Market evolution: Rubber scrap and waste (CN 4004) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report analyses the trade dynamics of EU extra-EU commerce in CN 4004 — Waste, parings and scrap of soft rubber and powders and granules obtained therefrom over the 2015–2025 period. This product category covers recyclable rubber materials, a segment increasingly relevant to circular economy objectives and global recycling supply chains.
Over the decade examined, the EU's trade position in this market has undergone a dramatic transformation. Exports surged from EUR 24.6 million in 2015 to EUR 72.6 million in 2025, while the trade surplus widened from EUR 17.2 million to EUR 59.3 million. However, this expansion has not been uniform: it has been characterised by a sharp volume-driven export boom to a small set of fast-growing destinations, declining unit export prices, and a notable geographical reorientation of both trade flows and their concentration. This report identifies three core dynamics and examines each in detail.
General overview of CN 4004 trade on Trade Dashboard
1. The EU's surging export dominance driven by volume over price
1.1 A fourfold increase in export volume underpins the trade surplus expansion
The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the scale of EU export growth. Export quantities rose from 299,310 tonnes in 2015 to 1,268,694 tonnes in 2025, representing a +323.9% increase over the decade. In value terms, exports grew from EUR 24.6 million to EUR 72.6 million (+195.4%). As a result, the EU's trade surplus in rubber scrap widened from EUR 17.2 million to EUR 59.3 million (+245.9%).
This expansion transformed the EU from a moderate net exporter into a major one, confirming that rubber scrap and waste is a product category in which the EU consistently generates a trade surplus with the rest of the world.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (EUR million) | 24.6 | 72.6 | +195.4% |
| Export quantity (tonnes) | 299,310 | 1,268,694 | +323.9% |
| Import value (EUR million) | 7.4 | 13.3 | +78.8% |
| Import quantity (tonnes) | 50,622 | 62,663 | +23.8% |
| Trade surplus (EUR million) | 17.2 | 59.3 | +245.9% |
1.2 Export volumes grew much faster than values, reflecting persistent price erosion
A critical nuance is that while export volumes quadrupled, the corresponding value increase was "only" 195%. This gap is explained by a decline in unit export prices, which fell from EUR 82.2/tonne in 2015 to EUR 57.3/tonne in 2025 (–30.3%). The minimum average export price during the decade was EUR 45.2/tonne, indicating that prices were under sustained downward pressure for much of the period.
This pattern suggests that EU exporters increasingly shipped larger volumes of lower-grade or lower-value rubber scrap, or that global demand conditions placed downward pressure on prices for this material. In either case, the EU's export growth was predominantly a volume story rather than a value-upgrading one.
| Metric | 2015 | Min (period) | Max (period) | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avg. export price (EUR/t) | 82.2 | 45.2 | 84.6 | 57.3 | –30.3% |
| Avg. import price (EUR/t) | 146.9 | 114.8 | 697.6 | 212.2 | +44.4% |
1.3 Import prices moved in the opposite direction, widening the price gap
In contrast to the export side, average import prices rose by 44.4%, from EUR 146.9/tonne in 2015 to EUR 212.2/tonne in 2025. The maximum observed import price (EUR 697.6/tonne) points to isolated episodes of premium-priced imports, likely from specialised sources or during periods of supply tightness.
The widening divergence between export and import unit prices — with imports priced roughly 3.7 times higher than exports by 2025 — implies a structural segmentation of the market: the EU exports relatively low-value rubber scrap in bulk, while importing smaller but more expensive quantities, possibly of higher-grade or processed materials, or from geographically distant sources with higher logistics costs.
