild specialisation, while Germany, despite being the EU's largest importer by absolute value (€123.1 million in 2025), shows no specialisation advantage (RCA 0.90). Most other Member States — including large economies like Italy (RCA 0.73) — are net importers with no comparative advantage.

3.3 Persistent import dependency creates strategic exposure

The combination of near-total import reliance (96.6% in 2025), a halving of domestic production, and historical volatility in key supplier relationships constitutes a meaningful strategic exposure. The pandemic demonstrated this vividly: when global supply chains buckled in 2020, the EU faced simultaneous demand surges and supply disruptions, driving import prices to unprecedented levels. While the HHI-based diversification has improved, the growing reliance on China — which now accounts for a far larger share than in 2015 — introduces a different kind of concentration risk. Meanwhile, trade intensity has risen modestly from 107.4% to 111.3%, reinforcing the structural openness of the EU market in this segment.

Conclusion

The EU market for non-medical vulcanised rubber gloves over 2015–2025 has been defined by three overarching dynamics: a dramatic but temporary COVID-19 shock, a significant reconfiguration of supplier geography (from Malaysia to China), and a continued erosion of domestic production capacity. By 2025, the market has largely normalised in volume and price terms from its pandemic peak, with total import values and quantities close to 2015 levels. However, the underlying structure has shifted: China is now the dominant supplier, import concentration has decreased overall, and EU production has halved. The EU's near-total import dependency of 97% remains unchanged, making the market structurally reliant on Asian supply chains. While greater diversification across partners provides some resilience, the rapid growth of Chinese share warrants continued monitoring from a supply-security perspective.