Market evolution: Automotive lighting and wipers (CN 8512) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the trade dynamics of CN 8512 — a broad heading covering electrical lighting and signalling equipment for motor vehicles and bicycles, windscreen wipers, defrosters, demisters, and their parts — traded between the EU and the rest of the world over the 2015–2025 period. The heading bundles five six-digit sub-headings, of which motor-vehicle lighting and signalling equipment (851220) and parts (851290) account for the lion's share of both imports and exports. The period under review spans two major disruptions — the COVID-19 pandemic and the geopolitical realignment following Russia's invasion of Ukraine — and coincides with the accelerating electrification and digitalisation of the global automotive industry. Against this backdrop, the EU's trade in CN 8512 underwent three major structural shifts: a sharp erosion of the trade surplus driven by surging imports, a profound geographic reconfiguration of sourcing and destination markets, and a pronounced price-led value growth that masks stagnating or declining physical volumes.

1. The Surplus Erosion: Import Growth Far Outpaces Export Growth

EU exports grew in value but shrank in volume

Between 2015 and 2025, the EU's total extra-EU exports of CN 8512 rose from €3.28 billion to €4.15 billion, a cumulative increase of 26.4%. Over the same period, exported quantity actually declined by 9.7%, falling from 102,397 tonnes to 92,436 tonnes. The gap was filled entirely by a 40.1% rise in unit export prices, from €32,070 per tonne to €44,916 per tonne — evidence of a premiumisation trend that will be discussed further below.

EU imports more than doubled in value and grew by half in volume

Imports tell a far more dramatic story. In value terms, extra-EU imports of CN 8512 surged from €1.68 billion in 2015 to €3.52 billion in 2025, a gain of 110.0%. Imported volumes rose by 49.1% (from 96,951 tonnes to 144,550 tonnes), while average import prices climbed 40.8% (from €17,282/t to €24,341/t). Imports therefore grew roughly four times faster than exports in value terms and reversed the volume trajectory: while export volumes contracted, import volumes expanded substantially.

The trade surplus shrank by over 60%

The combined effect was a steep erosion of the EU's traditionally positive trade balance in this product group. The surplus fell from €1.61 billion in 2015 to just €633 million in 2025, a contraction of 60.6%. The surplus had actually peaked at nearly €2.0 billion around 2016–2018 before entering a sustained decline. This shift reflects the growing competitiveness of non-EU suppliers — particularly in lighting electronics and parts — and the relocation of production capacity to lower-cost countries by European automotive Tier-1 suppliers themselves.

2. Geographic Reconfiguration: Nearshoring Partners Rise, Russia Disappears

China consolidated its position as the EU's top import source

Among non-EU import partners, China was already the leading supplier in 2015 at €416 million and grew to €926 million by 2025 (+122.6%). China alone accounts for over a quarter of the EU's extra-EU imports in this category. This growth is consistent with the broader trend of Chinese suppliers, many of them subsidiaries of European groups, scaling up LED and electronics manufacturing capacity for automotive applications.

Morocco, Serbia, and Türkiye emerged as fast-growing nearshoring hubs

The most striking geographic story is the rapid rise of three nearshoring partners:

Morocco's trajectory is especially remarkable: from a negligible base of €7.6 million in 2015, imports reached €297 million in 2025, representing an almost forty-fold increase. This mirrors the broader build-out of Morocco as an automotive manufacturing platform by European OEMs and suppliers (Renault, Stellantis, and their supply chains). Serbia and Türkiye similarly benefit from geographic proximity to the EU, competitive labour costs, and EU trade preferences. Together, these three partners absorbed €873 million in imports in 2025, comparable to China's €926 million — a sign that EU supply chains are actively diversifying away from single-source dependence.

Korea remained the second-largest import partner at €386 million in 2025 but showed essentially flat growth (+0.4%), while Taiwan grew by 79.5% to €310 million. The geographic concentration of imports, measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), declined from 1,425 to 1,197, confirming that the EU's import base has become meaningfully less concentrated over the decade.

Russia collapsed as an export destination

On the export side, the most dramatic shift was the near-total disappearance of Russia as a destination market. EU exports to Russia fell from €119 million in 2015 to just €338 thousand in 2025, a decline of 99.7%. The collapse was concentrated in the 2022–2025 period and corresponds directly to the EU's sanctions regime following the invasion of Ukraine. A supply shock of −99% is detected in the data for 2025, confirming the sanctions-driven rupture.

