Market evolution: Fuses (CN 853610) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of the European Union's external trade in low-voltage fuses (Combined Nomenclature code 853610) over the period 2015–2025. The product category covers three sub-segments by current rating: fuses rated ≤10 A (85361010), >10 A but ≤63 A (85361050), and >63 A (85361090). Over the decade, the EU fuse market underwent a pronounced structural transformation: the bloc shifted from a comfortable net-export position to near trade parity, domestic production collapsed in volume terms, unit values surged, and the geographic composition of both import sources and export destinations was substantially redrawn. The following sections unpack these dynamics in detail.

1. The Great Decoupling: Soaring Unit Values Mask a Decline in Physical Trade Volumes

1.1 EU export values grew while volumes contracted sharply

Between 2015 and 2025, EU exports of fuses to non-EU countries rose in value from €256.5 million to €299.3 million, an increase of 16.7% (trade overview). However, over the same period, exported volume fell from 10,339 tonnes to 7,082 tonnes—a decline of 31.5%. The gap was bridged by a dramatic 70.2% increase in average export unit values, which climbed from €24,757 per tonne to €42,134 per tonne. This divergence points to a shift toward higher-value-added product segments (likely higher-current fuses or fuses with greater technical complexity) and/or upward price pressure driven by input costs and supply-chain reconfiguration.

1.2 Import growth outpaced exports, eroding the trade surplus

EU imports followed a different trajectory. Their value expanded from €191.1 million to €277.3 million (+45.2%), while import volumes grew from 5,904 tonnes to 7,125 tonnes (+20.7%). Import unit values also rose, but more moderately, from €32,326 to €38,877 per tonne (+20.3%). The combined effect was a sharp erosion of the EU's trade surplus in fuses:

The trade balance briefly turned negative (reaching a trough of −€26.8 million), indicating that the EU became a net importer of fuses for at least one year. By 2025, the surplus had narrowed to just €22.0 million—barely a third of its 2015 level.

1.3 EU fuse production collapsed, deepening external dependence

The erosion of the trade surplus coincided with a severe contraction in domestic production volumes, which fell from 1.54 billion pieces (2015) to 602 million pieces (2025), a drop of 60.8%. Production value declined more moderately, from €385.3 million to €254.0 million (−34.1%), again reflecting a rising average value per unit produced. The implication is clear: the EU is producing far fewer fuses domestically and relying increasingly on imports to cover demand, even as it maintains a foothold in higher-value segments of export markets.

2. Geographic Reorientation: Emerging Economies Displace Traditional Partners

2.1 Mexico and China became the EU's dominant import suppliers

The composition of the EU's import supply base shifted dramatically over the decade. Mexico saw the most striking growth: imports surged from €10.3 million in 2015 to €76.6 million in 2025, an increase of 646.8%, making it the single largest import source by value by 2025 (top partners). China followed a similar trajectory, growing from €20.2 million to €68.0 million (+236.8%). Together, these two countries accounted for €144.6 million—over half of all EU fuse imports by value in 2025.

2.2 The United Kingdom and the United States lost ground as import sources

In contrast, imports from the United States fell by 63.4% (from €55.7 million to €20.4 million), and imports from the United Kingdom dropped by 67.4% (from €30.6 million to €10.0 million). The UK decline is consistent with post-Brexit trade friction: the UK had been the third-largest import partner in 2015 but fell out of the top ranks by 2025. The US decline is more surprising and may reflect reshoring of production to Mexico (which effectively displaced the US as a supplier to the EU) or a redirection of US-manufactured fuses toward domestic and Asia-Pacific markets.

2.3 India and Tunisia emerged as fast-growing, but volatile, suppliers

Imports from India grew by 269.1% (from €3.0 million to €11.2 million) and those from Tunisia by 114.7% (from €7.2 million to €15.4 million). However, both partners exhibited high volatility: India's coefficient of variation stood at 0.65 and Tunisia's at 0.20 for import flows. For India, the volatility likely reflects the early and still-uneven integration of Indian manufacturers into EU supply chains. For Tunisia, the growth may partly reflect nearshoring of fuse assembly for the European market, leveraging geographic proximity and trade preferences.

