Market evolution: Lubricating oils (CN 27101999) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in lubricating oils and heavy petroleum preparations (customs code 27101999) over the period 2015–2025. The product covers a broad family of petroleum-based lubricants, hydraulic fluids, white oils, gear oils, metalworking compounds, and electrical insulating oils — all with at least 70% petroleum content and not intended for chemical transformation. As a residual heading under CN 271019, it captures the downstream, value-added segment of refined petroleum products that sits between crude oil and finished industrial goods.

The period under review spans a decade of significant structural shifts: the post-2015 oil price crash, the COVID-19 demand shock, the post-pandemic recovery, and — critically — the EU's dramatic reorientation of energy supply chains following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Against this backdrop, three main dynamics emerge from the data: (1) a progressive erosion of the EU's trade surplus driven by faster import growth; (2) a major geopolitical reshuffling of the EU's import partners, with Middle Eastern and Asian suppliers replacing Russia; and (3) a pronounced price-led inflation in trade values that masks divergent volume trends between imports and exports.

1. The Erosion of the EU's Trade Surplus

Over the decade, the EU's net trade position in lubricating oils shifted markedly. While the bloc maintained a trade surplus throughout, that surplus narrowed dramatically from €727 million in 2015 to €246 million in 2025 — a decline of 66.2%. This erosion reflects a fundamental asymmetry: imports grew much faster than exports in value terms.

1.1. Import growth outpaced export growth by a wide margin

Between 2015 and 2025, EU imports of CN 27101999 rose from €1.23 billion to €1.77 billion (+44.5%), while exports grew more modestly from €1.95 billion to €2.02 billion (+3.3%). In at least one year, the trade balance approached near-parity, with the surplus falling to just €-358 thousand — effectively a rounding error. The table below summarises the headline trade evolution:

Source: Trade overview

1.2. Export volumes fell sharply while import volumes held steady

Perhaps the most striking feature is the divergence in volume trends. EU export volumes fell by 25% (from 2.55 Mt to 1.91 Mt), while import volumes grew modestly by 6.2% (from 1.74 Mt to 1.84 Mt). This suggests that the EU's domestic lubricant production base either contracted or increasingly served the internal market, while the bloc became more reliant on external supply. Rising prices on both sides — +37.6% for exports, +36.0% for imports — cushioned the value impact of lower export volumes, but could not prevent the surplus from shrinking.

1.3. Member-state contributions to trade flows shifted significantly

Within the EU, the geography of external trade changed substantially. On the import side, Belgium remained the largest single importer (€693 million in 2025, +44.5%), followed by the Netherlands (€395 million, +48.9%) and Germany (€350 million, +111.9%). Spain saw the most dramatic growth, with imports surging from just €8 million to €78 million (+931%). On the export side, Italy's role collapsed — exports fell from €568 million to €211 million (−62.8%), while the Netherlands surged from €238 million to €500 million (+109.5%), overtaking Italy as the EU's top exporter. Spain's exports also grew very strongly (+209%), rising to €343 million.

Source: Top reporters by value

This reconfiguration — with the Netherlands and Spain gaining ground as exporters while Italy and France lost share — likely reflects shifts in refining capacity, logistics hub roles, and re-export activity through port-based blending and distribution facilities.

2. Geopolitical Shock and Supplier Reorientation

The most dramatic story in the data is the near-total collapse of Russian lubricant oil imports into the EU, and the rapid emergence of Middle Eastern and Asian suppliers to fill the gap. This reorientation was driven by EU sanctions on Russian petroleum products following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, but its roots lie in a longer-term diversification trend.

2.1. Russia went from a major supplier to near-zero

In 2015, Russia was the EU's sixth-largest supplier of lubricating oils, with imports worth €60 million. At its peak (likely around 2021), Russian imports reached €260 million. By 2025, they had collapsed to a mere €59 thousand — a decline of 99.9%. This is the single largest structural break in the dataset and reflects the full impact of EU sanctions on Russian refined petroleum products.

