Market evolution: Electrical connectors and switches (CN 8536) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of the European Union's external trade in products classified under Combined Nomenclature heading 8536 — electrical apparatus for switching, protecting, or connecting electrical circuits at voltages not exceeding 1,000 V. This broad heading encompasses switches, relays, fuses, surge suppressors, plugs, sockets, lamp holders, and junction boxes, among others. The period under review, 2015–2025, spans a decade of significant structural change in global supply chains, punctuated by the COVID-19 pandemic, supply-chain disruptions, and the geopolitical realignment triggered by the war in Ukraine. The analysis draws exclusively on the general overview of EU extra-EU trade for CN 8536, along with complementary data on partner concentration, market structure, and vulnerability indicators.

1. A market that has traded volume for value: EU export competitiveness shifts upward

The most striking macro-level finding is a clear decoupling of EU export values from export volumes. Over the full period, EU extra-EU exports of CN 8536 grew by 35.4 % in value (from €12.26 billion to €16.61 billion) while declining by 9.1 % in volume (from 312,056 t to 283,774 t). The arithmetic consequence is a 48.9 % rise in the average unit export price, from €39,295/t to €58,527/t.

1.1 Export unit prices rose across nearly every sub-heading

A segment-level analysis confirms that this price uplift was pervasive rather than driven by a single product group. The table below shows the evolution of export unit prices (€/t) for the largest sub-headings:

(Sources: product segment breakdown)

Apparatus for protecting electrical circuits (853630) and switches (853650) recorded the steepest price gains, likely reflecting a shift in the EU's export mix towards higher-specification, safety-critical components used in industrial automation, EV charging infrastructure, and renewable-energy installations.

1.2 The EU's trade surplus widened despite faster import growth

Imports grew even faster than exports in value terms (+47.5 %, from €7.48 billion to €11.03 billion) but more modestly in volume (+18.0 %). Because import prices rose less steeply (+25.0 %) than export prices, the EU's trade balance in CN 8536 actually improved by 16.6 %, reaching €5.58 billion in 2025. The EU thus remains a structural net exporter — its export price premium over imports widened from roughly €6,300/t in 2015 to over €17,300/t by 2025, suggesting that the EU increasingly specialises in the higher-value segments of the product range.

1.3 Domestic production grew strongly in volume but only modestly in value

EU domestic production of CN 8536 items rose by 67.6 % in quantity (from 58.3 billion items to 97.8 billion items) but by only 13.2 % in value (from €20.99 billion to €23.76 billion), implying a significant decline in average unit values within domestic output. This likely reflects the growing weight of high-volume, lower-value components (e.g. connectors, standard plugs) produced within EU supply chains, while higher-value products destined for export commands premium pricing on world markets.

2. China's dominance and the broadening of EU import sourcing

2.1 China became the EU's largest single supplier by a wide margin

Among top import partners, China stands out for the scale and speed of its growth:

China's imports more than doubled, surging from €2.0 billion to €4.1 billion — reaching a peak of €4.7 billion in 2022. By 2025, China alone accounted for roughly 37 % of total EU imports in this heading, a dramatic increase from 27 % in 2015. Notably, China's peak import value occurred in 2022, after which there was a pull-back, possibly reflecting post-COVID destocking or the early effects of EU de-risking strategies.

2.2 Emerging suppliers gained ground as EU diversified sourcing

Several partners recorded very high growth rates from a lower base, indicating a diversification trend:

• India saw EU imports surge by 167 % (from €151 million to €402 million), making it one of the fastest-growing suppliers.
• Türkiye grew by 131 % (from €186 million to €428 million), likely benefiting from its customs-union arrangement with the EU and geographic proximity.
• Tunisia remained a steady nearshore supplier, growing by a more modest 14 % but reaching €401 million — consistent with the EU's "near-shoring" strategy for North Africa.

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value rose from 1,211 to 1,711 (+41.3 %), indicating increasing concentration. In other words, the growth of China and a few fast-growing suppliers more than offset diversification elsewhere. The HHI for import volume rose even more sharply (+80.9 %), reaching 3,111 — a level that signals a highly concentrated import structure by mass.

