Market evolution: Alloy steel semi-finished (CN 7224) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of the European Union's external trade in CN 7224 — alloy steel in ingots or semi-finished forms over the period 2015–2025. The product category covers non-stainless alloy steel in primary forms (CN 722410) and semi-finished products such as billets, blooms, and slabs (CN 722490), excluding waste, scrap, and continuously cast products. It sits at the upstream end of the steel value chain, feeding into the production of flat-rolled, long, and forged products.

The decade under review was marked by a succession of shocks — the 2020 pandemic, the 2021–2022 commodity super-cycle, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the resulting sanctions regime, and the EU's evolving trade-defence posture. Against this backdrop, the EU's trade in CN 7224 underwent a dramatic transformation: the bloc briefly became a net exporter in 2022, only to swing back into deficit by 2025. Importantly, the origin and destination of these flows shifted profoundly, as geopolitics redrew supply chains.

The analysis that follows is structured around three overarching findings: (1) the pronounced cyclicality of the trade balance and the exceptional 2022 peak; (2) the reshaping of the partner landscape, with China, Turkey, and Vietnam replacing Russia and Ukraine; and (3) a structural decline in EU production volumes that has left the bloc more reliant on imports than at the start of the period.

1. A Decade of Swings — From Structural Deficit to the 2022 Surge and Back

The EU entered the period as a persistent net importer and exited in a similar position

In 2015, the EU imported 558,723 tonnes of CN 7224 worth €259.4 million from non-EU countries, while exporting only 119,531 tonnes worth €147.8 million — a trade deficit of €111.7 million. By 2025, the deficit had narrowed to €72.3 million (imports €300.1 M, exports €227.8 M), but the structural orientation remained: the EU consumes more alloy steel semi-finished products than it ships abroad.

The following table summarises the key aggregate trade indicators at selected turning-point years:

Sources: General Overview

The 2020 pandemic brought volumes to their lowest point

COVID-19 and the associated industrial shutdowns struck the steel sector hard. EU import volumes fell to 187,446 tonnes in 2020 — just one-third of the 2015 level — while exports dropped to 126,470 tonnes. In value terms, imports hit their minimum at €118.3 million. However, exports fell less sharply in value (€123.9 million), producing the first near-balance in the series (€+5.6 million). This was a cyclical artefact rather than a structural shift: both import and export volumes recovered the following year.

2022 was an extraordinary year: the EU briefly became a major net exporter

The most striking feature of the decade is the 2022 export surge. EU exports of CN 7224 reached 544,578 tonnes — more than four times the 2015 level — and a record €599.1 million in value. By contrast, imports, while recovering to 288,667 tonnes and €303.3 million, were well below their 2015 peak. The result was a trade surplus of €295.8 million, the largest in the entire series and a complete inversion of the structural deficit.

This anomaly was driven almost entirely by a single destination: the United States received €443.5 million of EU alloy steel semi-finished exports in 2022, accounting for roughly 74% of all CN 7224 exports that year. The export concentration HHI surged to 5,577 in value terms — an extreme level — reflecting this dominance. The likely drivers include US infrastructure spending (the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act), post-COVID restocking, and supply re-routing away from sanctioned Russian material.

The surplus proved short-lived; by 2025 the deficit had returned

From 2023 onward, the export surge unwound. EU exports fell to 407,510 tonnes in 2023 and 185,073 tonnes in 2025, while imports rebuilt to 440,960 tonnes. The trade balance narrowed to just €11.0 million in 2023 and reversed to −€72.3 million by 2025. The net import reliance ratio, which had briefly dipped to −0.57% in 2022, climbed to 3.73% by 2025 — a level significantly above the 0.18% recorded at the start of the period.

2. Geopolitics Redraw the Map — Russia's Retreat and the Rise of New Suppliers

Russia was the dominant import source at the start of the period but has been sharply displaced

In 2015, Russia supplied €130.6 million of EU CN 7224 imports — more than half of total import value. Russian shipments grew further, peaking at an estimated €161.6 million at some point during the period. However, following the EU's progressively tightening sanctions regime from 2022 onward, Russian imports fell to €68.0 million by 2025, a decline of 47.9% from the 2015 level. Ukraine, once the third-largest supplier at €33.3 million, saw its share drop to €12.0 million (−63.9%), likely reflecting the destruction of Ukrainian steelmaking capacity during the war.

The import concentration HHI accordingly fell from 2,910 in 2015 to 1,774 in 2025, moving from a "highly concentrated" to a "moderately concentrated" structure. Supply diversification, however, was not necessarily chosen freely — it was forced by sanctions.

China, Turkey, and Vietnam filled the vacuum

Three countries absorbed most of the market share vacated by Russia and Ukraine:

Sources: Top import partners

China's trajectory is especially dramatic: imports rose from just €3.3 million in 2015 to €80.8 million at their peak, making China the single largest import source by value in some years — ahead of even Russia at its zenith. By 2025, Chinese shipments stood at €70.6 million. Turkish supply followed a steadier upward path, rising from €25.0 million to €66.6 million, while Vietnam emerged from near-zero to €36.6 million, representing a near-total newcomer in the EU market. The volatility of these flows was significant: China's coefficient of variation stood at 1.36 and Vietnam's at 0.86, reflecting the lumpy, policy-sensitive nature of these new supply relationships.

