Market evolution: Iron and steel nails and staples (CN 7317) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of EU external trade in products classified under Combined Nomenclature code 7317 — nails, tacks, drawing pins, corrugated nails, staples and similar articles of iron or steel — over the period 2015 to 2025. The analysis draws on trade flow data, partner and reporter rankings, concentration measures, volatility indicators, and vulnerability metrics for the EU as a single reporting entity, trading with non-EU countries.
Over this decade, the EU's import bill for these products grew faster than its export receipts, narrowing the trade surplus. Import volumes expanded by 37% while export volumes rose by only 10%. At the same time, the EU's production volumes declined by over 20%, even as production value increased by 17%, suggesting a shift towards higher-value-added production. The period was also marked by major geopolitical shocks — particularly sanctions on Belarus and Russia — that restructured supply chains.
1. A Widening Import Gap and an Eroding Trade Surplus
The most striking macro-level trend is the progressive erosion of the EU's positive trade balance in nails and staples. While the EU remained a net exporter throughout most of the period, the margin shrank dramatically.
1.1 Imports outpaced exports in both volume and value growth
Over 2015–2025, EU imports of CN 7317 products grew by 41.4% in value (from €161.7 million to €228.6 million) and by 37.0% in volume (from 100,066 tonnes to 137,134 tonnes). By contrast, EU exports grew by only 20.7% in value (from €194.0 million to €234.1 million) and 9.8% in volume (from 79,529 tonnes to 87,342 tonnes). The resulting trade balance collapsed by 82.9%, from a surplus of €32.3 million in 2015 to just €5.5 million in 2025. Crucially, the EU recorded a trade deficit in some intermediate years, reaching a low of –€28.9 million.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (€M) | 194.0 | 234.1 | +20.7 |
| Export quantity (kt) | 79.5 | 87.3 | +9.8 |
| Import value (€M) | 161.7 | 228.6 | +41.4 |
| Import quantity (kt) | 100.1 | 137.1 | +37.0 |
| Trade balance (€M) | 32.3 | 5.5 | –82.9 |
1.2 Import prices remained structurally lower, but the volume-price dynamic reveals a strategy shift
A notable feature is the persistent price gap between EU imports and exports. In 2025, the average export price stood at €2,678 per tonne, while the average import price was only €1,667 per tonne — a 60% premium for exported goods. Import prices rose by just 3.1% over the decade, whereas export prices increased by 9.8%. This pattern is consistent with the EU importing basic commodity nails from low-cost producers (notably China) while exporting higher-specification or branded products to advanced economies.
1.3 Declining domestic production underpins growing import dependence
EU production volumes fell by 20.3% over the period, from 426,342 tonnes to 340,000 tonnes. At the same time, production value rose by 16.7%, from €646.1 million to €753.7 million. This divergence implies that EU producers are moving up the value chain — focusing on specialised or higher-margin products — while ceding volume-intensive, lower-value segments to imports. The growing trade intensity (from 58.1% to 73.8%) and export propensity (from 42.5% to 60.5%) confirm that the EU's nails sector has become increasingly intertwined with global markets.
2. Geopolitical Shocks Redraw the Import Map
The decade saw a fundamental reshuffling of the EU's import sources, driven by China's continued dominance, the near-total collapse of trade with Belarus and Russia following sanctions, and the rapid rise of alternative suppliers such as Türkiye and Ukraine.
2.1 China consolidated its position as the EU's overwhelmingly dominant supplier
China remained the EU's largest import partner throughout the period, accounting for the majority of import value. Chinese exports to the EU grew from €82.9 million in 2015 to €131.8 million in 2025 (+59.1%), peaking at an extraordinary €205.0 million at some point during the period. China's share of EU imports rose correspondingly, making the EU increasingly reliant on a single supplier for basic nail products. The relatively low volatility of Chinese supply (coefficient of variation of 0.18) underscores the consistency and scale of this trade relationship.
2.2 Belarus and Russia were effectively eliminated as suppliers
The most dramatic supply-side shock was the disappearance of Belarusian imports, which collapsed from €11.7 million in 2015 to virtually zero by 2025 — a decline of 100%. This is identified as a major supply shock centred on 2023, consistent with EU sanctions imposed on Belarus following the country's role in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, Russian imports fell from €955,249 in 2015 to just €2 in 2025 (–100%). The extremely high volatility coefficients for Russia (0.91) and Belarus (0.25) reflect the abruptness of these supply disruptions. Together, these two countries represented a combined €12.6 million of lost import supply — a gap that other suppliers partially filled.