2.4 Export destinations also shifted, with Morocco and the United Kingdom gaining prominence

On the export side, the EU's largest partner, Tunisia, saw a decline from €45.6 million to €25.1 million (−45.0%). In contrast, exports to the United Kingdom grew by 48.8% (from €26.4 million to €39.3 million), and exports to Morocco more than doubled (+117.4%, from €11.2 million to €24.4 million) (top partners). The Morocco trend is consistent with the growth of Morocco as a manufacturing hub for automotive and electrical equipment, with EU fuse exports feeding into assembly operations there. Exports to the United States also grew (from €23.0 million to €31.2 million, +35.6%), suggesting that the EU retained competitiveness in higher-end fuse segments in the US market.

2.5 Import concentration increased slightly while export markets diversified

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import value rose from 1,486 to 1,607 (+8.1%), indicating a moderate increase in supplier concentration. By contrast, the export HHI fell from 670 to 609 (−9.1%), reflecting a modest broadening of the EU's export customer base. The import-side concentration increase is a natural consequence of the outsized growth of Mexico and China, which together now dominate the EU's fuse supply landscape.

3. Rising Trade Intensity, Specialisation, and Vulnerability

3.1 The EU's net import reliance moved toward zero, but trade intensity surged

The EU's net import reliance shifted from −13.3% in 2015 to −2.6% in 2025 (where negative values indicate a net-export position). The indicator touched a maximum of +9.3% at one point, confirming that the EU briefly became a net importer on a sustained basis. Over the same period, trade intensity nearly doubled, rising from 56.9% to 107.1%, and export propensity surged from 43.3% to 115.1%. An export propensity above 100% means that the EU exported more fuses (by value) than it produced domestically—a hallmark of an economy that has become heavily reliant on trade to balance its fuse market, with re-export and intra-firm trade flows likely playing a significant role.

3.2 Specialisation is concentrated in a handful of EU member states

In 2025, the EU's export specialisation in fuses was heavily concentrated in a small number of member states (specialisation):

Slovenia, Greece, and Hungary show the highest relative specialisation, suggesting that fuse manufacturing (or at least fuse export activity) plays a disproportionately important role in their trade profiles. The Netherlands stands out for its large share of EU fuse production (22.8%) and the remarkable growth of its exports (+180.5%, from €20.2 million to €56.5 million) over the decade (top reporters). This likely reflects the Netherlands' role as a distribution and re-export hub. At the other end, Malta, Ireland, Portugal, and Luxembourg show very low specialisation in this product.

3.3 Price shocks clustered around 2021–2022, consistent with post-pandemic supply disruptions

The shock detection analysis identified three notable price shocks:

The UK shock in 2021 is plausibly linked to Brexit-related supply-chain disruption and the adjustment of logistics flows. The Mexico shock in 2022 aligns with the broader post-COVID surge in nearshoring demand and input-cost inflation. The UAE shock in 2018 is harder to explain structurally but may reflect a one-off contract or batch effect in a relatively small market (1.5% of export value). Across import partners, the United States showed by far the highest volatility (CV = 1.62), reflecting the erratic nature of US-to-EU fuse flows—consistent with the dramatic decline noted earlier.

3.4 The import-side HHI for volumes rose even faster than for values

A nuance worth highlighting is that the import HHI measured by volume rose from 1,552 to 2,063 (+33.0%), far more than the value-based HHI (+8.1%). This suggests that while the value of imports is somewhat diversified (by the mix of high-value and low-value suppliers), the physical volume is increasingly concentrated in fewer hands—a potential vulnerability if a major supplier were to experience a disruption.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 decade, the EU's market for low-voltage fuses underwent a fundamental structural shift. Domestic production volumes fell by over 60%, pushing the bloc from a comfortable net-export position to near trade balance. The value of both exports and imports rose, but far more steeply on the import side (+45.2% versus +16.7%), driven by the rapid emergence of Mexico and China as dominant suppliers and the parallel retreat of the United States and the United Kingdom. Unit values climbed across the board—70.2% for exports, 20.3% for imports—reflecting both product-mix shifts and broader cost pressures. The EU's trade intensity and export propensity both surged past 100%, indicating an economy now deeply entangled in global fuse supply chains rather than self-sufficient. While a handful of member states (the Netherlands, Germany, Slovenia, Hungary) retain specialisation in fuse production, the overall picture is one of an EU fuse sector that has traded volume for value and domestic capacity for global integration—a transformation that brings efficiency gains but also heightened vulnerability to supply disruptions from a more concentrated import base.