Market evolution: Industrial impregnated knitted garments (CN 6113) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in CN 6113 — garments that are knitted or crocheted and then rubberised, impregnated, coated, or covered with plastics or other materials (excluding babies' garments and clothing accessories) — over the period 2015–2025. This niche product category straddles the textile and industrial materials sectors, finding applications in protective workwear, sportswear, medical garments, and technical apparel.

The data reveals a market undergoing a profound structural transformation. Over the decade, the EU's trade balance deteriorated sharply, driven by surging imports that nearly doubled in volume while exports grew only modestly. The EU's net import reliance climbed from 42.5% to 88.7%, signalling an increasing dependence on non-EU suppliers. Three broad dynamics shape the story: (1) the rapid rise of Southeast Asian and South Asian sourcing, (2) a striking reconfiguration of intra-EU production and export capabilities, and (3) geopolitical shocks that have redrawn the map of EU export destinations.

1. The Asian Sourcing Boom: Import Growth, Price Deflation, and the New Geography of Supply

1.1 Import volumes nearly doubled while unit prices fell

Between 2015 and 2025, EU imports of CN 6113 surged in volume (+89.7%, from 8,562 tonnes to 16,247 tonnes) and in value (+62.0%, from €185.4 million to €300.2 million). The fact that value grew more slowly than quantity points to a significant decline in the average import unit price (−14.6%, from €21,648/t to €18,477/t). This price deflation is consistent with intensifying competition among Asian suppliers and a possible shift towards lower-cost product lines.

1.2 China remains the dominant supplier, but Southeast Asia is the growth frontier

China is by far the EU's largest import partner, accounting for over half of total import value in 2025 (€153.0 million, up 48.1% from €103.3 million in 2015). However, the most dramatic growth has come from the "China+1" sourcing alternatives that EU importers have increasingly adopted:

Cambodia's explosive growth — from €18.9 million to €61.6 million — makes it the EU's second-largest supplier, overtaking Thailand. Myanmar and Bangladesh have emerged from negligible levels to become meaningful suppliers. Sri Lanka, too, has grown from near-zero to a notable niche player. These shifts likely reflect EU importers diversifying away from concentrated Chinese dependency, aided by preferential trade arrangements (e.g., the EU's Everything But Arms initiative for LDCs) and rising labour costs in China.

1.3 Import concentration has modestly declined as the supplier base broadens

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import value fell from 3,422 to 3,142 (−8.2%). While imports remain moderately concentrated (an HHI above 2,500 is typically considered concentrated), the decline indicates that the growth of Cambodia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and others is gradually reducing China's share weight, even as China's absolute value continues to rise. The volume-based HHI fell more steeply (−23.6%), confirming a genuine broadening of supply sources in physical terms.

2. A Transformed Intra-EU Production Landscape: More Items, Less Value

2.1 EU production volumes surged while value collapsed

Perhaps the most striking structural finding relates to EU production data. Production quantity grew by 165.9%, from approximately 105 million items to 280 million items, yet production value fell by 50.8%, from €401 million to €197 million. This implies an extraordinary collapse in the average production value per item — from roughly €3.81 to €0.70 per piece.

This pattern suggests a structural shift: EU producers appear to be pivoting towards high-volume, lower-value-added output — possibly standardised protective or disposable garments — while higher-value technical or fashion-grade products may increasingly be sourced from Asia.

2.2 The EU's largest producing member states have repositioned

The intra-EU specialisation map in 2025 shows that the most specialised producers (by revealed comparative advantage) include Malta (RSCA: 0.78), Denmark (0.71), Croatia (0.68), Lithuania (0.46), and Spain (0.44). Notably, Italy — historically the EU's largest exporter of this product — saw its export value plummet by 69.3%, from €105.3 million to just €32.3 million. Meanwhile, Spain and Poland emerged as major new exporters:

Spain's ascent (+802%) and Poland's meteoric rise (+3,726%) represent a genuine redistribution of EU production capacity from Western and Southern Europe towards the Iberian Peninsula and Central Europe. These shifts may reflect cost competitiveness advantages, proximity to end-markets, or the strategic repositioning of production facilities.

