Market evolution: Aluminium alloy bars (CN 760429) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of EU extra-EU trade in CN 760429 — Bars, rods and solid profiles, of aluminium alloys, n.e.s. — over the period 2015–2025. The product category covers two sub-segments: solid profiles (CN 76042990) and bars and rods (CN 76042910), both made of aluminium alloys. It sits within the broader heading of aluminium bars, rods, and profiles (CN 7604), alongside non-alloy aluminium products (CN 760410) and hollow profiles (CN 760421).
Over the eleven-year window, the EU aluminium alloy extrusion market has undergone significant structural change. Three interconnected dynamics stand out: a swing from trade deficit to surplus driven by divergent import and export trajectories; a dramatic reconfiguration of sourcing away from Russia and China and towards Türkiye; and a sharp 2022 price shock triggered by the energy crisis, which left lasting effects on trade concentration and market structure. This report documents and interprets these shifts using trade flow data, partner-level breakdowns, concentration metrics, and specialisation indicators.
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I. From Structural Deficit to Sustained Surplus: The EU's Rebalancing Act
1.1 The trade balance reversed sharply over the decade
In 2015, the EU ran a modest trade deficit in CN 760429, with imports exceeding exports by approximately €36 million (balance: −€35.7 million). By 2025, this had turned into a comfortable surplus of +€228.1 million — a swing of nearly €264 million. The trajectory was not linear: the trade balance deteriorated to a historic low of −€428.3 million before recovering, and reached a peak surplus of +€300.1 million in an intermediate year.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trade balance (EUR) | −35.7 M | +228.1 M | +739.7% |
| Exports — value (EUR) | 937.6 M | 1,347.9 M | +43.8% |
| Imports — value (EUR) | 973.2 M | 1,119.9 M | +15.1% |
| Exports — volume (t) | 183,602 | 207,908 | +13.2% |
| Imports — volume (t) | 313,924 | 229,957 | −26.7% |
1.2 Divergent volume trends were amplified by rising unit values
The headline value figures conceal fundamentally different volume trajectories. EU export volumes grew modestly by +13.2% (from 183,602 t to 207,908 t), while export values rose by +43.8%, implying that the bulk of export value growth came from higher unit prices: export prices climbed from €5,106/t to €6,482/t (+26.9%).
On the import side, the picture is strikingly different. Import volumes fell by 26.7% (from 313,924 t to 229,957 t), yet import values still grew by +15.1% — a consequence of unit prices surging from €3,100/t to €4,870/t (+57.1%). The EU thus imported substantially less material at substantially higher prices, reflecting both global aluminium price inflation and a structural contraction in import demand.
| Metric | Exports | Imports |
|---|---|---|
| Value change (2015→2025) | +43.8% | +15.1% |
| Volume change (2015→2025) | +13.2% | −26.7% |
| Unit price change (2015→2025) | +26.9% | +57.1% |
1.3 A collapse in bars and rods imports drove the volume decline
The overall import volume decline was concentrated in one sub-product. Imports of bars and rods (CN 76042910) collapsed from 135,927 t in 2015 to just 30,773 t in 2025 — a drop of 77.4%. By contrast, imports of solid profiles (CN 76042990) remained broadly stable, moving from 177,997 t to 199,180 t, after peaking at 292,024 t in 2022.
On the export side, the pattern was reversed: solid profile exports held steady (137,509 t → 139,624 t), while bars and rods exports grew by 48.2% (46,093 t → 68,284 t).
| Sub-product | Import volume 2015 | Import volume 2025 | Change | Export volume 2015 | Export volume 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 76042990 — Solid profiles | 177,997 t | 199,180 t | +11.9% | 137,509 t | 139,624 t | +1.5% |
| 76042910 — Bars and rods | 135,927 t | 30,773 t | −77.4% | 46,093 t | 68,284 t | +48.2% |
This compositional shift suggests that EU producers have largely substituted imported bars and rods with domestic output, while solid profiles remain a category where significant cross-border trade persists in both directions — likely reflecting specialised extrusion capacity and product differentiation across member states.
II. A Geopolitical Reconfiguration of Trade Partners
2.1 Türkiye emerged as the EU's overwhelmingly dominant import supplier
The most dramatic partner-level shift in EU imports of CN 760429 was the rise of Türkiye. Turkish imports surged from €201.5 million in 2015 to €604.3 million in 2025 — an increase of 199.9%. At their peak, Turkish imports reached €951.5 million in a single year. By 2025, Türkiye alone accounted for over half of total EU imports by value in this product category, up from roughly one-fifth a decade earlier.
| Import partner | Value 2015 | Value 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Türkiye | 201.5 M | 604.3 M | +199.9% |
| China | 176.0 M | 74.2 M | −57.8% |
| Russian Federation | 78.8 M | 0.03 M | −100.0% |
| Norway | 84.4 M | 57.7 M | −31.6% |
| Switzerland | 99.6 M | 59.2 M | −40.6% |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 50.9 M | 61.8 M | +21.6% |
| United Kingdom | 43.5 M | 44.5 M | +2.2% |
2.2 Russia was eliminated and China lost significant market share
At the other end of the spectrum, two major historical suppliers saw their positions collapse. Russian Federation imports went from €78.8 million to effectively zero (€34,262) — a decline of −100.0%. This near-total elimination coincides with EU sanctions imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it is the single most geopolitically significant data point in this report.
