Market evolution: Aluminium hollow profiles (CN 760421) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in hollow profiles of aluminium alloys (Combined Nomenclature code 760421) over the period 2015–2025. The product falls within the broader category of aluminium bars, rods and profiles and is widely used in construction, transport and industrial applications. The analysis draws on trade-overview data covering EU imports from and exports to non-EU countries, as well as complementary data on partner geography, intra-EU reporter shares, market concentration, price volatility and vulnerability indicators.

The decade reveals a striking transformation: the EU has gone from a comfortable net exporter of these profiles to a position of growing import dependence, driven largely by a surge in shipments from Western Balkan and Turkish producers.

1. From Surplus to Deficit: The EU's Changing Trade Balance

The most consequential structural shift over the 2015–2025 period is the complete reversal of the EU's trade balance in aluminium hollow profiles. While exports grew at a moderate pace, imports expanded at a far faster rate, erasing a trade surplus and turning it into a deficit.

Import growth vastly outpaced export growth

Between the first and last year in the data window, EU exports grew from €366.2 million to €542.3 million (+48.1% in value), while exported volumes rose from 71,563 tonnes to 81,493 tonnes (+13.9%). By contrast, EU imports surged from €223.8 million to €660.2 million (+195.0% in value), with quantities more than doubling from 60,750 tonnes to 139,527 tonnes (+129.7%).

Unit prices rose on both sides, but the EU commands a premium

EU export unit prices averaged €5,117/t in 2015 and reached €6,655/t in 2025 (+30.1%), while import unit prices moved from €3,684/t to €4,732/t (+28.4%). The persistent price gap — roughly €1,500–2,000/t throughout the period — suggests that the EU tends to export higher-value or more specialised profiles (e.g. for aerospace, automotive or premium construction applications) while importing standard-grade or commodity profiles. The full price and volume series can be explored on the trade dashboard.

The trade balance swung by €260 million

The EU's trade balance moved from a surplus of €142.4 million in 2015 to a deficit of €117.9 million in 2025, representing a deterioration of approximately €260 million. The net import reliance indicator confirms this trajectory: it moved from −3.05% (net exporter) in 2015 to −1.67% in 2025, having briefly turned positive (i.e. net import-reliant) at its peak. The minimum value of −3.73% in the earlier years highlights that the EU's export advantage was once considerably wider.

2. The Rise of Türkiye and the Western Balkans: A Structural Redrawing of Supply Routes

Behind the trade-balance reversal lies a dramatic restructuring of the EU's import geography. One partner — Türkiye — has come to dominate the import side of this product, while several smaller Western Balkan suppliers have also emerged rapidly. At the same time, China's role has diminished significantly.

Türkiye became the dominant supplier

Of all the shifts visible in the data, the rise of Türkiye stands out most sharply. EU imports from Türkiye grew from €54.8 million in 2015 to €338.4 million in 2025 — a staggering increase of +517.8%. Over the period, Türkiye's peak was €386.8 million. This single country now accounts for roughly half of all EU imports in this product category. Türkiye's trajectory is clearly visible in the partner-country view.

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia emerged as significant suppliers

Alongside Türkiye, two Western Balkan countries saw extraordinary growth:

Bosnia and Herzegovina's growth from €2.2 million to €40.4 million is particularly remarkable. Combined with Türkiye, these three partners — all geographically positioned on or near the EU's southeastern frontier — now supply a very large share of EU aluminium hollow-profile imports. This pattern is consistent with EU pre-accession trade arrangements, preferential agreements (the EU–Türkiye Customs Union, Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Western Balkan states) and competitive cost structures in the region.

China's role has declined sharply

China, which was the second-largest import partner in 2015 at €60.6 million, saw its share decline to €25.8 million by 2025 (−57.4%). China's peak was €98.9 million, indicating a pronounced fall from a mid-period high. This decline may reflect a combination of factors: EU trade defence measures on Chinese aluminium products, shifting global supply chains, and the rising competitiveness of nearer-source suppliers.

Switzerland remained the EU's largest export market

On the export side, Switzerland was consistently the top destination, growing from €81.9 million to €118.8 million (+45.1%). The United Kingdom (€69.9M → €109.9M, +57.0%) and the United States (€42.7M → €67.6M, +58.5%) were also major markets. Notably, exports to Mexico grew by +358.1% (from €5.8M to €26.6M), suggesting expanding EU industrial links with that country.

Import concentration increased sharply while export markets stayed diversified

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value rose from 2,095 to 2,979 (+42.2%), reflecting increasing concentration around a smaller number of suppliers — principally Türkiye. By volume, the import HHI was even higher at 3,305 in 2025. In contrast, the export HHI remained broadly stable at around 1,150–1,161, indicating that the EU continues to sell to a well-diversified set of destination markets.

3. Production Specialisation, Volatility and the 2022 Price Shocks

The decade also reveals information about the EU's internal production geography and about episodes of price volatility, with 2022 standing out as a year of particularly pronounced price shocks.

Southern and Northern European members dominate production specialisation

According to specialisation indicators for 2025, the EU members most specialised in the production and export of aluminium hollow profiles are:

Spain stands out both for its high specialisation and its dominant production share. Germany, while the largest absolute exporter at €202.9 million in 2025, does not appear among the most specialised producers because of the breadth of its overall manufacturing base. Conversely, Ireland (RSCA −0.989), Estonia (−0.989) and Latvia (−0.974) show the least specialisation, producing negligible volumes.

EU production grew modestly in value, less so in volume

EU production volumes rose only +3.0% over the period (from 2.76 billion kg to 2.84 billion kg), whereas production value grew by +37.7% (from €9.74 billion to €13.41 billion). This divergence points to sustained input-cost inflation — notably in primary aluminium and energy — being passed through into higher output values, rather than to physical expansion of production capacity.

2022 was marked by severe price shocks in several export markets

The shock detection analysis identifies three major price-shock events in EU exports, all centred on 2022:

The year 2022 was characterised globally by the energy-price spike following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which disproportionately affected aluminium-intensive industries due to the metal's high smelting energy requirements. The volatility analysis shows that trade with certain partners — notably the Russian Federation (coefficient of variation of 1.45 for imports) and India (1.40) — was markedly more volatile than with established partners such as Switzerland (0.16) or the United Kingdom (0.12). This is consistent with the disruption and sanctions-related trade re-routing that occurred from 2022 onward.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 decade, the EU's trade in aluminium hollow profiles has undergone a fundamental structural shift. A sector that was once characterised by a healthy export surplus has seen its trade balance flip into deficit, driven by a near-tripling of import values. This transformation is overwhelmingly linked to the rise of Türkiye as the dominant supplier, complemented by rapid growth from Western Balkan producers — a pattern likely shaped by EU preferential trade frameworks and competitive labour and energy costs in the region. Meanwhile, China's role has receded markedly.

Despite these pressures on the import side, the EU has maintained a diversified export portfolio and continues to command a significant unit-price premium, suggesting that its comparative advantage has shifted toward higher-value, more specialised profiles. The 2022 energy-price crisis left a clear imprint in the form of sharp price shocks, particularly in exports to Türkiye, Russia and Norway. Looking ahead, the increasing concentration of imports and the growing role of a limited number of suppliers on the EU's southeastern flank warrant attention from a supply-chain resilience perspective.