Market evolution: Motor vehicle parts n.e.s (CN 870899) — 2015–2025

Introduction

CN 870899 is a residual heading within the broader vehicle parts category (CN 8708), encompassing motor vehicle parts and accessories not classified under more specific sub-headings such as brakes, gearboxes, or steering systems. It includes general-purpose components (87089997), closed-die forged steel parts (87089993), and parts destined for the industrial assembly of smaller vehicles (87089910). Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU has remained a strong net exporter of these products, but the character of that trade has shifted profoundly: export volumes have contracted by 38.5% while unit values have surged by 44.0%; the geographic composition of both imports and exports has been redrawn by Brexit and the rise of Asian suppliers; and EU production has nearly doubled even as the industry has become markedly less export-oriented. This report identifies and interprets the three most consequential dynamics observed in the data.

1. Fewer Tonnes, Steeper Prices: The Decoupling of Volume from Value in EU Parts Trade

Export volumes contracted by nearly 40% while unit values climbed 44%

The most striking feature of EU trade in CN 870899 is the sharp divergence between physical volumes and trade values. Total EU exports fell from 1,383,425 tonnes in 2015 to just 851,265 tonnes in 2025 — a 38.5% contraction. Yet in value terms, exports declined only 11.4%, from €11.35 billion to €10.06 billion. The explanation lies in unit values: the average export price per tonne rose from €8,206 to €11,817 (+44.0%). This price resilience held even through the COVID-19 shock of 2020, when export values dipped to their decade-low of €9.02 billion before rebounding to a peak of €11.92 billion by 2023.

The sub-product breakdown confirms this pattern across all segments. The dominant category — general parts excluding forged steel (87089997) — saw export volumes fall from 1.20 million tonnes to 768,603 tonnes (−36%), yet its export value only declined 9.1%, from €10.22 billion to €9.29 billion. Industrial assembly parts (87089910) experienced even steeper volume erosion (−66%, from 113,177 to 38,167 tonnes), while forged steel parts (87089993) remained relatively stable in value terms (from €272 million to €264 million) despite a 33% volume decline.

Import growth was moderate and concentrated in rising unit prices

Imports followed a different trajectory. Total import values rose 18.4%, from €3.79 billion to €4.49 billion, while import volumes grew 12.1%, from 531,648 tonnes to 595,939 tonnes. Unit import prices edged up only 5.6% over the decade — a far more muted increase than on the export side — suggesting the EU has been sourcing relatively lower-cost parts from emerging suppliers while exporting higher-value-added components.

The most dramatic sub-product shift on the import side was the collapse of industrial assembly parts (87089910): volume plummeted from 57,534 tonnes to 18,967 tonnes (−67%), and its value fell from €438 million to €173 million. This likely reflects the restructuring of European vehicle assembly supply chains — potentially linked to the transition toward electric vehicles, which require different component specifications than the diesel and petrol vehicles referenced in the CN 87089910 definition.

The trade surplus has eroded from its 2021 peak back toward pandemic-trough levels

The EU's trade surplus in CN 870899 tells a cyclical story. Tracing the year-by-year balance:

The surplus collapsed to €5.44 billion during the 2020 pandemic, rebounded sharply to a peak of €7.90 billion in 2021, and has since declined steadily back to €5.57 billion in 2025 — approaching pandemic-trough levels. The net import reliance confirmed this pattern: from −19.7% in 2015 (strong net exporter) to −11.3% in 2025, with the most extreme net-export position at −27.5% around 2021.

2. A Rewired Network: Brexit, Asian Competition, and the Nearshoring Pivot

The United Kingdom's role as both supplier and buyer has declined sharply since Brexit

The most consequential geographic shift was the decline of the United Kingdom. As an import source, the UK fell from the EU's largest partner (€946 million, 2015) to third place (€561 million, 2025) — a 40.8% decline. A major price shock was detected in 2021, the first full year of post-Brexit trade, with an abnormality score of 219.7 — by far the highest of any bilateral flow in this product — accompanied by a 20.2% price shift and a 29.9% value share. This is consistent with the implementation of rules of origin, customs declarations, and regulatory divergence that added friction and cost to EU-UK automotive parts trade.

On the export side, the UK remained the EU's largest single destination but saw exports decline 12.0%, from €1.97 billion to €1.74 billion. The integrated EU-UK supply chain that existed prior to Brexit has given way to a more conventional third-country trading relationship.

China and India have surged as import sources while traditional Asian suppliers retreat

China's share of EU imports grew spectacularly, rising 139.1% from €427 million to €1.02 billion, making it the second-largest import partner by 2025. India similarly grew 148.2%, from €141 million to €350 million. Türkiye, already a major supplier, expanded 51.0% from €630 million to €951 million.