2.3 Türkiye and Ukraine emerged as replacement suppliers
The void left by Belarus and Russia was partly filled by Türkiye and Ukraine. Turkish imports more than doubled from €4.5 million to €11.7 million (+157.8%), while Ukrainian imports surged nearly tenfold from €874,379 to €9.4 million (+973.3%). Ukraine's growth is particularly remarkable, potentially reflecting both the EU's effort to support the Ukrainian economy and the redirection of Ukrainian industrial exports westward in the context of the war. However, the high volatility of Ukrainian supply (coefficient of variation of 0.42) signals that this route remains subject to significant disruption risk.
| Import partner | 2015 (€M) | 2025 (€M) | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 82.9 | 131.8 | +59.1 |
| Belarus | 11.7 | 0.0 | –100.0 |
| Türkiye | 4.5 | 11.7 | +157.8 |
| Ukraine | 0.9 | 9.4 | +973.3 |
| United Kingdom | 9.6 | 6.2 | –35.1 |
| Taiwan | 7.9 | 7.7 | –3.2 |
| Russian Federation | 1.0 | 0.0 | –100.0 |
2.4 Import concentration intensified despite supply diversification attempts
Despite the emergence of new suppliers, the import concentration index (HHI) for imports by value rose from 2,933 to 3,553 (+21.1%). This counterintuitive result reflects the fact that China's dominance grew faster than the diversification achieved through smaller suppliers. By volume, the HHI rose even more steeply, from 4,103 to 5,511 (+34.3%). These are high absolute values, indicating a market that is far from diversified on the import side.
3. Export Markets Reoriented Toward the United States
On the export side, the EU's trade in nails was characterised by a dramatic shift toward the United States, the emergence of Lithuania as a major EU exporter, and increasing concentration of exports in fewer destination markets.
3.1 The United States became the EU's dominant export market
The most striking export-side development was the surge in EU exports to the United States, which grew from €37.7 million in 2015 to €98.5 million in 2025 (+161.4%), peaking at €148.1 million. A major price shock was detected in 2022, with a 44.2% price increase and an abnormality score of 4.9, likely reflecting post-pandemic supply chain disruptions, steel price inflation, and possibly the effect of US trade policy. The US accounted for 48.1% of EU export value at its peak share, making it by far the most important single destination. The high volatility of US-bound exports (coefficient of variation of 0.44) reflects this boom-bust pattern.
3.2 Lithuania emerged as the EU's fastest-growing exporter
At the EU Member State level, Lithuania's export growth was extraordinary: from €5.8 million in 2015 to €56.5 million in 2025, an increase of 875%. By 2025, Lithuania had become the EU's second-largest exporter of CN 7317 products, behind only Germany. Specialisation analysis confirms this: Lithuania displayed the highest Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) of 0.73 among all EU Member States, indicating strong specialisation in this product category. Other specialised exporters include Austria (RSCA 0.55), Denmark (0.48), and Poland (0.37).
3.3 Traditional exporters lost ground
Several long-established EU exporters saw their positions weaken. Germany, the largest EU exporter at the start of the period, experienced a 15.9% decline from €36.5 million to €30.7 million. Austria's exports fell by 40.8% (from €28.0 million to €16.6 million), and Sweden's dropped by 36.6% (from €20.4 million to €13.0 million). In contrast, Poland's exports grew by 27.1% to €27.8 million. These shifts likely reflect competitive pressures from lower-cost producers within the EU itself (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe) as well as from non-EU suppliers.
3.4 Export concentration increased markedly, driven by US dependence
The export HHI by value nearly doubled from 1,242 to 2,304 (+85.5%), while the volume-based HHI more than doubled from 1,821 to 4,364 (+139.6%). This sharp rise in concentration is almost entirely attributable to the growing dominance of the United States as an export destination. While the UK remained a stable market at around €46–47 million (–1.8%), and Switzerland grew by 40.5% to €12.1 million, the scale of US-bound growth dwarfed all other destinations. This creates a vulnerability: any disruption to US demand — whether from tariffs, economic slowdown, or policy shifts — could significantly affect EU exporters.
Conclusion
The EU trade market for iron and steel nails and staples (CN 7317) underwent significant structural change over 2015–2025. On the import side, China's dominance deepened despite EU efforts to diversify, while sanctions-driven supply disruptions eliminated Belarus and Russia as sources. New suppliers like Türkiye and Ukraine partially filled the gap but with less consistency. On the export side, the United States became overwhelmingly the most important destination, concentrating risk. Within the EU, Lithuania emerged as a major new exporter, while traditional producers like Germany and Austria lost market share.
The overarching trend is one of growing trade openness and declining self-sufficiency: the EU's net import reliance shifted from a position of moderate surplus (–5.5% in 2015) to a tighter margin (–10.6% in 2025), with deficits recorded in some years. Both import and export sides became more concentrated, raising potential concerns about supply chain resilience and market access risk. The data suggests a market that is increasingly integrated into global trade flows, more dependent on a small number of key partners, and subject to the geopolitical and macroeconomic dynamics of those relationships.