Market evolution: Patterned hot-rolled steel coil (CN 720810) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the EU's external trade in patterned hot-rolled steel coils (customs code 720810) over the period 2015–2025. The product under analysis covers flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width ≥ 600 mm, in coils, simply hot-rolled, not clad, plated or coated, with patterns in relief directly due to the rolling process. The data reveals a market that has undergone a significant structural transformation: the EU has shifted from a comfortable net exporter to an increasingly import-dependent position, with trade volumes declining on both sides but unit values rising substantially. Several external shocks — most notably the post-2020 steel price spike and the geopolitical reconfiguration of supply chains following Russia's invasion of Ukraine — have left deep imprints on trade flows and partner relationships.
1. A Deteriorating Trade Balance Shaped by Diverging Export and Import Dynamics
Over the decade, the EU's trade balance in CN 720810 eroded dramatically. While the EU maintained a trade surplus throughout the period, the magnitude of that surplus collapsed from €13.9 million in 2015 to just €1.6 million in 2025 — an 88.4% decline. At its peak (sometime around 2017–2018, based on the maximum recorded), the surplus reached €58.6 million. This deterioration was driven by two distinct but reinforcing trends: a sharp contraction in exports and a more resilient, though structurally shifting, import base.
EU exports contracted sharply in volume while unit values rose
EU exports of CN 720810 to non-EU countries fell from 57,064 tonnes and €26.6 million in 2015 to 27,276 tonnes and €16.5 million in 2025, representing declines of 52.2% in quantity and 38.0% in value. The smaller decline in value relative to volume reflects rising unit export prices, which increased 29.6% from €466/t to €605/t over the period. Notably, the price peak was substantially higher: export prices reached a maximum of €1,196/t in some year, likely 2021 or 2022, consistent with the global steel price surge. The trade dashboard shows these trends clearly.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change (%) | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (€M) | 26.6 | 16.5 | −38.0% | 16.5 | 75.0 |
| Export volume (t) | 57,064 | 27,276 | −52.2% | 27,276 | 75,451 |
| Export price (€/t) | 466 | 605 | +29.6% | 466 | 1,196 |
EU imports proved more stable in value but also shifted structurally
EU imports showed a different pattern: the value increased 17.4% from €12.7 million to €14.9 million, while the volume actually declined 14.0% from 28,537 tonnes to 24,535 tonnes. This means import unit values rose even more steeply than export prices — by 36.6% from €444/t to €607/t, peaking at €985/t. Import volumes were highly volatile, dropping to a minimum of just 13,099 tonnes in one year before recovering.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change (%) | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Import value (€M) | 12.7 | 14.9 | +17.4% | 10.4 | 19.4 |
| Import volume (t) | 28,537 | 24,535 | −14.0% | 13,099 | 33,265 |
| Import price (€/t) | 444 | 607 | +36.6% | 410 | 985 |
Rising prices masked falling volumes on both sides
A key feature of this market is that unit values for both imports and exports roughly converged by 2025 (€605/t vs. €607/t), after starting at similar levels in 2015. The price spike of 2021–2022 — visible in the maximum values for both flows — was the most dramatic episode, driven by the global steel price surge following the post-COVID demand recovery, supply constraints, and elevated energy costs in Europe. This episode temporarily inflated the value of trade even as physical volumes were declining.
2. A Complete Reconfiguration of Import Partners Driven by Geopolitics
Perhaps the most striking feature of the CN 720810 market over 2015–2025 is the radical reshuffling of the EU's import sources. The partner concentration data reveals that traditional suppliers have been displaced by new entrants, largely in response to EU sanctions and broader geopolitical shifts.
Russia's near-total elimination from EU supply
The Russian Federation was a significant supplier in 2015, with imports valued at €1.4 million. By 2025, this had collapsed to just €37,000 — a 97.4% decline. The sharpest reductions coincided with the imposition of EU sanctions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The volatility data confirms that Russian imports showed a coefficient of variation of 0.66, reflecting this abrupt disruption. At their peak, Russian imports reached €6.8 million.
Türkiye emerged as the dominant import partner
The most dramatic shift was the rise of Türkiye. Starting from a negligible €57,000 in 2015, Turkish imports surged to €6.1 million in 2025 — an extraordinary 10,695% increase. Türkiye is now by far the largest non-EU supplier of CN 720810 to the EU. However, this trade relationship has been highly volatile (coefficient of variation of 1.50), reflecting both Türkiye's own industrial cycles and the opportunistic filling of supply gaps left by sanctions on Russia.
