Market evolution: Iron or steel turnings (CN 720441) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in ferrous scrap turnings, shavings, chips, and related iron or steel waste (CN 720441) over the 2015–2025 period. The product sits within the broader category of ferrous waste and scrap (CN 7204) and covers three sub-categories: turnings, shavings, chips, milling waste, sawdust, and filings (CN 72044110); bundled trimmings and stampings (CN 72044191); and unbundled trimmings and stampings (CN 72044199). These materials are a critical secondary raw material feedstock for steelmakers, particularly those operating electric arc furnaces.

Over the decade analysed, the EU's trade in this product underwent a profound structural transformation. The bloc shifted from a roughly balanced trade position to becoming a substantial net exporter, while the geographic composition of both import and export flows was dramatically redrawn by geopolitical events—most notably the United Kingdom's departure from the EU and the sanctions regime imposed on Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Simultaneously, physical trade volumes contracted on both sides, but rising unit prices meant that the total value of trade proved far more resilient than tonnage alone would suggest.

The overview dashboard provides the full interactive data underlying these findings.

1. From Balanced Trade to a €120 Million Export Surplus

The most striking macro-level development over the 2015–2025 period is the decisive swing in the EU's trade balance for CN 720441. What began as a near-equilibrium in 2015 ended as a dominant export position, driven by a simultaneous collapse in imports and relative resilience in exports.

The import side contracted to a fraction of its former scale

EU imports of iron or steel turnings from non-EU countries fell from 748,769 tonnes (€176.1 million) in 2015 to just 171,137 tonnes (€68.3 million) in 2025—a decline of 77.1% in volume and 61.2% in value. The contraction was persistent and steep: imports already fell to roughly 520,000 tonnes by 2018, dropped below 400,000 tonnes in 2019, and have remained below 200,000 tonnes since 2022.

The key trade flows show that the minimum import value over the period was €67.3 million (in 2023), a stark contrast with the 2015 peak of €176.1 million.

Exports declined less severely in volume but rose in value

EU exports moved from 826,133 tonnes (€173.5 million) in 2015 to 601,490 tonnes (€188.4 million) in 2025. While the volume decline of 27.2% is notable, it is far less dramatic than the import collapse. Crucially, export value actually increased by 8.6% despite lower tonnage, thanks to sharply higher unit prices. The peak export value reached an extraordinary €426.9 million in 2022, when post-pandemic demand and geopolitical supply disruptions drove ferrous scrap prices to cyclical highs.

The trade balance swung decisively into surplus

In 2015, the EU ran a small trade deficit of approximately €2.7 million on CN 720441. By 2025, this had become a surplus of €120.0 million—a transformation of over €122 million. The surplus peaked at €359.6 million in 2022, when the combination of elevated export values and depressed import volumes created the widest gap of the entire period.

Source: General Overview

2. Geopolitical Upheaval Redrew the Map of Scrap Trade Partners

The decade saw the complete restructuring of the EU's trade geography for ferrous turnings. Two events stand out as catalytic: Brexit (effective from January 2021 for trade purposes) and the EU's sanctions on Russia following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. These shocks, combined with shifting competitive dynamics, produced a radically different partner landscape by 2025.

Russia collapsed from a leading supplier to near zero

The Russian Federation was the EU's second-largest import source by value in 2015 at €59.5 million, supplying a substantial share of the EU's ferrous turnings needs. By 2025, Russian imports had fallen to a mere €2,050—effectively a complete cessation of trade, with a −100% decline. This reflects the EU's progressive sanctions on Russian steel and ferrous scrap imports imposed from 2022 onward. The import partners data confirms Russia's disappearance from the supply base.

The United Kingdom's role diminished sharply after Brexit

The UK was the EU's single largest import partner in 2015 at €70.4 million. By 2025, this had dropped to €10.3 million (−85.4%). While some of this decline may reflect broader trends in UK scrap generation and domestic demand, the timing and magnitude strongly suggest that the UK's departure from the EU single market and customs union introduced friction—customs formalities, rules of origin, and divergent regulatory frameworks—that reduced the fluidity of scrap flows that had previously been intra-EU trade.

Serbia and Ukraine emerged as new or expanded suppliers

As traditional suppliers exited, new ones grew. Serbia's imports into the EU surged from €867,000 in 2015 to €8.4 million in 2025, a rise of 869%. Ukraine similarly grew from €682,000 to €5.7 million (+730%), though the latter figure likely reflects complex dynamics around the war and the need for Ukraine to find export markets for its industrial scrap. These shifts are consistent with a broader pattern of the EU sourcing more ferrous scrap from Western Balkan and Eastern European neighbours.

Türkiye cemented its position as the EU's dominant export market

On the export side, Türkiye's share of EU exports grew dramatically. In 2015, exports to Türkiye stood at €50.6 million; by 2025, they had risen to €93.4 million (+84.4%). Türkiye is by far the EU's largest external scrap customer, driven by its large and growing electric arc furnace-based steel sector. The export partners data shows that Türkiye alone accounts for roughly half of all EU export value by 2025.

India's role declined, while Pakistan grew from a small base

India, once a major destination (peaking at €122.2 million in 2022), fell back to €15.6 million by 2025 (−60.2% from 2015). This volatility likely reflects India's own evolving scrap import policies and domestic supply dynamics. Meanwhile, Pakistan grew from €2.4 million to €7.1 million (+192%), emerging as a smaller but increasingly relevant buyer.

