Market evolution: Uranium ores (CN 2612) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the European Union's external trade in products classified under customs code 2612 — Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates — over the period 2015 to 2025. The EU is overwhelmingly a net importer of this strategic raw material, reflecting its dependence on external suppliers for nuclear fuel inputs. Over the decade, EU imports declined sharply in volume while rising significantly in unit price, indicating a tightening global supply environment and a structural shift toward higher-cost sourcing. At the same time, the geographic concentration of supply intensified and the distribution of import flows among EU Member States underwent significant redistribution.

The full overview of the data provides additional context for the figures cited below.

1. A Structural Shift from Volume to Value in EU Imports

Import volumes collapsed while unit prices surged

Between 2015 and 2025, the quantity of uranium and thorium ores imported by the EU fell from approximately 9.0 tonnes to just 1.4 tonnes — a decline of −84.0%. Over the same period, the average import price rose from €3,417 per tonne to €15,901 per tonne, an increase of +365.3%. This combination suggests that the EU has progressively lost access to large, low-cost volumes of ore and concentrates and has been forced into a market where smaller shipments command substantially higher prices.

Despite the sharp volume decline, total import value only fell by −25.3%, from €30,831 thousand to €23,022 thousand. The much smaller drop in value relative to volume underscores the extent to which rising prices have partially compensated for lost volumes — a dynamic consistent with tightening global uranium supply amid renewed interest in nuclear energy and geopolitical disruptions.

The trade deficit narrowed but remains substantial

The EU ran a persistent trade deficit in CN 2612 throughout the period. In 2015, the deficit stood at −€30,795 thousand; by 2025 it had narrowed to −€19,987 thousand (a +35.1% improvement). At its widest point the deficit reached −€30,795 thousand (2015) and at its narrowest it briefly approached near-balance, reaching +€873 thousand at one point. This narrowing reflects the combined effect of falling volumes and growing — though still modest — export activity.

2. Supplier Diversification Gave Way to Greater Geographic Concentration

The import supply base became more concentrated

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU imports by value rose from 2,957 in 2015 to 4,964 in 2025, an increase of +67.9%. This level is well above the conventional threshold of 2,500 considered "highly concentrated," indicating that the EU's import base has consolidated around a smaller number of dominant suppliers. By volume, the HHI followed a different trajectory — it actually declined from 6,285 to 2,861 (−54.5%) — reflecting the fact that while value became more concentrated, volume flows became more dispersed (likely reflecting many small, high-price transactions).

Key suppliers shifted substantially

The composition of EU import partners changed markedly over the period:

Several trends stand out:

• South Africa remained a major supplier throughout, though its share declined from the 2015 peak.
• The United Kingdom saw its exports to the EU virtually disappear (from €6,483 thousand to €61 thousand, −99.1%), likely reflecting post-Brexit trade realignment and/or shifts in UK reprocessing and fuel-cycle activity.
• Niger emerged as a much larger supplier, growing from €86 thousand to €2,318 thousand (+2,595.3%). This is notable given Niger's position as a significant uranium-producing country and the political instability the country has experienced in recent years.
• Namibia also expanded its role, rising from €2,707 thousand to €4,227 thousand (+56.2%), consistent with Namibia's growing importance as a uranium mining jurisdiction.
• The United States became a meaningful supplier for the first time, rising from just €9 thousand to €466 thousand.
• Uzbekistan appears as a single large-value import of €15,560 thousand (with zero percent change, suggesting a one-off transaction).

Supply shocks were detected across multiple partners

The volatility analysis identified several supply-side shocks:

• Canada experienced a complete supply disruption in 2018, with EU imports falling by −100% (shock abnormality score of 1.1). Canada has historically been one of the world's largest uranium producers, and this disruption coincided with the closure and care-and-maintenance of several Canadian mines.
• Benin (2016) and Ecuador (2018) also saw complete drops in supply to the EU (−100% each), though these represented much smaller shares of total trade.

These shocks, combined with the broader volume decline, help explain why the EU turned to fewer but more expensive sources over the decade.

3. Import Flows Shifted Dramatically Across EU Member States

France consolidated its position as the dominant EU importer

The redistribution of import flows across EU Member States was striking:

France moved from accounting for roughly 29% of EU import value in 2015 to approximately 89% in 2025, firmly establishing itself as the EU's primary gateway for uranium and thorium ores. This is consistent with France's central role in the European nuclear fuel cycle, anchored by Orano (formerly Areva) and its extensive network of conversion and enrichment facilities.

Spain, Ireland, and Germany all saw their import shares collapse. Spain and Ireland had been significant importers in 2015 (likely linked to specific fuel-cycle activities or reprocessing contracts), but their roles diminished substantially by 2025.

Italy and Poland emerged as growing importers, with Italy's imports rising by +802.3% and Poland's by +139.9%. Italy's growth may reflect renewed nuclear energy discussions, while Poland's increase aligns with its announced plans to build its first nuclear power plants.

EU exports remained small but showed notable activity

EU exports of CN 2612 grew from just €36 thousand in 2015 to €3,035 thousand in 2025 (+8,430%). While still dwarfed by imports, the export growth reflects occasional re-exports or intra-industry transactions. Notable export events include:

• A large one-off export to China worth €31,070 thousand (appearing in the data with zero percent change, suggesting a single-year transaction), which likely represented a re-export of processed material.
• Significant export growth to Sweden (from €806 to €4,344 thousand, +439%) and Finland (from €1 to €2,521 thousand).
• The United Kingdom received growing EU exports (from €5 to €61 thousand, +1,120%).

The export HHI rose from 5,157 to 8,371 (+62.3%), indicating that EU exports also became more concentrated over time, dominated by a handful of destination countries.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in uranium and thorium ores (CN 2612) over 2015–2025 tells a clear story of structural tightening and consolidation. Import volumes fell by 84% while unit prices quadrupled, reflecting a global uranium market that has moved from oversupply (following the post-Fukushima demand slump) into deficit as countries recommit to nuclear energy. The EU's supplier base has concentrated around fewer, more geographically diverse partners — notably shifting away from the UK and toward Niger, Namibia, and to a lesser extent, the United States.

Within the EU, France has cemented its dominance as the primary importing Member State, consistent with its role at the heart of the European nuclear fuel cycle. Meanwhile, emerging importers such as Italy and Poland signal possible early-stage positioning for expanded nuclear capacity. The persistence of a substantial trade deficit — albeit a narrowing one — underscores the EU's continued strategic dependence on external uranium supply chains, a vulnerability that has received growing policy attention in the context of supply security and the EU's energy transition goals.