Market evolution: Medium oils (CN 271019) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the trade dynamics of EU customs code 271019, which covers medium oils and preparations of petroleum or bituminous minerals (excluding biodiesel). The heading is a residual, bundling product that encompasses a wide range of refined petroleum products, including kerosene, gas oils at various sulfur specifications, fuel oils, and lubricating preparations. Over the 2015–2025 decade, the EU's external trade in this product group was shaped by three powerful forces: a secular shift from volume toward value, a dramatic reconfiguration of import supply chains away from Russia, and a regulatory-driven restructuring of the product mix itself. The scope and definitions page provides the full product hierarchy underlying this analysis.
1. A Decade of Declining Volumes but Rising Values
The most striking aggregate feature of the 2015–2025 period is the divergence between traded volumes, which fell sharply, and traded values, which rose. Both import and export quantities declined by roughly 30%, yet total trade values grew in single-digit to low-double-digit percentages, driven entirely by higher unit prices.
1.1 The volume–value divergence in EU imports and exports
Between 2015 and 2025, EU export quantities fell from 91.8 million tonnes to 65.6 million tonnes (−28.5%), while export values rose from €38.4 billion to €44.1 billion (+15.0%). Similarly, import quantities dropped from 107.3 million tonnes to 74.8 million tonnes (−30.2%), yet import values increased from €44.7 billion to €48.5 billion (+8.6%). The reconciling factor is unit prices: export prices rose from €418/t to €672/t (+60.7%), and import prices from €417/t to €647/t (+55.3%). The EU effectively traded less petroleum but paid more for it.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (€ bn) | 38.4 | 44.1 | +15.0% |
| Export quantity (M t) | 91.8 | 65.6 | −28.5% |
| Export price (€/t) | 418 | 672 | +60.7% |
| Import value (€ bn) | 44.7 | 48.5 | +8.6% |
| Import quantity (M t) | 107.3 | 74.8 | −30.2% |
| Import price (€/t) | 417 | 647 | +55.3% |
| Trade balance (€ bn) | −6.3 | −4.4 | +30.0% |
1.2 The 2020 trough and 2022 price spike
The period was far from linear. The COVID-19 pandemic drove trade values to their decade lows: EU export value fell to €26.1 billion and import value to €30.7 billion, reflecting both a collapse in demand and depressed oil prices (export prices bottomed at €332/t, import prices at €342/t). The recovery was sharp, but 2022 stands out as the decade's extremum. In the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing European energy crisis, import prices surged to €972/t and export prices to €934/t. Total import value peaked at €82.4 billion and export value at €69.8 billion, even though volumes had not recovered to pre-pandemic levels. The trade deficit widened to its worst point at −€12.6 billion in that year before narrowing again as prices retreated. Full trade overview data are available on the dashboard.
1.3 A structurally narrowing trade deficit
Despite the 2022 shock, the overall trend in the EU's trade balance for CN 271019 is one of gradual improvement. The deficit narrowed from −€6.3 billion in 2015 to −€4.4 billion in 2025, a 30% improvement. This reflects the EU's growing export capacity in refined products — particularly from the Netherlands, Greece, and Spain — partially offsetting its dependence on imported crude-derived medium oils.
2. From Russian Dominance to Supply Diversification
The geopolitical rupture of 2022 triggered the most consequential structural shift in the EU's import base for medium oils: the near-total elimination of Russian Federation supply. What had been the EU's largest single-source supplier became a marginal player within three years, forcing a rapid and broad-based supply diversification.
2.1 The collapse of Russian imports
In 2015, Russian Federation supplied €15.7 billion worth of CN 271019 products to the EU, by far the largest single partner. By 2025, this figure had fallen to just €167 million — a decline of 98.9%. The phasing out of Russian petroleum product imports accelerated sharply after the EU's embargoes adopted in response to the Ukraine conflict. This collapse is reflected in the coefficient of variation of Russian import flows (0.62), indicating high instability across the period. The partner-level data show the full trajectory.
2.2 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, India, and the UAE filled the gap
The partners that absorbed Russia's former market share reveal the geographic reorientation of EU petroleum supply chains:
| Partner | 2015 imports (€ bn) | 2025 imports (€ bn) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russian Federation | 15.7 | 0.2 | −98.9% |
| Saudi Arabia | 3.0 | 8.2 | +171.1% |
| Kuwait | 0.7 | 6.9 | +826.8% |
| United States | 6.3 | 6.1 | −2.5% |
| India | 1.8 | 4.9 | +163.6% |
| United Arab Emirates | 1.6 | 2.5 | +53.1% |
| United Kingdom | 4.5 | 1.5 | −67.5% |
Kuwait's imports grew by a factor of more than nine, while Saudi Arabia nearly tripled its shipments. India and the United Arab Emirates also expanded significantly. These shifts point to a strategic pivot toward Gulf Cooperation Council states and India as alternative suppliers. The United States remained a stable, large-scale partner (€6.1 billion), reinforcing the transatlantic energy trade relationship that deepened after 2022. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom's role as an import source shrank by two-thirds, likely reflecting post-Brexit trade reorientation and declining North Sea output.
2.3 Import concentration halved as supply diversified
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of import concentration by value fell from 1,916 in 2015 to 975 in 2025 — a decline of 49.1%. An HHI below 1,000 is generally considered indicative of an unconcentrated market. This halving of concentration is a direct mathematical consequence of the shift from a single dominant supplier (Russia) to a more balanced portfolio of origins. The volume-based HHI tells a similar story, dropping from 2,136 to 997 (−53.3%). By contrast, export concentration rose modestly (HHI from 707 to 810, +14.6%), suggesting that the EU's export base became slightly more focused — likely reflecting the growing dominance of the Netherlands and Greece as refining hubs. The concentration analysis provides additional detail.