The United Kingdom remained the EU's single largest export market throughout the period, though its share eroded slightly from €889 million to €777 million (−12.6%), likely reflecting post-Brexit trade frictions. China, by contrast, grew from €709 million to €1,166 million (+64.5%), making it the second-largest export destination — a reminder that EU lighting suppliers continue to serve the Chinese automotive market with high-end components. Exports to Türkiye grew by 82.6% to €242 million, and to Brazil by 82.1% to €124 million, partially compensating for the loss of the Russian market.

EU Member States show divergent specialisation patterns

Within the EU, production specialisation in CN 8512 is heavily concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2025, the most specialised Member States by revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) were:

These countries host large automotive assembly plants (Volkswagen, Kia, Renault/Dacia, and their supplier networks), which explains the concentration. At the other end, large economies like Germany, France, and Italy play dominant roles in absolute terms — Germany alone exported €2.37 billion in 2025, accounting for more than half of total EU exports — but their specialisation indices are lower because their export baskets are more diversified.

3. Premiumisation and Rising Trade Intensity Mask Structural Volume Pressures

Production value exploded while output quantities barely grew

EU domestic production data reveals a striking divergence. The number of items produced in the EU rose modestly from 345 million units in 2015 to 376 million in 2025 (+9.0%). Over the same period, the total value of production surged from €5.37 billion to €14.82 billion (+176.3%). This implies a roughly tripling of the average unit value of EU-made automotive lighting and signalling products. The shift is driven by the ongoing transition from conventional halogen and incandescent technology to LED, matrix-LED, laser, and OLED lighting systems, which carry significantly higher price points. Advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS) integration — such as adaptive driving beam and intelligent lighting — further increases the per-unit value of modern headlamps and signalling equipment.

Unit prices rose across nearly all product sub-headings

The premiumisation effect is visible across sub-headings in both imports and exports. For the dominant sub-heading 851220 (motor-vehicle lighting and signalling equipment), export prices per tonne rose from €39,993/t to €62,251/t (+55.6%) while import prices climbed from €18,859/t to €30,203/t (+60.1%). The persistent price gap — EU exports averaging roughly double the unit value of imports — indicates that the EU retains a competitive edge in high-end, technology-intensive lighting modules while increasingly sourcing standard-commodity and mid-range components from non-EU suppliers.

One notable exception is sub-heading 851240 (windscreen wipers, defrosters, and demisters), where export volumes collapsed from 9,638 tonnes in 2015 to just 3,405 tonnes in 2025 (−64.7%), and export value halved from €138 million to €64 million (−53.4%). This segment appears to be one where non-EU producers — particularly in China and Southeast Asia — have achieved decisive cost competitiveness.

Trade intensity and export propensity surged

The EU's trade intensity (the ratio of extra-EU trade to production value) rose from 13.8% in 2015 to 43.4% in 2025 — a more than threefold increase. Similarly, export propensity (exports as a share of production) climbed from 9.5% to 30.5%. These figures indicate that the EU's automotive lighting sector has become significantly more globally integrated over the decade. While the EU maintained a net-export position throughout (net import reliance remained negative, moving from −4.6% to −8.6% as shown in the vulnerability dashboard), the combination of rising import volumes and rising trade intensity points to a sector where cross-border supply chains now play a much larger role than a decade ago.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU's trade in CN 8512 underwent a structural transformation. The EU remains a net exporter, but its trade surplus has eroded sharply as imports — particularly from China, Morocco, Serbia, and Türkiye — grew at more than four times the rate of exports. The geographic landscape shifted profoundly: nearshoring partners in North Africa and the Western Balkans have risen from marginal positions to become major suppliers, while Russia has virtually vanished as an export market following the 2022 sanctions. Beneath the headline value figures, a powerful premiumisation dynamic is at work. Both production and trade values have surged, but physical volumes have stagnated or declined, reflecting the industry's transition to higher-value LED and ADAS-integrated lighting technologies. The EU appears to be concentrating on the upper end of the value chain — exporting expensive, technology-rich modules while importing growing volumes of standard and mid-range components. This strategic positioning carries benefits (higher margins, technological leadership) but also vulnerabilities (greater supply-chain dependence, exposure to geopolitical disruption), as the data on trade intensity and partner concentration makes clear.