Market evolution: Aluminium profiles (CN 76042990) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the EU's extra-EU trade in solid aluminium alloy profiles (CN 76042990) over the period 2015–2025. The product sits within the broader category of aluminium bars, rods and profiles (CN 7604) and corresponds to Prodcom code 24.42.22.50. Over the past decade, the EU aluminium profile market has undergone significant structural change: a once-healthy trade surplus eroded nearly to zero, import sourcing became far more concentrated on a single supplier, and the commodity price shocks of 2021–2022 left a lasting mark on unit values. At the same time, EU production volumes proved relatively resilient and several member states emerged as increasingly specialised exporters. The following sections trace these dynamics in detail.
1. From Trade Surplus to Near-Parity: The Widening Import Gap
1.1. Export growth lagged behind a surge in imports
Between 2015 and 2025, EU exports of solid aluminium alloy profiles rose from €751 million to €961 million (+27.9%), while imports climbed from €638 million to €963 million (+50.9%). In volume terms the asymmetry was even more pronounced: export quantities grew by only 1.5% (from 137,509 t to 139,624 t), whereas import volumes rose 11.9% (from 177,997 t to 199,180 t). The EU has therefore remained a structural net importer by volume throughout the entire period, and the gap in value terms widened considerably.
1.2. The trade balance swung from surplus to deficit before recovering slightly
The EU's trade balance in this product evolved as follows:
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Period min | Period max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Balance (EUR) | +113.1 M | −2.6 M | −436.6 M | +157.3 M |
The surplus peaked at €157 million before collapsing to a deficit of €437 million at the trough. By 2025, the balance had partly recovered but remained in marginal deficit. This swing reflects a combination of faster-rising import volumes and the erosion of the EU's unit-price advantage.
1.3. Unit prices rose on both sides, but import price inflation was sharper
| Flow | Price 2015 (EUR/t) | Price 2025 (EUR/t) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exports | 5,463 | 6,879 | +25.9% |
| Imports | 3,585 | 4,836 | +34.9% |
Export unit values have consistently been higher than import unit values, reflecting the EU's focus on higher-value or more-finished profiles. However, import prices rose faster, narrowing the gap and suggesting that foreign suppliers increasingly competed at higher price points — or that cost-push factors (energy, raw material) affected them disproportionately.
2. Türkiye's Dominance and the Reconfiguration of Trade Partnerships
2.1. Türkiye became the EU's largest import supplier, displacing China
The most striking shift in the EU's import geography was the rise of Türkiye. Import values from Türkiye surged from €189 million in 2015 to €575 million in 2025 (+203.8%), peaking at €897 million. Over the same period, imports from China fell from €153 million to €65 million (−57.2%). This divergence likely reflects a combination of EU trade defence measures on Chinese aluminium products, Türkiye's cost competitiveness and customs-union proximity, and the re-routing of supply chains following earlier anti-dumping actions.
| Import partner | Value 2015 | Value 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Türkiye | 189.4 M | 575.4 M | +203.8% |
| China | 152.9 M | 65.4 M | −57.2% |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 50.8 M | 61.5 M | +21.0% |
| Norway | 54.9 M | 47.9 M | −12.7% |
| Switzerland | 79.4 M | 48.6 M | −38.8% |
| United Kingdom | 35.3 M | 35.7 M | +1.0% |
| Egypt | 13.8 M | 15.3 M | +11.2% |
2.2. Import concentration roughly doubled, driven by Türkiye's growing share
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU imports by value rose from 1,795 in 2015 to 3,756 in 2025 (+109.3%), confirming a sharp increase in sourcing concentration. An HHI above 2,500 is generally considered highly concentrated. This means that the EU became substantially more dependent on a narrow set of suppliers — above all Türkiye — raising questions about supply-chain resilience.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import HHI (value) | 1,795 | 3,756 | +109.3% |
| Import HHI (volume) | 1,797 | 4,091 | +127.6% |
| Export HHI (value) | 1,862 | 1,317 | −29.3% |
By contrast, the export HHI declined by 29.3%, indicating that EU exporters diversified their destination markets over the same period.
