Market evolution: Iron and steel scrap (CN 720449) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in iron and steel waste and scrap classified under Combined Nomenclature code 720449 over the period 2015–2025. CN 720449 is a residual category within the broader ferrous waste and scrap heading (CN 7204), encompassing non-alloy, non-stainless steel scrap that is not covered by the more specific sub-headings for cast iron, stainless steel, tinned steel, turnings/shavings, or remelting ingots [^scope]. It is subdivided into three product lines: fragmentised ("shredded") scrap (72044910), non-fragmentised scrap in bundles (72044930), and non-fragmentised scrap not in bundles (72044990) [^scope].

Iron and steel scrap is a critical secondary raw material for the circular economy and for steelmaking — both via electric arc furnaces (EAF) and as a charge component in basic oxygen furnaces. The EU is a significant generator and consumer of scrap, and its trade flows in this product reflect broader industrial, geopolitical, and commodity-market dynamics. Over the decade under review, the EU consolidated its position as a major net exporter of ferrous scrap, with total export value rising from EUR 1.59 billion in 2015 to EUR 4.32 billion by 2025 (a +171.7% increase), while the trade surplus expanded by +302.1% [^overview].

[^scope]: Scope & Definitions — CN 720449 [^overview]: General Overview — EU trade in CN 720449

1. The EU's expanding footprint as a global scrap exporter

1.1 Export volumes and values grew far faster than imports

The decade 2015–2025 was characterised by a strong outward orientation of EU ferrous scrap trade. Export value surged from EUR 1.59 billion to EUR 4.32 billion (+171.7%), while export quantity rose from 7.38 million tonnes to 13.87 million tonnes (+87.9%) [^overview]. In contrast, imports grew more modestly — value increased from EUR 803 million to EUR 1.16 billion (+44.4%), and quantity barely moved from 3.60 million tonnes to 3.80 million tonnes (+5.6%) [^overview]. The EU's trade balance in CN 720449 thus widened dramatically, from EUR 785 million in 2015 to EUR 3.16 billion in 2025 (+302.1%) [^overview].

Source: General Overview

The fact that export quantity nearly doubled while import quantity barely changed suggests that the EU increasingly directed its domestic scrap generation toward external markets rather than absorbing it domestically. This trend may reflect growing overseas demand (particularly from emerging-market steel producers), favourable price differentials, or constraints on domestic EAF capacity relative to scrap supply.

1.2 Türkiye dominates EU scrap exports; Egypt and India are the fastest-growing destinations

The geographic concentration of EU exports tells a clear story. Türkiye has been — and remains — the overwhelming destination for EU ferrous scrap, absorbing EUR 1.09 billion in 2015 and EUR 2.76 billion in 2025 (+153.9%). At its peak in 2022, Türkiye accounted for EUR 4.29 billion of EU scrap exports [^partners]. Türkiye's steel industry is heavily reliant on EAF-based production using imported scrap, making it the natural anchor market for European surplus scrap.

Beyond Türkiye, several other destinations recorded striking growth:

Source: Top partners by value

Egypt, India, and Pakistan — all countries with rapidly expanding steelmaking capacity — emerged as increasingly important outlets for EU scrap. The diversification away from a near-exclusive reliance on Türkiye is also visible in the export Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) by value, which declined from 4,793 to 4,316 (−10.0%) over the period, albeit remaining in a highly concentrated range ^concentration.

1.3 The Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany are the EU's leading scrap exporters

Within the EU, the Netherlands emerged as the largest single exporter, growing from EUR 336 million in 2015 to EUR 966 million in 2025 (+187.9%) [^reporters]. Belgium and Germany followed, with Belgium's exports rising from EUR 382 million to EUR 723 million (+89.2%) and Germany's from EUR 123 million to EUR 353 million (+187.2%). Notably, several Central and Eastern European Member States — Romania (+247.3%), Lithuania (+278.3%), and Poland (+1,567.4%) — registered explosive growth, reflecting both industrial restructuring and the development of efficient scrap collection and export infrastructure in these countries [^reporters].

