Market evolution: Gas oil with biodiesel (CN 271020) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of the European Union's external trade in gas oil and petroleum-based preparations containing biodiesel (Combined Nomenclature code 271020) over the period 2015–2025. CN 271020 covers a range of diesel and fuel oil blends in which biodiesel is a constituent — a product category shaped by EU renewable fuel mandates (notably the Renewable Energy Directive) and by the broader energy market turbulence of the early 2020s. The analysis draws on annual trade data between the EU and non-EU countries, covering value (EUR), quantity (net tonnes) and derived unit prices. Three main dynamics emerge: a deepening structural trade deficit, a dramatic reshuffling of supply and destination partners, and the lasting impact of the 2022 energy-price shock.

For a full overview of the data, see the General Overview.

1. A Widening Trade Deficit Driven by Surging Imports and Shrinking Exports

The EU's trade position in CN 271020 deteriorated markedly over the decade. While the bloc started as a modest net importer, the gap widened dramatically by 2025.

1.1 Imports grew in value by 138 % while exports contracted

Over the full period, EU imports of gas oil with biodiesel rose from EUR 234.7 million (2015) to EUR 557.9 million (2025), a nominal increase of 137.8 %. Import volumes grew by 66.1 %, from 500,688 t to 831,617 t. Prices also climbed 43.2 %, indicating that both demand and market conditions drove the value increase.

By contrast, EU exports fell from EUR 188.7 million to EUR 172.7 million (–8.5 % in value) and, more dramatically, from 362,746 t to 261,555 t (–27.9 % in volume). Export prices rose 26.9 %, partially cushioning the value decline.

The trade balance moved from –46.0 million EUR to –385.3 million EUR — a sevenfold worsening. The deficit peaked in 2022 at –632.0 million EUR, before partially narrowing.

1.2 The deficit reflects both structural and cyclical factors

Several factors underpin this shift:

• Renewable fuel blending mandates (RED II and its successor) have steadily raised the required biodiesel content in road diesel across the EU, lifting aggregate demand for blended gas oil — much of which is now supplied from non-EU refineries.
• Refinery rationalisation: certain EU member states have reduced domestic refining capacity or shifted output toward other products, increasing reliance on imported blends.
• Price effects: the 2022 energy-price spike inflated the value of imports far more than exports, because the EU imports in larger volumes and from more price-volatile sources.

1.3 Unit prices converged, then diverged

EU import and export unit prices converged from a spread of EUR 51/t in 2015 (exports more expensive) to near-parity in 2025 at EUR 671/t and EUR 660/t respectively. The convergence was interrupted by the 2022 spike, when export prices briefly exceeded import prices (EUR 1,132/t vs EUR 1,002/t), reflecting re-export of high-cost inventory. Since 2023, import prices have again risen above export prices, suggesting EU-based blending or re-processing adds value before re-export.

2. A Dramatic Reconfiguration of Trade Partners

The period saw profound changes in both the sourcing and destination geography of CN 271020 trade.

2.1 The United Kingdom became the EU's overwhelmingly dominant supplier

UK-sourced imports surged from EUR 148.1 million in 2015 to EUR 441.0 million in 2025 (+197.8 %). At their peak in 2022 they reached EUR 702.7 million. The UK accounts for the vast majority of EU imports by value — its low volatility (coefficient of variation of just 0.24) confirms it as a stable, structural supplier rather than a spot-market source.

The import concentration (Herfindahl–Hirschman Index by value) rose from 4,659 to 6,402, confirming that the EU's import base has become more reliant on a smaller number of dominant suppliers — principally the UK.

2.2 New Middle Eastern and Asian suppliers emerged

Several partners that were negligible in 2015 became meaningful by 2025:

• India went from EUR 15 in imports to EUR 52.9 million, making it the third-largest supplier.
• Saudi Arabia grew from EUR 2.5 million to EUR 23.9 million.
• The United Arab Emirates peaked at EUR 70.1 million (2022) before declining to EUR 1,901 in 2025 — a highly volatile trajectory (CV = 2.00).

These shifts suggest EU buyers diversified sourcing during the 2022 supply disruption, tapping Middle Eastern and Asian refining surpluses. However, the instability of these flows (high coefficients of variation) indicates they remain opportunistic rather than structural.

2.3 Export destinations shifted away from neighbouring microstates

EU exports to traditional nearby destinations declined sharply:

Exports to the UK — the only major partner that grew — remain the largest single destination. Meanwhile, exports to Gibraltar, Andorra and Norway all collapsed. This may reflect changes in customs classification practices (e.g. post-Brexit adjustments for UK trade), re-routing of bunker fuel flows, or reduced demand from small neighbouring markets. Exports to "High seas" (bunker fuel) grew 305 %, from EUR 1.8 million to EUR 7.2 million, hinting at a shift toward maritime bunkering as a growth outlet.

The export concentration (HHI) rose from 2,194 to 2,834, reflecting this narrowing of export destinations.