Trade concentration shifted in opposite directions for imports and exports

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) tells a clear story of diverging trends:

Import concentration fell substantially, meaning the EU diversified its sources—away from heavy reliance on Russia and the UK toward a broader basket of suppliers. Export concentration rose, reflecting the growing dominance of Türkiye as a buyer. An HHI above 2,500 is generally considered highly concentrated, suggesting that the EU's export market for this product is now notably dependent on a single buyer country.

EU member state specialisation reveals a core of producers and exporters

Within the EU, specialisation data for 2025 shows that Slovenia (RSCA: 0.605), Croatia (0.545), Slovakia (0.523), and France (0.495) are the most specialised exporters of CN 720441 relative to their overall trade. France accounts for the largest share of EU production at 23.1%, followed by Czechia at 8.3% and Slovakia at 6.7%. At the other end, Lithuania, Ireland, and Greece show no recorded exports of this product (RSCA of −1.0).

On the import side, Spain was by far the largest EU importer in 2015 at €107.4 million, but this collapsed to €6.4 million by 2025 (−94%). The EU member state import data shows that the Netherlands (€25.3M) and Italy (€11.9M) are now the leading importers, having grown their imports by 114% and 91% respectively over the period.

3. Scarcity and Demand Pushed Prices Higher Despite Falling Volumes

A central feature of the 2015–2025 period is the divergence between physical trade volumes and trade values. Tonnages declined on both the import and export sides, yet prices surged—reflecting a fundamental tightening of the ferrous scrap market.

Unit prices nearly doubled over the decade

Export unit prices rose from €210/t in 2015 to €313/t in 2025 (+49.2%), while import unit prices climbed from €235/t to €399/t (+69.7%). The gap between import and export prices widened, with imports now commanding a significant premium—possibly reflecting the scarcity of non-EU supply sources after the loss of Russian and UK volumes, as well as quality or logistics differentials.

Prices peaked sharply in 2021–2022 across all sub-segments. The product segment breakdown shows the following peak prices:

The extraordinary import price of €3,061/t for bundled trimmings in 2022 (CN 72044191) appears anomalous—likely driven by an extremely small trade volume of just 119 tonnes that year, making the unit price highly sensitive to individual transactions.

Specific price shocks were detected in 2021

The supply shock analysis identified three significant price shock events, all centred on 2021:

The 2021 timing aligns with the post-COVID industrial recovery, when surging global steel demand created intense competition for scrap inputs. Switzerland, as both a significant import source (27.9% of import value) and export destination (14.7% of export value), experienced sharp price dislocations in both directions.

EU domestic production declined modestly

EU production volumes of ferrous turnings fell from 36.0 billion kg in 2015 to 33.6 billion kg in 2025 (−6.7%), while production value dropped from €9.1 billion to €8.78 billion (−3.5%). This modest contraction in domestic output—driven by shifts in EU industrial activity, particularly in the automotive and mechanical engineering sectors that generate most machining scrap—helps explain the rising prices: less scrap was being generated internally while external supply channels were simultaneously disrupted.

The bundled trimmings sub-segment experienced a near-total import collapse

A closer look at the product segment breakdown reveals that the decline in imports was not uniform across sub-segments. CN 72044191 (bundled trimmings and stampings) saw imports fall from 69,560 tonnes in 2015 to just 760 tonnes in 2025—a collapse of 98.9%. Imports of CN 72044110 (turnings, shavings, etc.) fell from 482,429 tonnes to 136,146 tonnes (−71.8%), and CN 72044199 (unbundled trimmings) from 196,780 tonnes to 34,231 tonnes (−82.6%).

On the export side, the decline was more moderate:

The bundled trimmings segment (72044191) shows the steepest export decline as well, suggesting a structural shift away from this form of scrap packaging—possibly reflecting changing logistics practices or declining demand from buyers who previously preferred bundled material.

Trade intensity and export propensity both declined

The vulnerability indicators show that trade intensity (total trade as a share of production plus imports) fell from 40.2% to 35.0% (−12.8%), while export propensity (exports as a share of production) dropped from 31.4% to 23.5% (−25.1%). This suggests that a growing share of the EU's ferrous turnings production is being absorbed domestically—consistent with the expansion of electric arc furnace steelmaking capacity within the EU and the strategic importance of retaining scrap as a domestic resource, a trend reinforced by the EU's discussions around restricting scrap exports.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in iron or steel turnings (CN 720441) underwent a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. The bloc moved from a near-balanced trade position to a €120 million export surplus, driven by an 77% collapse in import volumes and only a 27% decline in export tonnage. This structural shift was propelled by two major geopolitical disruptions: Brexit, which sharply curtailed UK-origin scrap flows, and EU sanctions on Russia, which eliminated what had been the bloc's second-largest import source.

The resulting scarcity, combined with modestly declining domestic production (−6.7% in volume), drove unit prices substantially higher—import prices rose 70% and export prices rose 49% over the decade. The ferrous turnings market thus became one where the EU ships out less material by weight but extracts more value per tonne, while simultaneously struggling to source adequate supply from non-EU partners.

Looking ahead, the concentration of EU exports on Türkiye (now approaching 50% of export value) represents a growing dependency risk, as evidenced by the rising export HHI of 2,983. At the same time, falling export propensity and trade intensity suggest that the EU may be on a trajectory toward greater scrap self-sufficiency—or, alternatively, toward policy measures that explicitly limit outbound scrap flows to preserve feedstock for the continent's decarbonising steel industry. The interplay between scrap availability, green steel ambitions, and trade policy will define the next phase of this market's evolution.