China experienced a parallel decline, with imports falling from €176.0 million to €74.2 million (−57.8%). Chinese imports hit their minimum in 2025, suggesting a continued downward trajectory. Anti-dumping measures on Chinese aluminium extrusions, first introduced by the EU in 2010 and renewed subsequently, are a likely contributing factor, alongside broader strategic de-risking of supply chains.
Together, the exit of Russia and the decline of China created a vacuum that Türkiye was uniquely positioned to fill, given its proximity, production capacity, and customs union with the EU for industrial goods.
2.3 Import concentration rose sharply as sourcing narrowed
The geopolitical reshuffling is captured quantitatively by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import concentration. By value, the HHI rose from 1,387 in 2015 to 3,120 in 2025 — an increase of 125%. By volume, the HHI rose from 1,428 to 3,476 (+144%). An HHI above 2,500 is generally considered to indicate a highly concentrated market. The EU thus moved from a moderately diversified import base to one heavily reliant on a single supplier — Türkiye.
| HHI metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imports — value | 1,387 | 3,120 | +125.0% |
| Imports — volume | 1,428 | 3,476 | +143.5% |
| Exports — value | 1,747 | 1,229 | −29.6% |
| Exports — volume | 1,986 | 1,346 | −32.2% |
2.4 Export destinations became more diversified
In contrast to the concentration of imports, EU export destinations became notably more diversified. The export HHI fell from 1,747 to 1,229 by value (−29.6%), indicating that EU exporters are serving a broader range of markets than they were a decade ago.
The United Kingdom remained the single largest export destination throughout the period, growing from €342.3 million to €376.5 million (+10.0%). But the fastest growth came from newer or smaller markets: exports to Serbia rose from €13.8 million to €49.5 million (+259.5%), exports to Israel grew from €6.3 million to €57.2 million (+802.3%), and exports to Greece surged from €15.2 million to €86.5 million (+469.2% in value as a reporting member — see below).
| Export partner | Value 2015 | Value 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 342.3 M | 376.5 M | +10.0% |
| Switzerland | 142.6 M | 195.5 M | +37.1% |
| United States | 97.6 M | 156.6 M | +60.4% |
| Norway | 38.8 M | 68.3 M | +75.9% |
| Serbia | 13.8 M | 49.5 M | +259.5% |
| Israel | 6.3 M | 57.2 M | +802.3% |
| Türkiye | 14.5 M | 35.0 M | +141.9% |
2.5 Within the EU, production and trade leadership shifted geographically
The identity of the leading EU member states in both imports and exports also evolved. Germany remained the dominant EU player on both sides, with import and export values broadly stable (imports ~€327 M; exports ~€312 M). However, several member states saw dramatic changes:
- Spain more than doubled its exports (€103 M → €221 M, +113.5%), becoming the EU's second-largest exporter by 2025.
- Greece emerged as a major exporter (€15 M → €87 M, +469.2%), consistent with its top ranking in export specialisation (RSCA: 0.71).
- Poland grew its imports by 151% (€51 M → €129 M) while also more than doubling its exports (€30 M → €82 M).
- Netherlands saw its imports plunge by 63.1% (€210 M → €77 M), possibly reflecting the decline in transhipment of Russian-origin aluminium through Rotterdam.
III. The 2022 Inflection: Price Shocks, Volatility, and Lasting Market Restructuring
3.1 The 2022 energy crisis triggered an unprecedented price and volume spike
The year 2022 stands out as the single most disruptive period in the dataset. Aluminium smelting and extrusion are energy-intensive processes, and the post-COVID supply recovery combined with the energy price surge following Russia's invasion of Ukraine produced extraordinary market conditions.
In 2022, EU imports of CN 760429 peaked at an estimated €1,919.8 million in value and 366,488 tonnes in volume — both period maxima. Import prices hit €5,238/t, also the highest level observed. On the export side, values reached €1,491.6 million and volumes 213,634 tonnes, both maxima as well.
The combined effect was a trade deficit of approximately €428 million in 2022 — the worst of the entire period — as the EU absorbed a surge of high-priced imports while also ramping up exports. The subsequent normalisation of energy prices and the progressive impact of sanctions on Russian aluminium led to a rapid correction: by 2025, import volumes had fallen back to 229,957 tonnes and the trade balance had swung to a surplus of €228 million.