2.4 Ireland and Spain became the EU's dominant importing Member States

Within the EU, the geography of imports changed substantially:

• Ireland went from EUR 78.2 million to EUR 439.8 million (+462.6 %), becoming by far the largest importing Member State. Ireland's island geography and limited refining capacity make it reliant on seaborne supply, and the UK is its natural supplier.
• Spain emerged from virtually zero (EUR 16,526) to EUR 98.6 million, suggesting a new import corridor — possibly linked to biodiesel blending at Spanish refineries or transhipment.
• Traditional importers like France (from EUR 40.3 M to EUR 67,928), Italy (from EUR 28.4 M to EUR 10,538) and Cyprus (from EUR 52.8 M to EUR 1,068) virtually disappeared from the data, indicating a consolidation of import flows through fewer, larger entry points.

3. The 2022 Energy Crisis Left a Lasting Imprint on Prices and Trade Patterns

The Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ensuing European energy crisis of 2022 triggered the most pronounced shock observed in the dataset.

3.1 Prices more than doubled in 2022 before partially retreating

Average EU import unit prices for CN 271020 rose from EUR 469/t in 2015 to a peak of EUR 1,002/t in 2022 (+114 %), before easing to EUR 671/t in 2025. Export prices followed a similar arc, peaking at EUR 1,132/t in 2022. The price shock was the most extreme in the series: for UK imports, the price abnormality score reached 8.8 (on a scale where values above 3 are considered significant), with a year-on-year shift of +136.1 %.

3.2 The 2022 shock reshuffled supply chains

The price spike coincided with a near-doubling of import value (from EUR 440.0 M in 2021 to EUR 883.1 M in 2022) even as volumes rose only modestly (from 860,376 t to 980,642 t). This implies the EU absorbed a massive terms-of-trade deterioration, paying far more per tonne for roughly the same volume.

Several partner-specific shocks were detected in 2022:

• Andorra (exports): price abnormality 6.4, +151.0 % shift
• Gibraltar (exports): price abnormality 5.2, +152.8 % shift

These anomalies likely reflect the peculiarities of fuel supply to small jurisdictions dependent on EU-origin diesel, where global price increases transmitted fully and immediately.

3.3 Post-crisis normalisation has been uneven

By 2025, import prices had retreated to EUR 671/t — still 43 % above 2015 levels. Export prices at EUR 660/t were 27 % above 2015. The retreat from the 2022 peak was smooth for the UK (low volatility), but remained erratic for smaller, more volatile suppliers. For example, Norwegian import prices showed a coefficient of variation of 2.85, and Canadian imports (CV = 3.16) exhibited the highest instability of any supplier — consistent with opportunistic, small-volume spot purchases during the crisis.

The crisis also accelerated the structural trends noted above: EU exports continued to decline post-2022 (from 207,822 t in 2022 to 261,555 t in 2025, still well below pre-crisis levels of 362,746 t in 2015), while imports remained elevated, suggesting the EU's net-importer position has become entrenched.

3.4 Product-level data confirms dominance of ultra-low-sulphur gas oil

Breaking down the product segments, subheading 27102011 (ultra-low-sulphur gas oil, ≤ 0.001 % S, with biodiesel) accounts for the overwhelming majority of both import and export volumes:

• Imports: 27102011 represented 826,621 t out of 832,038 t total in 2025 (99.4 %).
• Exports: 27102011 represented 225,191 t out of 278,554 t total in 2025 (80.8 %), with the remainder increasingly composed of low-sulphur fuel oils (27102032: 23,061 t) and medium-sulphur gas oil (27102016: 7,308 t).

The growth of fuel oil and medium-sulphur gas oil exports since 2020 suggests the EU is increasingly exporting niche blended products, while the bulk of its imports remain standard EN 590-quality diesel with biodiesel content.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU's trade in gas oil containing biodiesel (CN 271020) underwent a structural transformation. The bloc moved from a modest trade deficit of EUR 46 million to a deficit of EUR 385 million, driven by a 66 % increase in import volumes and a 28 % decline in export volumes. The United Kingdom consolidated its position as the EU's overwhelmingly dominant supplier, accounting for the majority of imports with low price volatility. Meanwhile, new suppliers from India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE emerged — often opportunistically and with high volatility — particularly during the 2022 energy crisis.

That crisis, triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, produced the most dramatic price shock in the series (UK import prices +136 % in a single year, with an abnormality score of 8.8). While prices have since retreated, they remain well above pre-2020 levels, and the trade patterns established during the crisis — particularly the deepening reliance on UK supply and the emergence of Middle Eastern sources — appear to have become semi-permanent.

Looking ahead, the EU's trade balance in this product is likely to remain in deficit as renewable fuel blending mandates continue to raise demand. The concentration of imports on a small number of suppliers (HHI rising from 4,659 to 6,402) poses a supply-security consideration, though the UK's geographical proximity and market integration mitigate some of that risk. Export prospects will depend on the competitiveness of EU-based biodiesel blending relative to non-EU refineries, and on the willingness of nearby markets to absorb EU-origin product at prevailing price levels.