Market evolution: Iron and steel waste (CN 2619) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the trade dynamics of CN 2619 — Slag, dross, scalings and other waste from the manufacture of iron or steel (excl. granulated slag) by the European Union with non-EU countries over the period 2015–2025. Over this decade, the EU underwent a dramatic transformation: it shifted from being a net exporter (trade surplus of €3.4 million in 2015) to a major net importer (trade deficit of €52.6 million in 2025). Import volumes surged over twelvefold while export quantities halved, reshaping the competitive landscape, partner relationships, and concentration patterns of the market. Three major dynamics — the collapse of UK-bound exports following Brexit, the dramatic expansion and subsequent contraction of Russian imports, and the sector-wide price shocks of 2021–2022 — have defined this period.

1. From net exporter to net importer: a structural reversal of EU trade flows

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the complete reversal of the EU's trade position in steel slag and related waste. What began as a modest export surplus ended as a substantial and sustained import dependency.

Exports contracted in both volume and diversity

EU exports of CN 2619 declined steadily over the decade, falling from 413,125 tonnes / €14.1 million in 2015 to 206,422 tonnes / €10.8 million in 2025 — a drop of 50% in volume and 23% in value (General Overview). The minimum export value during the period reached €7.4 million, indicating that the trough was significantly deeper than both the start and end points. Interestingly, the average unit export price rose by 53.7% — from €34/t to €52/t — suggesting that the EU progressively lost access to (or interest in) lower-value, high-volume export channels while retaining higher-priced, smaller-scale trade.

Imports expanded explosively, driving a shift in market dynamics

In stark contrast, EU imports surged from 79,208 tonnes / €10.7 million in 2015 to 1,072,457 tonnes / €63.4 million in 2025 — an increase of 1,254% in volume and 493% in value. The import peak reached 1.07 million tonnes and €212.9 million in value during the period, underscoring the scale of demand growth. Notably, the average import unit price fell by 56.2%, from €135/t to €59/t, implying that much of the new import volume came from lower-cost suppliers and/or lower-grade material, a pattern consistent with the sourcing of slag as a raw input for cement production and construction rather than higher-value metallurgical recycling.

The trade balance reversed sharply

The EU swung from a trade surplus to a deficit of €52.6 million, with the worst deficit during the period reaching €196.3 million — a change of −1,663% relative to the starting balance. This reversal reflects both the decline in traditional export markets (notably the UK) and the aggressive expansion of imports from new and existing partners.

2. A reshuffling of trade partners driven by geopolitics and Brexit

The decade witnessed a profound reorientation of both the EU's export destinations and import sources, driven by the United Kingdom's departure from the EU single market, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and shifting industrial needs.

The collapse of UK-bound exports was the defining export-side event

The United Kingdom was the EU's largest single export destination for CN 2619 in 2015, accounting for €8.5 million — over 60% of total export value. By 2025, exports to the UK had collapsed to just €31,000, a decline of 99.6% (top partners — exports). This collapse began before the formal Brexit date and accelerated through the transition period, likely reflecting new customs frictions, diverging waste management regulations, and the UK's own development of alternative sourcing. The loss of this market alone accounts for most of the decline in EU export volumes.

Russia dominated imports, but with extreme volatility and eventual sanctions-driven disruption

The Russian Federation was the EU's largest import partner throughout most of the period, with import values rising from €5.8 million in 2015 to a peak of €188.1 million before settling at €34.5 million in 2025 (a net increase of 497.5%). Russia's import trajectory likely peaked around 2021–2022, reflecting both the pre-war surge in steel-related trade and the EU's subsequent sanctions regime. The extreme volatility (coefficient of variation = 0.48) and the wide range (€5.8M to €188.1M) indicate highly unstable supply conditions.

New partners emerged as the EU diversified its supply base

As traditional trade patterns were disrupted, several new or previously marginal partners gained prominence on the import side:

On the export side, new markets also opened up — notably Malaysia (from €3,098 to €1.5 million), Israel (from €85,500 to €840,486), and Serbia (from €465,610 to €2.2 million). The emergence of Serbia as both a major import and export partner suggests it has become a key transit or processing hub in the regional steel waste value chain.