Ukraine and Saudi Arabia emerged as new suppliers
Ukrainian imports grew 650% from €268,000 to €2.0 million, and Saudi Arabia appeared almost from nowhere (€4,098 in 2015 to €877,000 in 2025). Japan also became a notable supplier, rising from €73 to €204,000. These new entrants suggest the EU has actively diversified its supply base in the wake of geopolitical disruptions.
| Partner | 2015 (€M) | 2025 (€M) | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 4.0 | 3.7 | −8.0% |
| Serbia | 6.7 | 3.0 | −56.0% |
| Russian Federation | 1.4 | 0.04 | −97.4% |
| Türkiye | 0.06 | 6.1 | +10,695% |
| Ukraine | 0.27 | 2.0 | +650% |
| Saudi Arabia | 0.004 | 0.88 | +21,290% |
| Japan | 0.0001 | 0.20 | +278,864% |
Import concentration declined, reflecting supply diversification
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import concentration by value fell from 3,963 in 2015 to 2,900 in 2025 (−26.8%). An HHI above 2,500 still indicates a moderately concentrated market, but the downward trend suggests meaningful diversification — likely a deliberate response to the risks exposed by the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Export markets also shifted, with the US remaining dominant but declining
On the export side, the United States remained the largest EU export destination, though its share declined from €9.5 million to €6.7 million (−29%). Exports to Mexico and Türkiye collapsed by 89% and 93% respectively. The United Kingdom, by contrast, grew as an export destination (+130% to €2.3 million), likely reflecting post-Brexit trade dynamics. Export concentration actually increased (HHI from 1,959 to 2,536), meaning EU exports became more dependent on fewer partners — a potentially concerning vulnerability.
3. Declining EU Production and Rising Import Dependence Signal Structural Vulnerability
The trade data must be read alongside production trends and vulnerability indicators, which together paint a picture of a sector under structural pressure.
EU production of CN 720810 declined substantially
Available production data shows that EU production volume fell 23% from 25.8 billion kg in 2015 to 19.9 billion kg in 2025, hitting a trough of 14.7 billion kg along the way. Production value declined more modestly (−5.5%, from €13.3 billion to €12.6 billion), again reflecting higher unit values. The production minimum (€6.2 billion) likely coincided with the 2020 pandemic-related downturn.
Net import reliance nearly doubled
The EU's net import reliance rose from 16.9% in 2015 to 26.0% in 2025 (a 53.8% increase). Remarkably, at one point (likely 2017–2018), the ratio briefly turned negative (−1.1%), indicating the EU was temporarily a net exporter. The reversal to a 26% import reliance by 2025 represents a fundamental shift in the EU's position in this market.
Export propensity collapsed, confirming the EU's shrinking role as a supplier
The export propensity — the share of EU production exported to non-EU countries — fell from 12.9% to 7.5% (−42.2%). This is the most salient vulnerability indicator (salience score of 84.7 out of 100), suggesting that the EU's competitive position in international markets for this product has weakened considerably. Trade intensity, by contrast, remained relatively stable around 35%.
| Vulnerability Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net import reliance (%) | 16.9 | 26.0 | +53.8% |
| Trade intensity (%) | 34.7 | 35.1 | +1.3% |
| Export propensity (%) | 12.9 | 7.5 | −42.2% |
Price shocks in 2021 tested the market's resilience
The supply shock analysis identified a major price shock centred on 2021, affecting EU exports to the United States (abnormality score of 325.2, with prices shifting +128.1% and representing 61.9% of export value) and imports from Serbia (abnormality 47.0, price shift +83.8%). The 2021 episode was the defining volatility event of the decade, driven by the convergence of post-pandemic demand recovery, supply chain disruptions, and the early effects of energy cost inflation. The shock was particularly severe for the US export relationship, which is also the most volatile export partner (CV = 0.36 for the US among the top partners, but with the highest absolute abnormality).
Conclusion
The EU's market for patterned hot-rolled steel coils (CN 720810) has undergone a profound transformation between 2015 and 2025. The trade surplus eroded by 88.4%, driven by a halving of export volumes and a more resilient (though shifting) import base. Geopolitical events — principally EU sanctions on Russia — triggered a complete reconfiguration of import partnerships, with Türkiye rising from a marginal supplier to the dominant non-EU source, and new suppliers like Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, and Japan entering the picture. Meanwhile, declining EU production and a doubling of net import reliance (from 17% to 26%) signal growing structural dependence on external sources. The collapse of export propensity (from 13% to 7.5%) further confirms the EU's diminishing competitive edge in this product category. Looking forward, the key risks lie in the concentration of imports (the HHI, while declining, remains elevated), the volatility of the Turkish supply relationship, and the EU's broader vulnerability to global steel price shocks, as vividly demonstrated by the 2021 episode.