Market evolution: Heavy fuel oil (CN 27101967) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU external trade in heavy fuel oil with a sulphur content exceeding 0.5% by weight (customs code 27101967), a product primarily used as bunker fuel for maritime shipping and in industrial heating. Although the query window spans 2015 to 2025, the available data covers the period 2020–2025; all comparisons in this report are drawn strictly within this window. Over these six years, the EU's trade in this product underwent dramatic transformation: volumes contracted sharply while unit prices nearly doubled, the supplier landscape was redrawn by geopolitical events, and internal EU hubs experienced significant reshuffling. Three dynamics stand out and structure the analysis below.

1. Halved Volumes, Doubled Prices: A Market in Structural Contraction

The most striking feature of the 2020–2025 period is the simultaneous collapse of traded quantities and surge in unit values, a pattern visible on both the import and export sides.

1.1 Export volumes fell by over half while values proved more resilient

EU exports of CN 27101967 to non-EU partners dropped from 12.77 million tonnes in 2020 to 5.48 million tonnes in 2025, a decline of 57.1%. Yet export value decreased by only 15.2% over the same period (from €2.95 billion to €2.50 billion), cushioned by a near-doubling of the average export price from €231/t to €457/t (+97.7%). The price peak was reached in 2022, when the average unit value hit €539/t, coinciding with the global energy price shock triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Source: General Overview — Trade

1.2 Import volumes declined even more steeply in relative terms

EU imports shrank from 2.81 million tonnes to 1.53 million tonnes (−45.6%), while import value fell only 6.8% (from €726 million to €677 million). The import price followed the same trajectory as exports, rising from €258/t to €442/t (+71.5%), with a peak of €572/t in 2022. Notably, the highest import value on record — €1.67 billion — occurred not in the latest year but during the 2022 price spike, when fewer tonnes were imported at far higher prices.

Source: General Overview — Trade

1.3 The EU's trade surplus narrowed but remained substantial

Because exports vastly exceed imports in this product, the EU runs a large surplus. It declined from €2.23 billion in 2020 to €1.83 billion in 2025 (−17.9%), reflecting that export volumes fell more steeply than import volumes. The surplus peaked at €3.71 billion, again during the 2022 price surge, when export values briefly exceeded €5 billion.

The volume decline on both sides likely reflects a combination of factors: the IMO 2020 sulphur cap (which reduced demand for high-sulphur fuel oil in shipping), the accelerating energy transition in European industry, and the disruptive effects of the 2022 energy crisis which temporarily rerouted petroleum flows globally.

2. Geopolitical Shock and Supplier Reconfiguration

The period 2020–2025 saw a fundamental reshaping of the EU's import supply base, driven overwhelmingly by the Russia–Ukraine conflict and subsequent EU sanctions.

2.1 Russian supply collapsed almost entirely

Imports from the Russian Federation fell from €123 million in 2020 to just €128 thousand in 2025 — a decline of 99.9%. Russia had been a significant supplier, peaking at over €201 million in a single year during the period. The near-total elimination of Russian fuel oil imports is a direct consequence of the EU's sanctions packages adopted from 2022 onwards. The volatility coefficient for Russian imports stood at 0.98, reflecting the sharp shock nature of this withdrawal.

2.2 Türkiye emerged as the dominant replacement supplier

The most dramatic growth story in imports belongs to Türkiye, whose exports to the EU surged from €3.6 million in 2020 to €238 million in 2025 — an increase of 6,534%. This extraordinary rise suggests that Türkiye has become a key re-routing or refining hub for petroleum products destined for the EU, possibly processing crude from sources that the EU can no longer import directly. Türkiye now ranks as the second-largest import partner by value.

Source: General Overview — Top Partners

2.3 Import concentration increased markedly

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU imports by value rose from 1,549 to 2,026 (+30.8%), moving the market from a moderately concentrated structure towards a more concentrated one. The volume-based HHI followed a similar trajectory (from 1,752 to 1,991). This increase reflects the fact that the loss of Russian supply was not fully diversified across many new partners but was instead concentrated in a few — principally Türkiye and Canada. The concentration data confirms that the EU's import base for high-sulphur fuel oil is now structurally more dependent on fewer partners than it was at the start of the decade.