[^partners]: Top partners by value [^reporters]: Top reporters by value

2. The 2021–2022 commodity boom and subsequent price correction

2.1 Scrap prices more than doubled between 2016 and 2022 before retreating

The price trajectory for CN 720449 followed a pronounced boom–bust cycle. EU export prices bottomed out at EUR 190.3/t in 2016, rose steadily through the late 2010s, then surged to a peak of EUR 409.6/t in 2022 — an increase of 115% from the trough. By 2025, export prices had corrected to EUR 311.2/t, representing a decline of 24% from the 2022 peak but still 44.6% above 2015 levels [^overview].

Import prices followed a closely correlated pattern, peaking at EUR 415.2/t in 2022 and settling at EUR 305.1/t by 2025 (+36.7% over the full period) [^overview].

Source: General Overview

The 2021–2022 price spike was driven by a convergence of factors: the post-COVID-19 industrial recovery, global supply-chain disruptions, surging energy costs (particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022), and strong demand from Turkish and Asian steel mills. The subsequent correction reflects the normalisation of energy markets, weakening global steel demand in 2023, and destocking cycles.

2.2 Specific supply shocks amplified price volatility in 2021

The data reveals several acute price shocks concentrated around 2021:

• EU exports to India: A price abnormality of 46.9 and a year-on-year shift of +69.8%, with India's share of export value at 6.7% [^shocks]. This likely reflects the surge in Indian steel production and scrap procurement during the post-pandemic recovery.
• EU imports from Norway: A price abnormality of 15.6 and a shift of +53.0%, with Norway accounting for 14.5% of import value [^shocks]. Norway is a key scrap supplier to the Nordic and Baltic regions, and its pricing was heavily affected by the broader commodity surge.
• EU imports from the United Kingdom: A price abnormality of 13.9 and a shift of +58.9%, with the UK contributing 49.0% of total import value — by far the largest import source [^shocks]. The UK's dominant role in EU scrap imports meant that price movements in UK-origin scrap had an outsized impact on the overall import bill.

These shocks were part of a broader pattern: the coefficient of variation (CV) for import prices from the United Kingdom stood at 0.26, while Ukraine (1.56) and the Russian Federation (0.87) exhibited the highest volatility among import partners [^volatility]. On the export side, Bangladesh (1.03) and India (0.70) were the most volatile destinations [^volatility].

[^shocks]: Supply shocks [^volatility]: Volatility bars

2.3 The price spike temporarily inflated export values without matching volume gains

A telling observation is that the 2022 peak in export value (EUR 6.41 billion) was not matched by a proportional peak in export quantity (17.47 Mt, reached in 2021). In 2022, volumes actually declined to 14.80 Mt while value remained near its all-time high [^overview]. This disconnect underscores the degree to which price effects — rather than volume expansion — drove the headline growth in export value during the boom years. By 2025, with prices correcting, export value settled at EUR 4.32 billion on a volume of 13.87 Mt, reflecting a more sustainable equilibrium [^overview].

3. Structural shifts in the EU's scrap trade landscape

3.1 Import sourcing has diversified markedly, while geopolitical disruptions reshaped supplier rankings

Perhaps the most striking structural change in EU scrap trade concerns the composition of import suppliers. The import HHI by value fell from 3,564 in 2015 to 1,792 in 2025 (−49.7%) ^concentration, indicating a dramatic shift from a concentrated to a more diversified import base. Several geopolitical and economic factors drove this transformation:

Source: Top partners by value

The collapse of Russian scrap imports (from EUR 107 million to EUR 22 million, −79.0%) is consistent with the sanctions and trade restrictions imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The surge in Ukrainian scrap imports (from EUR 5 million to EUR 100 million) is a notable counterpoint — despite the ongoing conflict, Ukraine's scrap exports to the EU increased dramatically, possibly reflecting the redirection of Ukrainian trade flows westward as traditional eastern markets became inaccessible. US scrap imports grew by +602.4%, potentially linked to transatlantic price arbitrage and changes in US domestic scrap market dynamics.

The UK remains the largest single import source (EUR 373 million in 2025), but its share has eroded. Switzerland and Norway, both geographically proximate non-EU European suppliers, roughly doubled their scrap exports to the EU.

3.2 EU domestic scrap production has edged downward even as export volumes surged

An important contextual factor is the evolution of EU domestic production of ferrous scrap. According to available production data, EU output of secondary ferrous raw materials declined from 36.0 billion kg in 2015 to 33.6 billion kg in 2025 (−6.7% in quantity) and from EUR 9.1 billion to EUR 8.8 billion in value (−3.5%) [^production]. This modest contraction in domestic supply occurred against a backdrop of nearly doubled export volumes, implying that either domestic scrap consumption fell, imports filled the gap, or inventory drawdowns supplemented supply.