EU Member State roles shifted dramatically

The internal geography of EU trade also changed. Among top reporting Member States:

• Austria and Germany — traditionally large importers — saw their import values drop by 52% and 72% respectively, suggesting reduced domestic steelmaking activity or a shift in slag sourcing.
• The Netherlands surged from €418,000 to €39.4 million in imports (+9,309%), likely reflecting its role as a logistics gateway and the expansion of waste-processing capacity in the port of Rotterdam.
• Romania grew from €25,000 to €11.1 million in imports (+44,731%), consistent with the expansion of its steel and construction sectors.

On the export side, Germany's exports fell by 93% (from €8.2M to €571K), while Belgium grew by 1,173% (from €70K to €885K) and Slovakia emerged as a significant exporter (+21,358%).

Market concentration decreased substantially

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for both imports and exports fell sharply over the period:

This reduction indicates a significant diversification of trade partners. The EU moved from a market dominated by a few key suppliers (Russia for imports, the UK for exports) to a more distributed network of partners, with HHI values that — while still above the 1,000 threshold for a "competitive" market — are well below the 2,500 threshold for a "concentrated" market. This diversification likely reflects both deliberate supply-chain resilience strategies and the forced reshuffling caused by Brexit and sanctions.

3. Price shocks, pandemic disruptions, and geopolitical instability in 2021–2022

The period 2021–2022 stands out as an episode of extraordinary price volatility and trade disruption in the CN 2619 market, likely linked to the convergence of post-pandemic industrial recovery, surging energy costs, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Norway experienced the most extreme import price shock

The most dramatic single shock detected was the 843.7% price increase in EU imports from Norway in 2022, with an abnormality score of 836.6 — the highest in the dataset (top shock events). This shock accounted for 6.1% of total EU import value and likely reflected the broader spike in energy-intensive industrial input costs during the European energy crisis of 2022.

Turkish and Ukrainian prices also showed large shocks

• Türkiye saw a 104.7% price shock in import prices in 2021 (abnormality: 95.6), accounting for 5.4% of import value — likely reflecting the post-pandemic commodity price surge and the depreciation of the Turkish lira.
• Ukraine experienced a 122.1% price shock in export prices in 2022 (abnormality: 262.3), accounting for 2.8% of export value — temporally coinciding with the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war and the disruption of Ukrainian industrial output.

Volatility was highest among newer and geopolitically sensitive partners

The coefficient of variation (CV) of trade values reveals which partnerships were most unstable:

Partners with very high volatility — India, China, Serbia on the export side; Ukraine, Serbia, Canada on the import side — are predominantly newer trade relationships, suggesting that these flows are driven by opportunistic or spot-market transactions rather than long-term contractual relationships. In contrast, established partners like Norway (exports) and Switzerland (imports) showed much more stable, predictable trade patterns.

The broader context: energy crisis, post-COVID demand, and geopolitical shock

The 2021–2022 price spikes should be understood in the context of several overlapping shocks:

1. Post-pandemic industrial recovery (2021): The rebound in global steel production and construction activity drove up demand for slag as a supplementary cementitious material.
2. European energy crisis (2022): Surging natural gas and electricity prices in the EU raised the cost of energy-intensive processing of slag and dross.
3. Russia-Ukraine war (2022): Disruption of Russian and Ukrainian steel production and exports, combined with EU sanctions, caused rapid re-sourcing and price instability.

These shocks appear to have been largely transitory — prices moderated in subsequent years — but they accelerated the structural shifts already underway in the market.

Conclusion

The EU trade in CN 2619 (iron and steel slag, dross, and waste) underwent a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. The market reversed from a position of modest net exports (€3.4 million surplus) to substantial net imports (€52.6 million deficit), driven by the near-total collapse of UK-bound exports after Brexit and a more-than-twelvefold increase in import volumes. Russia emerged as the dominant — and highly volatile — import partner until geopolitical disruptions forced diversification toward Serbia, Ukraine, Canada, and other suppliers. The market also experienced significant price shocks in 2021–2022 linked to the post-pandemic recovery, the European energy crisis, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Over the full period, trade concentration decreased markedly (HHI fell ~60% for both imports and exports), indicating a more diversified but also more fragmented trading environment. Going forward, the EU's growing import dependency for steel waste — combined with geopolitical risk and the energy transition in the steel sector — is likely to remain a defining feature of this market.