2.4 Export markets also saw significant shifts

On the export side, the United States became the largest single-country destination, growing from €177 million to €291 million (+64.2%), while exports to Saudi Arabia collapsed from €223 million to €32 million (−85.8%). Morocco also grew strongly (+139.3%), and Singapore (+75.3%) reinforced its role as a global bunkering hub receiving EU-origin fuel oil. The category "Stores and provisions" (which captures bunkering supplies to international shipping) remained the largest single export destination but declined from €1.50 billion to €881 million (−41.2%), consistent with the overall volume contraction.

3. Internal EU Repositioning: Hub Consolidation and Specialisation Shifts

The contraction and price shock of 2020–2025 did not affect all EU member states equally. Some traditional hubs lost ground, while others — particularly Mediterranean refiners — gained prominence.

3.1 The Netherlands remained the dominant EU hub but lost share

The Netherlands was by far the largest EU exporter of CN 27101967, accounting for €1.57 billion in 2020 and €1.24 billion in 2025 (−21.1%). It was also the leading importer, though imports fell from €208 million to €93 million (−55.3%). The Netherlands' position reflects the role of Rotterdam as Europe's primary petroleum refining and trading hub. Despite the decline, it still accounted for roughly half of all EU exports in value terms by 2025.

3.2 Southern European members gained export prominence

Greece and Italy saw their exports grow substantially:

Source: General Overview — Top Reporters

Greece and Italy's gains likely reflect their strategic Mediterranean location and active refining sectors, well-positioned to serve North African, Middle Eastern, and trans-Atlantic markets. Specialisation data for 2025 confirms this: Greece ranks as the second most specialised EU member state in this product (RSCA of 0.907), behind only Malta (RSCA of 0.981), while France (RSCA 0.528) and Croatia (RSCA 0.846) also show strong specialisation (Specialisation data).

3.3 Several traditional exporters exited almost entirely

In stark contrast, Spain, Sweden, and Lithuania saw their exports collapse by 98–99%. On the import side, Belgium (−96.8%) and Estonia (−99.6%) similarly retreated. Estonia's near-total exit from imports is particularly noteworthy given its historical role as a gateway for Russian petroleum products — the sanctions-driven elimination of Russian supply directly undermined its position.

3.4 The 2022 energy crisis generated the largest recorded price shocks

The volatility and shock analysis identifies three major shock events:

The United Arab Emirates experienced a supply shock of −99.1% in EU imports in 2025, rated at 5.7 standard deviations from normal — the most extreme event detected. The two US-related price shocks in 2022 reflect the global repricing of petroleum products following the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Partners such as Norway (CV 1.61), Egypt (CV 1.03), and Brazil (CV 0.99) on the import side, and Senegal (CV 1.58) and Egypt (CV 1.07) on the export side, showed the highest overall volatility over the period.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in high-sulphur fuel oil (CN 27101967) between 2020 and 2025 tells a story of structural decline overlaid with geopolitical disruption. Volumes on both the import and export sides roughly halved, driven by tightening environmental regulations (especially the IMO 2020 cap), the accelerating energy transition, and the post-2022 energy market reconfiguration. Prices more than compensated in value terms until 2022 but have since moderated, leaving 2025 export and import values still below their 2020 levels.

The most consequential single event was the elimination of Russian supply, which collapsed from €123 million to near zero. This was partially offset by the rapid rise of Türkiye as a re-routing hub and the growth of Canadian and Israeli exports to the EU, but at the cost of higher import concentration (HHI +31%). On the export side, the market consolidated geographically around Mediterranean hubs (Greece, Italy) and the Netherlands, while several northern and Baltic exporters exited the market almost entirely.

Looking forward, the continued decline in volumes suggests that this market will likely keep contracting as the EU advances its decarbonisation agenda and the maritime sector increasingly adopts low-sulphur alternatives and alternative fuels. The geopolitical supplier landscape, however, may continue to evolve as sanctions dynamics and global refinery economics shift.