The production decline is consistent with broader trends in the EU steel sector: the closure of integrated steelworks (which generate internal scrap), reduced industrial activity in certain Member States, and the increasing efficiency of scrap collection. Yet the EU's Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) in CN 720449 remained positive for several Member States — notably Cyprus (0.77), Croatia (0.52), Czechia (0.48), Slovenia (0.48), and Denmark (0.48) — confirming the EU's ongoing structural competitiveness in scrap exports ^market. Conversely, Italy (−0.90), Ireland (−0.86), and Greece (−0.81) show strong comparative disadvantage, consistent with their roles as net scrap consumers ^market.

[^production]: Production volumes

3.3 The EU's net-exporter position has narrowed, and export propensity is declining

Despite the headline growth in export values, vulnerability indicators paint a more nuanced picture. The EU's net import reliance moved from −20.1% in 2015 to −6.2% in 2025 (a +69.4% change toward zero), indicating that the EU's surplus in scrap trade has narrowed in relative terms. Simultaneously, export propensity — the share of domestic production exported — declined from 31.4% to 23.5% (−25.1%), while trade intensity (the combined import-and-export share relative to production) fell from 40.2% to 35.0% (−12.8%) [^vulnerability].

Source: Autonomy & Vulnerability

These trends suggest that while absolute trade volumes grew, the EU's economy has become somewhat less oriented toward scrap exports relative to its production base. This could reflect growing domestic demand from EU EAF mills (driven by decarbonisation policies favouring scrap-based steelmaking), tighter national export restrictions on scrap (some Member States have considered or implemented measures to retain strategic raw materials), or simply a maturing of the scrap collection ecosystem. The salience analysis confirms that export propensity (score: 51.6) is the most distinctive feature of the EU's trade profile in this product, ahead of trade intensity (27.8) [^vulnerability].

[^vulnerability]: Autonomy & Vulnerability

3.4 The product mix is dominated by non-fragmentised scrap not in bundles

At the sub-product level, CN 72044990 (non-fragmentised, non-bundled scrap) accounts for the overwhelming majority of both imports and exports throughout the period. In 2025, 72044990 represented 68.9% of import quantity and 75.4% of export quantity [^segments]. Fragmentised scrap (72044910) was the second-largest segment, at 30.3% of imports and 24.2% of exports by volume. The small bunded category (72044930) remained marginal at under 1% of trade volumes [^segments].

Export prices across all three sub-products peaked in 2022 and have since corrected:

Source: Product segment breakdown

Notably, the bundled sub-category (72044930) has shown the most erratic pricing, with import prices reaching EUR 709.5/t in 2024 — a figure that likely reflects very small traded volumes and consequent statistical volatility rather than a fundamental market trend.

[^segments]: Product segment breakdown

Conclusion

The EU's trade in iron and steel scrap (CN 720449) over the 2015–2025 decade has been shaped by three intersecting dynamics: the consolidation of the EU's role as a major global scrap exporter, a dramatic commodity-price cycle peaking in 2021–2022, and a structural reconfiguration of trade partnerships driven by geopolitics and industrial shifts.

Export growth has been the dominant story — in value terms more than in volume terms — propelled by strong demand from Türkiye and increasingly from South Asian and North African markets. The 2021–2022 price boom temporarily inflated trade values to unsustainable levels, but the underlying volume trend remains firmly upward compared to 2015. On the import side, the EU has significantly diversified its supplier base, with the import HHI halving over the decade. The collapse of Russian scrap imports and the emergence of Ukraine and the United States as major suppliers reflect both geopolitical ruptures and evolving market equilibria.

Looking ahead, the narrowing of the EU's net-exporter surplus and the decline in export propensity suggest that the EU's scrap trade balance may continue to tighten. As the European Green Deal and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) incentivise domestic scrap-based steelmaking to reduce emissions, competition between internal consumption and export demand for EU-generated scrap is likely to intensify. This could reshape the EU's trade profile in CN 720449 over the coming years, potentially turning what has been a growing export surplus into a more contested resource-allocation challenge.