2.3 The UK's post-Brexit decline was the main counter-trend

The United Kingdom was the only top-7 import partner to record a decline (−24.3 %, from €889 million to €673 million), reflecting the disruption of intra-European supply chains after Brexit. The UK's import share fell from around 12 % in 2015 to 6 % in 2025.

3. Geopolitical shocks and the restructuring of EU export geography

3.1 The US became the EU's single largest export destination

EU exports to the United States grew by 58.9 % (from €1.80 billion to €2.86 billion), overtaking China to become the EU's largest extra-EU market. This reflects both strong US demand for European industrial components and, potentially, a redirection of trade flows as US-China tensions reshaped global sourcing patterns.

Morocco recorded the most impressive growth among EU export destinations (+100.4 %, from €414 million to €829 million), underlining the country's role as a near-shoring hub for European manufacturers — particularly in the automotive and electronics assembly sectors.

3.2 The collapse of exports to Russia constitutes the most dramatic supply shock

The volatility analysis identifies a single, severe supply shock: exports to the Russian Federation collapsed by 98.2 % in 2025, representing an abnormality score of 3.7 (the highest detected). EU exports to Russia had been relatively volatile (coefficient of variation: 0.70), but this near-total wipe-out is clearly linked to the successive rounds of EU sanctions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. With Russia's export share at roughly 3.1 %, the shock was significant in absolute terms but was absorbed without destabilising the overall export portfolio.

3.3 Export destination volatility was generally low, except for geopolitically exposed partners

The coefficient of variation for exports was generally below 0.20, indicating stable, long-term trade relationships for most partners. Notable exceptions were Russia (0.70) and the United Kingdom (0.26), the latter likely reflecting post-Brexit adjustment volatility. Among import partners, the UK also showed the highest volatility (0.60), followed by Morocco (0.29) and Serbia (0.27). By contrast, imports from China were remarkably stable (CV = 0.20) despite their rapid growth — a reflection of deep structural integration rather than boom-bust dynamics.

3.4 The EU's export-propensity and trade-intensity indicators point to deeper global integration

According to vulnerability indicators, the EU's export propensity (extra-EU exports as a share of production) surged from 26.7 % in 2015 to 67.5 % in 2025 (+152.8 %), while trade intensity (total extra-EU trade as a share of production) nearly doubled, from 39.2 % to 77.5 %. These figures indicate that EU producers have become far more reliant on international markets — both as customers and as suppliers of intermediate inputs — over the decade. The net import reliance metric moved from −6.5 % to −29.5 % (or, in absolute terms, from a modest export surplus to a much larger one), confirming the EU's strengthened net-exporter position in this product category.

Within the EU, the most specialised producing Member States in 2025 included Malta (RSCA: 0.79), Ireland (0.58), Bulgaria (0.38), Romania (0.37), and Czechia (0.32), while Germany, France, and Italy remained the dominant absolute exporters and importers, consistent with their large industrial bases.

Conclusion

Over the decade 2015–2025, the EU's trade in electrical switching and connection apparatus (CN 8536) underwent a clear structural transformation. Export value growth (+35 %) was driven almost entirely by higher unit prices (+49 %) rather than by increased volumes, pointing to an EU specialisation shift towards premium, high-specification products. Imports, by contrast, grew in both value and volume, with China emerging as the overwhelmingly dominant supplier — its share of EU imports rising from roughly one-quarter to over one-third. The EU's trade surplus widened to €5.6 billion by 2025, but this masks a growing dependency on a small number of foreign sources: import concentration (HHI) rose by over 40 % in value terms.

Geopolitically, the period was marked by a dramatic realignment: the near-total collapse of exports to Russia under sanctions, the strengthening of near-shoring ties with Morocco, Tunisia, and Türkiye, and a pronounced deepening of transatlantic trade with the United States. The post-Brexit decline in EU-UK trade in this heading is a further structural consequence of the decade's political shifts. Looking ahead, the combination of rising trade intensity, increased import concentration, and a more complex geopolitical landscape suggests that supply-chain resilience will remain a key concern for EU policymakers and industry in this strategically important product category.