Market evolution: Gas oil (CN 27101948) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in gas oils of petroleum or bituminous minerals with a sulphur content exceeding 0.1% by weight (CN code 27101948), excluding biodiesel blends and products destined for chemical transformation. Over the period 2015–2025, the EU's trade in this product has undergone a profound transformation: export values fell by 79.4%, import values by 64.0%, and the historically large trade surplus contracted by 88.2%. These movements reflect a combination of long-term structural shifts in European refining, major geopolitical disruptions — notably EU sanctions on Russian petroleum products following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine — and significant price volatility linked to global energy market turmoil.

The data used in this report is sourced from the EU Trade Dashboard — Overview for CN 27101948.

1. A Decade of Contraction: The Collapse of EU Gas Oil Trade Volumes

EU exports more than halved in both value and tonnage

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the sheer magnitude of the decline in EU gas oil trade. EU exports of this high-sulphur gas oil fell from €2.45 billion in 2015 to just €504 million in 2025, a drop of 79.4% in value. In volume terms, the decline was even steeper: from approximately 5.55 million tonnes down to 910,000 tonnes (−83.6%). The gap between value and volume declines is explained by the fact that unit export prices rose from €442/t to €554/t (+25.4%) over the period, partially cushioning the value decline.

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Overview

Imports declined even more rapidly than the trade surplus could sustain

EU imports contracted from €889 million to €320 million (−64.0%) and from 2.44 million tonnes to 582,000 tonnes (−76.1%). The EU's trade surplus in this product — once a robust €1.56 billion — shrank to just €184 million by 2025. This dramatic erosion reflects both a collapse in outward flows (the EU was historically a large re-exporter and regional distributor of gas oil) and a less pronounced but still significant decline in inward flows.

The Netherlands and Belgium ceased to be the EU's export gateways

At the member-state level, the contraction was concentrated in the two countries that had historically dominated EU gas oil exports. The Netherlands saw its exports fall from €1.30 billion to just €15 million (−98.8%), while Belgium's exports dropped from €719 million to €13 million (−98.2%). Together, these two countries accounted for the vast majority of the decline. In their place, France's exports rose from €111 million to €298 million (+168.7%), Sweden's from €35 million to €91 million (+160.2%), and Greece emerged from virtually nothing (€2.4 million) to €72 million. This redistribution suggests a shift in refining and bunkering activity away from the ARA (Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp) hub toward Mediterranean and Nordic ports.

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Reporters

2. Geopolitical Rupture: Sanctions, Partner Substitution, and West African Retreat

The Russia–Ukraine war and EU sanctions reshaped the import side

Russia was the EU's second-largest import source for this product in 2015, supplying €248 million (peaking at €419 million in a later year). By 2025, Russian imports had fallen to just €28 million (−88.5%), a direct consequence of the EU's progressively tightened sanctions on Russian petroleum products adopted in 2022 and 2023. The collapse was abrupt: the minimum recorded value for Russian imports (€28 million) corresponds to the last year in the series, indicating that by 2025, only residual or legacy shipments remained.

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Partners

Türkiye emerged as a substitute supplier

Among all partners tracked, Türkiye stands out as the only one to record a dramatic increase. From a negligible €346 in 2015, Turkish imports surged to €75.5 million by 2025 — an extraordinary shift. This likely reflects Türkiye's role as an intermediary: with Russian oil products partially redirected to Turkish refineries following Western sanctions, some of this output has found its way back into the EU market. The United Kingdom remained the largest single import source at €196 million but also recorded a significant decline (−51.7%), reflecting post-Brexit trade frictions and the overall market contraction.