2.3 Export concentration increased as the market consolidated around fewer destinations

The export HHI rose sharply from 1,323 to 2,510 (+89.6%), indicating that EU export flows have become significantly more concentrated. This is largely a consequence of two forces: the collapse of exports to Russia and the surge of exports to China, which together have reshaped the EU's export geography.

3. Geopolitical Realignments: The Collapse of Russian Trade and the Rise of China as an Export Destination

3.1 EU exports to Russia collapsed following sanctions

EU exports to the Russian Federation fell by 95.7%, from €35.4 million in 2015 to just €1.5 million in 2025. Russia was the EU's single largest export market in 2015; by 2025 it had effectively disappeared. This collapse is almost certainly linked to the EU sanctions regime imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it represents the single most significant structural disruption in EU export flows for this product over the period.

3.2 China reversed roles: from supplier to top export destination

In a remarkable turn, China went from being a minor EU export destination (€3.7 million in 2015) to the EU's largest export market by value (€87.3 million in 2025, +2,245%). This is an extraordinary development. While China simultaneously supplies over half of the EU's imports, its role as a destination for EU exports suggests either:

• Re-export and processing chains: EU firms importing semi-finished goods from China, adding value (e.g., specialised coatings, technical specifications), and re-exporting finished products back;
• China's growing domestic demand for high-specification industrial garments in construction, manufacturing, and healthcare; or
• Hong Kong/transhipment dynamics, where some recorded "exports to China" may reflect re-export flows to broader Asian markets.

The coefficient of variation for EU exports to China is 2.06 — extremely high — reflecting the fact that this trade relationship essentially materialised within the last few years of the sample.

3.3 The trade balance deteriorated dramatically, and vulnerability indicators flash red

The EU's trade balance in CN 6113 shifted from a modest deficit of €28.7 million in 2015 to a deficit of €118.2 million in 2025 — a deterioration of 312.4%. The deficit peaked at €328.5 million in 2021, coinciding with the post-COVID demand surge and supply chain disruptions. Net import reliance more than doubled, from 42.5% to 88.7%, peaking at 94.6%.

At the same time, export propensity surged by 310.3%, reflecting the growing importance of non-EU markets for the (diminished) EU production base — a paradox where the EU becomes simultaneously more import-dependent and more export-oriented relative to its own production. This suggests a hollowing-out of the domestic market: the EU is importing more for consumption while exporting an increasing share of what it does produce.

The volatility data further underscores the fragility of these new trade relationships. Exports to the UAE, Tunisia, and China all exhibit coefficients of variation well above 1.0, indicating highly unstable flows. Detected price shocks include an extreme +777.6% price shift in exports to the UAE in 2023, a +2,504.6% price spike in exports to Tunisia in 2018, and a +196.4% price shift in imports from Myanmar in 2017 — all indicative of volatile, opportunistic trade rather than stable, long-term supply relationships.

Conclusion

The EU market for industrial impregnated knitted garments (CN 6113) has undergone a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. The picture that emerges is one of increasing dependence on Asian suppliers, a restructuring of intra-EU production towards higher-volume but lower-value output, and a geopolitically-driven reorientation of export flows away from Russia and towards China.

The most consequential trend is the surge in import reliance: the EU now sources nearly 89% of its net consumption from outside the bloc, up from 43% a decade ago. While China remains the anchor supplier, the rapid growth of Cambodia, Myanmar, and Bangladesh reflects a genuine diversification of the Asian supply base — though this diversification brings its own volatility risks, as the high coefficients of variation for newer partners attest.

On the production side, the paradox of rising output volumes but collapsing output values suggests that EU manufacturers are adapting to competitive pressure by moving down the value chain — a strategy that may be sustainable in the short term but raises questions about long-term industrial competitiveness and technological upgrading.

Finally, the near-total disappearance of Russian export markets and the explosive rise of China as the EU's primary export destination represent a geopolitical reconfiguration of the first order. Whether this China-facing export orientation proves durable — or whether it is vulnerable to the same kinds of sanctions and trade disruptions that severed the Russia relationship — remains an open and consequential question for EU trade policy in the years ahead.