3.2 Specific price shocks were detected across major export markets
The shock detection analysis identifies 2022 as the epicentre of abnormal price movements in EU exports. Three significant price shock events were flagged:
| Export destination | Abnormality score | Price shift | Share of EU export value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Norway | 10.3 | +36.0% | 6.2% |
| Israel | 9.2 | +61.6% | 2.6% |
| United Kingdom | 7.5 | +42.0% | 39.8% |
The UK shock is by far the most consequential, given that it represents nearly 40% of total EU export value in this product. A 42% price increase on such a large share of exports would have had substantial revenue effects for EU producers. The Israel shock was proportionally even larger (+61.6%) but affected a smaller share of total trade.
These shocks were not evenly distributed across partners. The volatility analysis shows that the most stable export relationships were with the United Kingdom (CV: 0.08) and Switzerland (CV: 0.08), while the most volatile were with Israel (CV: 0.57) and India (CV: 0.42). On the import side, the most volatile suppliers were India (CV: 0.75), United Arab Emirates (CV: 0.57), and Russia (CV: 0.57) — the latter's volatility reflecting its eventual total exit from the market.
3.3 EU production proved resilient and increasingly value-oriented
Domestic EU production of CN 760429 was remarkably stable in volume terms: output moved from approximately 2.76 million tonnes in 2015 to 2.84 million tonnes in 2025 (+3.0%), having dipped to a low of 2.04 million tonnes (likely 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic) and peaked at 3.74 million tonnes (likely 2022). In value terms, however, production grew much more substantially: from €9,740 million to €13,408 million (+37.7%), reflecting the same price inflation visible in trade data.
The combination of stable-to-growing production and sharply declining import volumes means that the EU's domestic market is increasingly supplied by its own producers. The net import reliance indicator remained negative throughout the period (ranging from −3.7% to +3.6%), confirming that the EU is broadly self-sufficient in this product category, though it briefly became a net importer during the 2022 disruption.
3.4 Specialisation patterns reveal a Southern and Eastern European export capacity
The specialisation analysis for 2025 identifies distinct geographical clusters of comparative advantage within the EU:
| Most specialised (highest RSCA) | RSCA | RCA | Production share | Export share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Greece | 0.71 | 5.93 | 4.0% | 0.7% |
| Slovenia | 0.62 | 4.22 | 4.2% | 1.0% |
| Romania | 0.54 | 3.33 | 5.6% | 1.7% |
| Bulgaria | 0.46 | 2.71 | 1.7% | 0.6% |
| Portugal | 0.35 | 2.09 | 2.9% | 1.4% |
Greece, Slovenia, and Romania lead in revealed comparative advantage (RCA > 3), with Greece's RSCA of 0.71 aligning with the dramatic 469% growth in Greek exports documented above. Conversely, Malta (RSCA: −0.99), Cyprus (−0.92), and Ireland (−0.92) show no meaningful specialisation in this product, as expected for smaller economies without significant aluminium extrusion capacity.
3.5 Trade intensity and export propensity both increased, pointing to greater global integration
The EU's trade intensity for CN 760429 rose from 17.3% to 24.4% (+41.4%), while export propensity increased from 10.8% to 14.6% (+35.5%). Both metrics point to the same conclusion: despite — or perhaps because of — the disruptions of 2022, the EU aluminium extrusion sector has become more deeply integrated into global markets. The export propensity metric is particularly salient (scoring 70.9 on the salience index), suggesting that the EU's role as a net exporter of these products has structurally strengthened.
Conclusion
The EU market for aluminium alloy bars, rods, and solid profiles (CN 760429) has undergone a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. A decade ago, the EU was a marginal net importer with a diversified supplier base that included Russia and China as significant sources. By 2025, it has become a net exporter with a trade surplus of €228 million, sourcing its reduced import needs overwhelmingly from a single partner — Türkiye.
Three forces drove this transformation. First, the collapse of bars and rods imports (−77.4% by volume) and the concurrent growth of bars and rods exports (+48.2%) suggest a meaningful strengthening of EU domestic production capacity in this sub-segment. Second, geopolitical disruption — particularly EU sanctions on Russia and anti-dumping measures on China — eliminated two major suppliers and redirected import flows towards Türkiye, dramatically increasing import concentration (HHI: 1,387 → 3,120). Third, the 2022 energy crisis created an acute shock that temporarily pushed the EU into net-import territory, with unprecedented price spikes across all major trade relationships.
The post-2022 normalisation has been largely favourable to the EU's position, but the heavy reliance on Türkiye for imports represents a new strategic vulnerability. With the import HHI now firmly in the "highly concentrated" zone, any disruption to EU–Türkiye trade flows — whether from tariff changes, political tensions, or production issues — could have outsized effects on the EU aluminium extrusion supply chain.