2.3. The United Kingdom remained the dominant export market, but Southern and Eastern European exporters gained ground
The United Kingdom absorbed €286 million of EU exports in 2025, roughly unchanged from 2015 (−1.1%). Switzerland and the United States rounded out the top three, with the latter growing by 75.5% to €100 million. Serbia emerged as a fast-growing destination (+441.5% to €44 million), likely linked to supply-chain integration in the Western Balkans.
| Export partner | Value 2015 | Value 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 289.1 M | 285.8 M | −1.1% |
| Switzerland | 118.1 M | 148.0 M | +25.3% |
| United States | 57.2 M | 100.4 M | +75.5% |
| Serbia | 8.1 M | 43.6 M | +441.5% |
| Norway | 27.8 M | 40.1 M | +44.4% |
Within the EU, Spain more than doubled its export value (+113.4% to €207 million), Poland grew by 158.5% to €66 million, and Greece surged by 417.4% to €70 million — each signalling an expanding production and export base in southern and eastern member states.
3. Price Shocks, Production Resilience, and Evolving Vulnerability
3.1. The 2022 energy crisis triggered pronounced export-price shocks to key partners
The volatility analysis reveals that the most extreme shock events all centred on 2022, driven by sharp price increases in EU export flows:
| Partner | Flow | Shock type | Abnormality score | Price shift | Value share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norway | Exports | Price | 16.5 | +32.8% | 5.0% |
| Switzerland | Exports | Price | 8.4 | +35.4% | 20.9% |
| United Kingdom | Exports | Price | 8.4 | +38.8% | 42.6% |
These spikes coincide with the European energy crisis of 2021–2022, which disproportionately affected energy-intensive aluminium processing. The UK shock is particularly noteworthy given that it accounts for 42.6% of EU export value in this product. On the import side, Türkiye and China exhibited the highest volatility (coefficients of variation of 0.44 and 0.48 respectively), while Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most stable supplier (CV of 0.07).
3.2. EU production volumes held steady while values surged, pointing to cost-push dynamics
EU production (PRODCOM 24.42.22.50) data shows a resilient volume base but a dramatic value increase:
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Production quantity (kg) | 2,759,809,493 | 2,843,074,931 | +3.0% |
| Production value (EUR) | 9,739,932,633 | 13,408,137,414 | +37.7% |
Production volume peaked at approximately 3.74 billion kg at its highest point, before settling back to 2.84 billion kg in 2025. Meanwhile, production value rose nearly 38%, reflecting substantial cost-push inflation (energy, raw materials, labour) rather than output expansion. This decoupling of volume and value is consistent with the broader European industrial experience during the 2021–2023 period of elevated energy costs.
3.3. The EU's net import reliance and export competitiveness indicators followed diverging paths
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net import reliance (%) | −3.0 | −1.7 | +45.3% |
| Trade intensity (%) | 17.3 | 24.4 | +41.4% |
| Export propensity (%) | 10.8 | 14.6 | +35.5% |
Net import reliance remained negative (indicating the EU is still a slight net exporter by value in this product), but it trended towards zero — consistent with the surplus erosion described in Section 1. Trade intensity and export propensity both increased, meaning the EU's aluminium profile sector became more open and more outward-oriented even as its net competitive edge narrowed. The convergence of these indicators suggests a sector that is increasingly integrated into global trade flows but with diminishing margins of competitive advantage.
Net import reliance · Trade intensity · Export propensity
Conclusion
Over 2015–2025, the EU's solid aluminium alloy profile market experienced three defining shifts: (1) the near-total erosion of a once-positive trade balance, driven by import volumes and values that grew far faster than exports; (2) a dramatic re-orientation of import sourcing towards Türkiye and away from China, resulting in a doubling of import-side concentration; and (3) a cost-push inflation episode in 2021–2022 that lifted both production values and export prices without correspondingly increasing output volumes. While the EU's production base proved volume-resilient and several member states (Spain, Greece, Poland) emerged as increasingly competitive exporters, the rising concentration of imports on a small number of suppliers — above all Türkiye — constitutes a growing strategic dependency. Looking ahead, the interplay between EU energy policy, trade defence instruments, and supply-chain diversification will be critical in shaping the trajectory of this market.