2. A geographical reorientation of trade: emerging economies replace traditional partners
2.1 Export flows pivoted decisively towards Türkiye, India, and other emerging markets
The most dramatic changes in the EU's rubber scrap trade occurred in the destination markets for exports. Three countries stand out for their extraordinary growth:
| Destination | Value 2015 (EUR) | Value 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Türkiye | 639,115 | 18,554,389 | +2,803% |
| India | 1,640,366 | 26,383,058 | +1,508% |
| Belarus | 117,001 | 1,286,889 | +1,000% |
| Morocco | 2,605,167 | 6,379,285 | +144.9% |
| Pakistan | 480,190 | 621,379 | +29.4% |
| United Kingdom | 3,533,089 | 3,255,292 | –7.9% |
| Korea, Republic of | 721,914 | ~0 | –100.0% |
Partner-level trade data on Trade Dashboard
India became the EU's single largest export destination by 2025, absorbing EUR 26.4 million in rubber scrap — more than a third of total EU exports. Türkiye followed at EUR 18.6 million. Together, these two countries alone accounted for roughly 62% of all EU rubber scrap exports by value. Meanwhile, South Korea — once a meaningful buyer — disappeared entirely from the trade, and the United Kingdom saw a modest decline despite post-Brexit regulatory continuity.
This reorientation reflects the growing demand for raw recyclable rubber in countries with expanding tyre and rubber-products manufacturing sectors. India and Türkiye, in particular, have both invested heavily in rubber recycling and reprocessing capacity over the past decade.
2.2 Import sources consolidated around the United Kingdom, while some suppliers vanished
On the import side, the United Kingdom became the dominant supplier, with imports rising from EUR 1.4 million in 2015 to EUR 5.8 million in 2025 (+303.8%). The UK now accounts for roughly 43% of all EU rubber scrap imports by value, reflecting deep supply-chain linkages that persisted — and in some cases deepened — after Brexit.
Other notable import trends include:
| Source | Value 2015 (EUR) | Value 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 1,428,213 | 5,767,290 | +303.8% |
| Iceland | 618 | 529,085 | +85,513% |
| Egypt | 890,736 | 1,615,201 | +81.3% |
| United States | 740,198 | 1,343,390 | +81.5% |
| Norway | 164,956 | 123,811 | –24.9% |
| Switzerland | 273,147 | 148,456 | –45.6% |
| Brazil | 812,749 | 101 | –100.0% |
Brazil collapsed from EUR 813,000 to essentially zero, while Iceland emerged as a new source, growing from negligible levels to over half a million euros. The decline in Norwegian and Swiss supply may reflect tighter domestic recycling regulations in those countries or shifts in their own export strategies.
2.3 EU Member States' roles diverged sharply between exporting and importing
Within the EU, the distribution of trade activity shifted considerably among Member States:
Export-side leaders by 2025:
| Member State | Export value 2015 (EUR) | Export value 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Italy | 5,481,376 | 16,765,179 | +205.9% |
| France | 2,275,430 | 14,911,379 | +555.3% |
| Germany | 2,183,198 | 11,028,703 | +405.2% |
| Spain | 2,502,975 | 5,253,454 | +109.9% |
| Poland | 710,178 | 4,448,325 | +526.4% |
Reporter-level trade data on Trade Dashboard
France emerged as a particularly dynamic exporter, growing by +555%, while Italy consolidated its position as the EU's largest exporter. Poland also rose sharply (+526%), reflecting Eastern Europe's growing integration into rubber scrap supply chains.
On the import side, the Netherlands (from EUR 446,417 to EUR 4,587,386, +928%) and Ireland (from EUR 1,733 to EUR 2,671,945) experienced extraordinary increases, suggesting their emergence as logistics hubs or reprocessing gateways for rubber scrap entering the EU.
3. Rising market concentration and persistent supply-chain volatility
3.1 Trade concentration intensified on both sides of the market
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) — a standard measure of market concentration — reveals a significant consolidation of trade flows over the period:
| Flow | HHI (value) 2015 | HHI (value) 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imports | 979 | 2,323 | +137.2% |
| Exports | 686 | 2,137 | +211.6% |
Concentration analysis on Trade Dashboard
An HHI above 2,000 is generally considered indicative of a highly concentrated market. Both the import and export sides now exceed this threshold, meaning that the EU's rubber scrap trade has become heavily dependent on a small number of partners. For exports, India and Türkiye alone now dominate; for imports, the United Kingdom is the single most important source.