Source: Top partners by value

2.2. Middle Eastern and Asian suppliers filled the void

The suppliers that gained the most from Russia's displacement were Qatar (from €94 million to €385 million, +309%), Indonesia (from €28 million to €120 million, +331%), and the United States (from €296 million to €534 million, +80%). Qatar's surge is particularly notable: it became the EU's second-largest supplier, reflecting the Gulf states' strategy of leveraging refining capacity to capture downstream petroleum markets. Indonesia's rise likely reflects the expansion of Asian refinery output targeting European markets.

Bahrain, another Gulf state, maintained a stable presence at around €116 million. The net effect was a shift in the EU's import base away from Russia and toward a combination of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, the US, and Southeast Asia.

2.3. The United Kingdom's post-Brexit decline

The UK saw its role as both an import source and an export destination diminish. EU imports from the UK fell from €198 million to €96 million (−51.4%), while EU exports to the UK declined from €220 million to €176 million (−20.0%). This likely reflects the combined effects of Brexit-related trade friction, the UK developing its own supply chains, and regulatory divergence in petroleum product standards.

3. Price Inflation, Volatility, and Market Shocks

The 2015–2025 period was characterised by significant price movements in lubricating oils, driven by crude oil price cycles, pandemic disruptions, and post-2021 energy market turbulence. While prices rose roughly 36–38% over the full decade, the path was far from linear.

3.1. Price trends masked divergent volume dynamics

Both export and import unit values roughly followed a similar trajectory, rising from around €700–770/t in 2015 to €960–1,055/t in 2025. The minimum export price was €649/t and the maximum reached €1,404/t — a factor of 2.2 between trough and peak. For imports, the range was even wider: from €554/t to €1,313/t (factor of 2.4). This indicates that import prices were more volatile, likely reflecting the greater exposure to crude oil benchmarks and shipping costs from distant suppliers.

3.2. Import concentration increased, reflecting supply chain restructuring

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports rose from 1,555 to 1,954 (+25.7%), moving the import market from a moderately competitive structure toward greater concentration. This increase was driven by the growing dominance of a few large suppliers — notably the US, Qatar, and South Korea — as Russia's displacement redirected flows through fewer, larger channels. By contrast, the export HHI remained stable at around 556–575, indicating that EU exports remained diversified across many destination markets.

Source: Concentration & specialisation

3.3. Specific shock events hit export markets in 2021 and 2023

The volatility analysis reveals several notable supply shock events:

Source: Top shock events

The 2021 shocks in South Africa and Kenya are likely linked to the post-COVID surge in petroleum prices and shipping costs, which disproportionately affected African markets. The 2023 Russian export price shock (a nearly 4-fold increase in abnormality-adjusted terms) may reflect residual or indirect trade flows being repriced in a sanctions-constrained environment, or measurement artefacts from the near-complete collapse of bilateral trade.

On the import side, the highest volatility was observed for Saudi Arabia (CV: 1.15) and Singapore (CV: 1.40), both of which are transit or blending hubs whose trade flows are inherently more lumpy. Russia's import CV stood at 0.67, reflecting the sharp discontinuity rather than steady-state volatility.

Conclusion

The EU market for lubricating oils (CN 27101999) underwent a significant structural transformation between 2015 and 2025. The bloc's historically comfortable trade surplus eroded by two-thirds, as import growth (+44.5% in value) far outstripped the modest increase in export revenues (+3.3%), while export volumes contracted by a quarter. The most dramatic change was the near-total elimination of Russian supply — from a peak of over €250 million to essentially zero — driven by EU sanctions. This gap was filled primarily by Gulf states (Qatar, Bahrain) and the United States, leading to a more concentrated import base (HHI rising by 26%).

Within the EU, the geography of trade shifted notably: the Netherlands and Spain emerged as increasingly important exporters and import hubs, while Italy's export role diminished sharply. Price inflation across both flows (+36–38%) cushioned the value impact of falling export volumes, but also introduced significant volatility, with specific shock events in African and Russian markets marking the turbulent post-pandemic and post-sanctions period.

Looking ahead, the data suggests the EU's lubricant trade is entering a phase of structural dependency on a smaller number of large external suppliers, particularly in the Gulf. While export diversification remains healthy, the combination of declining volumes and rising import reliance warrants close attention from a supply security perspective.