The United Kingdom consolidated its position as the EU's top export destination

On the export side, the United Kingdom grew from €22.1 million in 2015 to €64.5 million in 2025 (+191.6%), overtaking the United States as the leading destination outside the 2022 anomaly. This likely reflects post-Brexit trade reorientation, as UK manufacturers sourced alloy steel semi-finished products from the EU rather than from previous intra-EU supply chains. The United States, despite the 2022 peak, settled at €38.5 million in 2025, a more modest +25.7% from 2015. Other traditional destinations such as Saudi Arabia (−94.0%) and Mexico (−94.0%) saw near-total collapses, while China emerged as a meaningful export market at €36.9 million (+86.6%).

EU member states specialised unevenly in the production and trade of CN 7224

Not all EU members contributed equally to the alloy steel semi-finished trade. According to specialisation data for 2025:

Austria displayed the highest relative comparative advantage (RSCA of 0.65), reflecting its specialisation in high-grade alloy steels. Germany, while the largest producer by volume (32.3% of EU production), had a more moderate specialisation ratio, consistent with its broader steel portfolio. At the other extreme, Ireland, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states showed no meaningful specialisation in this product category.

Among EU importing members, Belgium remained the largest single importer throughout (€87.2 million in 2025), likely reflecting Antwerp's role as a transhipment hub, followed by Italy (€93.2 million, up 161%). France's imports, however, contracted by 75.7% from €16.5 million to €4.0 million, suggesting a significant reduction in French downstream demand or sourcing changes.

3. Weaker Foundations — Declining Production and Growing Import Vulnerability

EU production of alloy steel semi-finished products declined markedly over the decade

According to PRODCOM production data, EU output of CN 7224 fell from 4,118 kt in 2015 to 3,180 kt in 2025 — a decline of 22.8%. The trajectory was far from linear:

Sources: Production volumes

Production collapsed to its minimum of 2,327 kt during the 2020 pandemic, rebounded sharply to a peak of 6,821 kt in 2022 — when the global steel boom incentivised maximum output — and then contracted again to 3,180 kt by 2025. Meanwhile, the value of production rose from €1,496 million to €3,300 million (+120.7%), implying that unit production values roughly tripled over the decade. This reflects both a structural rise in input costs (energy, raw materials, carbon costs under the EU ETS) and a shift in the product mix toward higher-value grades.

Import and export prices diverged, narrowing the EU's value-added margin

A notable feature of the decade is the convergence of import and export unit values:

Sources: Overview

Export prices — which reflect the EU's position as a supplier of higher-grade, specialty alloy steels — remained relatively stable around €960–1,236/t. Import prices, however, more than doubled from €464/t in 2015 to a peak of €1,050/t in 2022 before settling at €680/t in 2025. The spread thus narrowed sharply in 2022 and has only partially recovered.

At the sub-product level, the breakdown between CN 722490 (semi-finished) and CN 722410 (ingots/primary forms) reveals that semi-finished products dominate both trade flows. Import prices for CN 722490 rose from €453/t to €666/t, while the much smaller ingot segment (CN 722410) saw extreme price volatility, reaching €3,701/t in 2023 before retreating to €2,654/t in 2025 — consistent with the niche, high-specification nature of primary alloy steel forms.

The EU's structural reliance on imports has deepened

The period's most consequential long-term trend may be the rise in net import reliance. Despite the 2022 anomaly, the net import reliance ratio moved from 0.18% in 2015 to 3.73% in 2025. Similarly, trade intensity rose from 0.30% to 6.20%, and export propensity from 0.06% to 1.32%.

These increases point to a steel sector that has become more exposed to global markets — both as buyer and seller — at a time when the supplier base has shifted toward countries with which the EU has more complex trade relationships (China, Turkey) or from which supply is more geographically or politically volatile (Vietnam). Import prices that rose 46.6% over the period, even as import volumes fell 21.1%, underscore the cost pressure this exposure entails.

Conclusion

The decade 2015–2025 was one of turbulence and structural transformation for the EU's trade in alloy steel semi-finished products (CN 7224). The headline numbers show a market that ended not far from where it began in terms of the trade balance: a modest deficit. But beneath this surface stability, almost everything changed.

The EU's supplier base was reshaped by geopolitics: Russia's share was cut roughly in half, while China's grew twenty-fold and Vietnam emerged from nothing to become a significant supplier. Turkey consolidated its position as a reliable alternative. On the export side, the extraordinary 2022 surge — driven almost entirely by US-bound shipments — was a one-off windfall rather than a structural shift, and the UK emerged as the most durable export market.

Perhaps most concerning from a strategic standpoint is the decline in domestic production (−22.8% in volume) even as the implied value of output rose sharply, suggesting a sector producing less but at higher cost. Combined with growing net import reliance and a shift toward more volatile supplier relationships, the EU's position in this upstream segment of the steel value chain has become more exposed. Whether the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and other EU trade policy instruments will alter this trajectory remains to be seen in the data that the coming years will provide.