West African markets shrank as EU export destinations

On the export side, West Africa had been the primary destination for EU gas oil in 2015. Togo (€512 million), Nigeria (€288 million), Senegal (€255 million), and Guinea (€152 million) together accounted for roughly half of all EU exports. By 2025, only Senegal retained meaningful volumes (€195 million, −23.7%), while Togo (−95.4%), Nigeria (−93.7%), and Guinea (−97.9%) collapsed. This pattern is consistent with West African nations increasingly sourcing refined products from domestic or regional refining capacity (e.g., Nigeria's Dangote refinery) and from non-European suppliers such as India, the Middle East, and Russia (pre-sanctions).

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Partners

Gibraltar is a notable exception, with imports from the EU more than doubling from €51 million to €107 million (+110.9%), likely reflecting its role as a bunkering hub for Mediterranean shipping.

3. Price Spikes, Rising Concentration, and Structural Shifts in Specialisation

The 2022 energy crisis produced extreme price shocks

Unit prices for both imports and exports followed a broadly similar trajectory: a period of relative stability from 2015 to 2020 (with import prices hovering around €333–410/t and export prices around €324–466/t), followed by a dramatic spike in 2022. The maximum observed import price reached €943/t and the maximum export price €940/t — both roughly double the 2015 levels. By 2025, prices had partially normalised to €550/t (imports) and €554/t (exports), still well above pre-crisis levels.

The shock detection analysis identifies three major price shock events, all centred on 2022:

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Supply Shocks

The US import price shock (a +631% year-on-year shift with an abnormality score of 32.0) is particularly notable and likely reflects a temporary surge in EU procurement of American gas oil during the acute phase of the 2022 energy crisis, when European buyers scrambled to replace Russian supply. The Nigeria export price shock (+160%, value share 29.9%) underscores how the EU's largest remaining African market was directly exposed to the cost surge.

Trade concentration increased markedly on both sides

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports rose from 3,904 to 4,757 (+21.8%), while for exports it nearly doubled from 1,175 to 2,275 (+93.5%). Both movements indicate a significant narrowing of the partner base. On the import side, the loss of diversified Russian supply and the retreat of several smaller suppliers (Norway, Canada, the US) concentrated remaining flows among fewer partners — principally the UK and, increasingly, Türkiye. On the export side, the collapse of West African destinations and the ARA hub's withdrawal forced the EU to rely on a much smaller set of buyers (Senegal, Gibraltar, and a handful of others), driving the HHI above 2,200 — a level that approaches moderate concentration.

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Concentration

Sweden, Spain, and Greece emerged as specialised exporters

The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) analysis for 2025 shows that Sweden (RCA 4.78), Spain (4.27), and Greece (4.06) have the strongest specialisation in exporting this specific gas oil code. Belgium (RCA 2.99) retains a significant position, while the Netherlands (RCA 1.23) — once the dominant player — has fallen to near-parity. At the other end, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Slovenia, and Estonia show effectively zero specialisation (RCA ≈ 0), indicating that this product plays no meaningful role in their export profiles. This pattern aligns with the geography of European refining: Mediterranean and Nordic refiners have absorbed market share lost by the ARA hub.

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Specialisation

Conclusion

The EU's trade in high-sulphur gas oil (CN 27101948) has been fundamentally reshaped over the 2015–2025 decade. Three dynamics stand out. First, a structural contraction in both export and import volumes — driven by the declining competitiveness of European refining, changing sulphur regulations (IMO 2020), and the loss of traditional West African markets — reduced the EU from a major net exporter (surplus of €1.56 billion in 2015) to a much smaller player (surplus of €184 million in 2025). Second, the geopolitical shock of 2022 severed the EU's import relationship with Russia, triggered extreme price spikes (unit prices doubling to nearly €940/t), and catalysed a partial reorientation toward Turkish and other alternative suppliers. Third, the geography of EU trade shifted decisively: the Netherlands and Belgium lost their former dominance, while France, Sweden, Greece, and to some extent Italy and Spain absorbed larger shares — a redistribution that reflects both the changing economics of European refining and the consequences of sanctions-driven supply chain restructuring. The result is a smaller, more concentrated, and more expensive market than the one that existed at the start of the period.