This concentration creates potential vulnerabilities: any disruption in bilateral relations, logistics, or regulatory frameworks with these key partners could materially affect EU trade flows.
3.2 Specialisation patterns point to Southern and Central Europe as production hubs
The revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) data for 2025 identifies which EU Member States are most specialised in rubber scrap production relative to their overall trade:
| Member State | RSCA | RCA | Share of EU rubber scrap production |
|---|---|---|---|
| Portugal | 0.650 | 4.72 | 6.5% |
| Romania | 0.624 | 4.32 | 7.2% |
| Slovakia | 0.499 | 2.99 | 6.3% |
| Poland | 0.351 | 2.08 | 13.8% |
| Italy | 0.345 | 2.05 | 16.4% |
Specialisation data on Trade Dashboard
Conversely, the Netherlands (RSCA: –0.990), Denmark (–0.985), and Latvia (–0.957) are heavily unspecialised, consistent with their roles as trade intermediaries or economies with limited rubber manufacturing. Italy's combination of high specialisation and a large production share (16.4%) underscores its central role as the EU's rubber scrap powerhouse.
3.3 Partner-level volatility remained high, with notable price shocks detected
Volatility analysis reveals that trade flows with many partners exhibited considerable instability over the period:
| Partner (imports) | Coefficient of Variation | Partner (exports) | Coefficient of Variation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 1.078 | Korea, Republic of | 1.212 |
| Korea, Republic of | 1.222 | India | 0.906 |
| Iceland | 0.844 | United States | 0.752 |
| South Africa | 0.740 | Türkiye | 0.710 |
| United States | 0.645 | Pakistan | 0.634 |
| India | 0.646 | Belarus | 0.558 |
Volatility analysis on Trade Dashboard
Three specific shock events were identified:
| Shock | Year | Type | Shift | Value share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Switzerland (imports) | 2019 | Price | +71.5% | 3.1% |
| Brazil (imports) | 2023 | Price | +1,756% | 6.2% |
| United Kingdom (imports) | 2018 | Price | +341.8% | 47.1% |
Supply shock analysis on Trade Dashboard
The United Kingdom price shock in 2018 is particularly significant given that the UK accounts for nearly half of import value. The extreme volatility in Brazilian imports (a +1,756% price shift in 2023) aligns with Brazil's subsequent disappearance as a supplier, suggesting a possible quality or supply-chain disruption. The high volatility coefficients for partners like Brazil, South Korea, and Iceland confirm that many of the EU's secondary trade relationships in this product remain episodic and unstable.
Conclusion
The EU's trade in rubber scrap and waste (CN 4004) between 2015 and 2025 tells a story of explosive export growth, geographical reorientation, and increasing concentration. The EU consolidated its position as a major net exporter, but this was achieved primarily through volume expansion rather than price improvement — export unit prices fell by 30% while volumes quadrupled. The most dramatic shift was the pivot towards India and Türkiye, which together absorbed over 60% of EU exports by 2025, while traditional partners like South Korea faded.
On the import side, the United Kingdom became the overwhelmingly dominant supplier, accounting for nearly half of all import value. Market concentration rose sharply on both the import and export sides, crossing into the "highly concentrated" range — a development that introduces both efficiency gains and strategic vulnerabilities.
These dynamics are consistent with broader global trends: growing demand for recyclable rubber raw materials in emerging manufacturing hubs (particularly in Asia and the Middle East), the EU's role as a net supplier of recyclable waste streams, and the increasing specialisation of specific Member States within the Union. However, the heavy dependence on a small number of partners, combined with persistent price volatility and several detected supply shocks, suggests that both EU policymakers and market participants should monitor supply-chain resilience in this segment carefully.