Conversely, traditional Asian automotive suppliers — Japan (−48.7%) and South Korea (−32.0%) — saw substantial declines. This likely reflects both competitive pressure from lower-cost producers and the restructuring of Japanese and Korean OEMs' supply chains, with greater localisation of production closer to end markets. Notably, both the UK and Japan exhibit high trade volatility (coefficient of variation of 0.37 and 0.34 respectively), consistent with the structural disruption their trade flows have undergone.

Türkiye and Morocco have emerged as key export destinations, reflecting nearshoring trends

On the export side, the most notable growth came from nearby markets. Türkiye — an EU accession candidate with a deeply integrated automotive sector — saw EU parts exports rise 36.9%, from €937 million to €1.28 billion, making it the third-largest export destination. Morocco grew even faster in relative terms (+40.3%, from €320 million to €448 million), reflecting the expansion of automotive assembly capacity in Tangier and Kenitra by European manufacturers.

Meanwhile, the United States — historically the EU's second-largest export market — saw a 22.4% decline (from €1.76 billion to €1.37 billion), potentially reflecting both increased localisation by European OEMs in North America and competitive pressures from Asian suppliers.

3. Production Surges Inward: The Declining Export Orientation of EU Automotive Manufacturing

Czechia's export growth (+201%) contrasts with steep declines in France and Italy

Within the EU, the geography of parts export has shifted markedly eastward. Czechia's exports surged 201.4% over the decade — from €230 million to €694 million — the fastest growth rate of any EU member state. Czechia benefits from deep integration into German automotive supply chains, competitive labour costs, and a strong specialisation in automotive manufacturing (RSCA of 0.26 in 2025).

By contrast, traditional Western European automotive powers experienced steep declines. France saw the steepest drop (−41.5%, from €1.63 billion to €953 million), followed by Italy (−33.8%) and Belgium (−27.6%). Germany, the EU's largest exporter, proved relatively resilient (−1.5%), reflecting its dominance in high-value-added components and the anchoring effect of its major OEMs. On the import side, the Netherlands stands out with a 110.6% increase (from €163 million to €344 million), likely reflecting the country's role as a logistics hub for re-export and the growth of Rotterdam as an entry point for Asian parts.

EU production value has nearly doubled even as external trade volumes have weakened

One of the most significant trends is the near-doubling of EU production value, which grew from €32.2 billion to €68.3 billion (+111.8%) over the period. This expansion occurred even as export volumes contracted by 38.5%, suggesting that a growing share of EU production is being absorbed within the Union's own supply chains — either integrated into finished vehicles assembled domestically or consumed by the internal aftermarket. The revealed comparative advantage data for 2025 confirms that automotive parts specialisation is concentrated in a belt of Iberian and Central European economies — Portugal (RSCA 0.54), Spain (0.28), Slovenia (0.26), Czechia (0.26), and Slovakia (0.23) — all deeply embedded in European OEM supply chains.

Trade intensity and export propensity have fallen dramatically, signalling inward integration

The declining external orientation of the EU's automotive parts industry is captured starkly by two composite indicators. The trade intensity index — measuring the share of production that crosses external borders — declined from 35.9% to 21.6% (−40.0%). The export propensity — the share of production that is exported — fell from 28.3% to 16.6% (−41.6%). Both metrics point to the same conclusion: the EU's automotive parts industry has become markedly less outward-facing in relative terms. Market concentration remained moderate throughout. The import HHI edged up from 1,266 to 1,307 (+3.3% by value), with a more notable increase in volume-based concentration (1,547 to 1,824, +17.9%), indicating that physical import flows are consolidating around a smaller number of large suppliers. Export concentration by volume actually declined (899 to 693, −22.8%), suggesting EU exporters have diversified their destination markets.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in motor vehicle parts n.e.s. (CN 870899) has undergone a profound structural transformation between 2015 and 2025, defined by three overarching dynamics.

First, the dramatic divergence between falling physical volumes and rising unit values — particularly on the export side — points to a European industry that ships fewer tonnes but sustains its revenue through higher-value output. Export volumes dropped 38.5% while unit values climbed 44.0%, cushioning the decline in total export value to just 11.4%.

Second, the geographic landscape has been redrawn. Brexit cost the United Kingdom its position as the EU's preeminent trading partner in this category, while China and India have emerged as major suppliers. Nearshoring has boosted trade with Türkiye and Morocco, reflecting a preference for shorter, more resilient supply chains.

Third, a quiet but consequential internal rebalancing has taken place. Central European economies — above all Czechia — have captured an increasing share of EU export capacity, while France and Italy have seen their positions erode sharply. The near-doubling of EU production value alongside a 40% decline in trade intensity suggests an industry that is growing in absolute scale but becoming progressively more inward-looking — a structural shift with significant implications for the EU's competitive positioning in global automotive supply chains.