2.4 Intra-EU specialisation patterns
Within the EU, member states display markedly different degrees of specialisation in CN 271019 trade. In 2025, Malta (RSCA 0.77, RCA 7.69), Greece (RSCA 0.66, RCA 4.80), and Finland (RSCA 0.61, RCA 4.15) were the most specialised exporters, consistent with their roles as island or peripheral economies with significant bunkering and refining activity. Belgium (RSCA 0.44, share of EU exports 8.5%) combined high specialisation with substantial absolute volumes. At the other extreme, Luxembourg (RSCA −0.97), Cyprus (RSCA −0.93), and Ireland (RSCA −0.84) showed negligible specialisation, as expected for economies without major refining infrastructure. Large economies like Germany (RSCA −0.78 when considering its export profile in this product) and Poland (RSCA −0.78) were net importers with no comparative advantage in this segment. Full specialisation rankings are available.
3. A Product Mix in Transition: Sulfur, Regulation, and the 2025 Reclassification
Beyond the aggregate volume and partner shifts, the internal composition of CN 271019 trade changed profoundly. The period witnessed a pronounced decline in high-sulfur products, a contraction of fuel oil for industrial processing, and — most dramatically — the appearance of a new subcategory (27101944) in 2025 that instantly became the single largest product line by volume.
3.1 The decline of high-sulfur gas oils
Across the decade, high-sulfur gas oils (CN 27101948, sulfur content >0.1%) underwent a structural collapse. EU imports of this subcategory fell from 2.4 million tonnes (€889 million) in 2015 to 0.6 million tonnes (€320 million) in 2025. Exports declined even more dramatically, from 5.5 million tonnes (€2.5 billion) to 0.9 million tonnes (€504 million). This trajectory is consistent with the implementation of the IMO 2020 global sulfur cap on marine fuels (limiting sulfur to 0.5%) and EU directives mandating progressively cleaner fuels for inland and maritime use. The parallel decline of medium-sulfur gas oils (CN 27101947, 0.002–0.1% sulfur), whose imports fell from 8.0 million tonnes to 2.1 million tonnes, confirms a broader shift toward ultra-low-sulfur specifications.
3.2 Fuel oils for processing are losing ground
Imports of fuel oils destined for specific industrial processes (CN 27101951) fell from 21.4 million tonnes in 2015 to just 5.0 million tonnes in 2025 — a 77% decline in volume. This subcategory had been the single largest import line at the start of the period. The contraction likely reflects declining refinery throughput within the EU, the closure or conversion of less efficient refineries, and reduced demand for heavy industrial feedstocks as Europe's industrial base evolved. On the export side, fuel oil subcategories appeared in the data from 2020 onward (CN 27101966 and 27101967), suggesting that EU refineries increasingly processed and re-exported these products rather than consuming them domestically.
3.3 The sudden emergence of CN 27101944 in 2025
The most striking product-level development is the appearance of subcategory 27101944 — covering gas oils with a sulfur content of ≤0.001% — in 2025, with no prior reported trade. In that single year, EU imports of this product reached 37.1 million tonnes (€23.3 billion) and exports reached 25.7 million tonnes (€16.4 billion), making it instantly the dominant subcategory within CN 271019. The timing and scale strongly suggest a statistical reclassification event: products previously reported under other gas oil or fuel oil codes (such as CN 27101931, 27101947, or 27101962) were likely remapped to this ultra-low-sulfur code from 2025 onward. This is consistent with evolving EU regulatory definitions around renewable and bio-based diesel blends, where new codes have been introduced to distinguish conventional petroleum-derived products from those with renewable content. Whatever the classification mechanism, the data confirm that ultra-low-sulfur gas oils have become the defining product of the EU's medium oil trade.
3.4 Kerosene: a stable growth story amid the turbulence
Against this backdrop of volatility and reclassification, kerosene (CN 27101921) displayed remarkable stability and steady growth. EU imports rose from 15.2 million tonnes in 2015 to 18.5 million tonnes in 2025, while exports grew from 6.8 million tonnes to 12.6 million tonnes. Kerosene's share of the CN 271019 total expanded over the period, supported by post-pandemic aviation recovery and the EU's role as both a consumer and a re-exporter of jet fuel. Even during the 2020 demand shock, kerosene volumes held up better than most other subcategories.
Conclusion
The EU's trade in medium oils (CN 271019) over 2015–2025 tells a story of transformation on multiple fronts. In aggregate, the EU traded significantly less volume but at substantially higher prices, resulting in modest value growth and a narrowing trade deficit. Geopolitically, the decade's defining event was the near-total displacement of Russian supply — from a 35% share of imports to less than 0.5% — and its replacement by a more diversified portfolio of Gulf, Indian, and American suppliers. This diversification halved the import concentration index and reduced single-source dependency. At the product level, the transition toward ultra-low-sulfur specifications accelerated throughout the period, culminating in the 2025 appearance of subcategory 27101944 as the dominant product line by volume. High-sulfur products and heavy fuel oils for processing declined in parallel, reflecting both regulatory tightening and structural changes in European refining. Looking ahead, the interplay between EU decarbonisation targets, evolving product classifications, and the geopolitics of energy supply will continue to reshape this market.