Market evolution: Steel angles and shapes (CN 7216) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the trade dynamics of Combined Nomenclature heading 7216 — Angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel, n.e.s. — for the European Union over the 2015–2025 period. The product group covers a broad range of hot-rolled and cold-formed structural steel profiles (U, I, H, L, T sections and others), which are essential inputs for construction, infrastructure, and heavy industry. As shown in the scope and definitions section, the EU has remained a structural net exporter of these products throughout the decade, though its trade surplus has narrowed considerably. Three major dynamics define the period: a sustained contraction of export volumes offset only partly by rising unit values; a reorientation of both import and export partner structures driven by geopolitical events and cost competitiveness shifts; and a product-level rebalancing within the HS 6-digit sub-headings that reflects changing demand patterns.
A shrinking surplus: Export volumes contract while import demand grows
Export value held up despite a 41 % drop in tonnage
The EU's extra-EU exports of CN 7216 fell from EUR 1.83 billion in 2015 to EUR 1.64 billion in 2025, a decline of 10.5 % in value — yet this masks a far more dramatic collapse in physical volumes. Exported quantities dropped from 3.17 million tonnes to 1.87 million tonnes over the same period, a contraction of 41 %. The shortfall was cushioned by a sharp rise in unit export values, which climbed from EUR 578/t to EUR 876/t (+51.6 %), peaking at EUR 1,220/t in 2022 during the post-COVID steel price spike. As detailed in the trade overview, the peak export value of EUR 2.31 billion was recorded in 2022, driven almost entirely by price rather than volume.
| Metric | 2015 | 2020 | 2022 | 2025 | Change 2015→2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exports – value (EUR bn) | 1.83 | 1.25 | 2.31 | 1.64 | −10.5 % |
| Exports – quantity (Mt) | 3.17 | 2.30 | 2.04 | 1.87 | −41.0 % |
| Exports – price (EUR/t) | 578 | 544 | 1,220 | 876 | +51.6 % |
Import expenditure rose 72 %, driven by both volume and price
On the import side, the trend was the opposite: total import value grew from EUR 369 million to EUR 636 million (+72.3 %), the result of both higher volumes (592 kt → 754 kt, +27.5 %) and higher unit prices (EUR 624/t → EUR 843/t, +35.2 %). The import price spike was even more pronounced than on the export side, reaching EUR 1,177/t in 2022. Despite this increase, import quantities remained well below export volumes, confirming the EU's structural role as a net exporter.
| Metric | 2015 | 2020 | 2022 | 2025 | Change 2015→2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Imports – value (EUR M) | 369 | 369 | 801 | 636 | +72.3 % |
| Imports – quantity (kt) | 592 | 583 | 686 | 754 | +27.5 % |
| Imports – price (EUR/t) | 624 | 551 | 1,177 | 843 | +35.2 % |
The trade balance eroded by nearly a third
The combined effect of stagnating export value and surging import expenditure was a pronounced erosion of the EU's trade surplus. As shown in the net import reliance data, the surplus fell from EUR 1.46 billion in 2015 to EUR 1.00 billion in 2025 (−31.5 %), hitting a low of EUR 882 million in 2020. Net import reliance — expressed as the ratio of net imports to domestic production plus imports minus exports — remained negative throughout, confirming the EU's persistent exporter status; however, it moved from −12.9 % in 2015 to −10.6 % in 2025, indicating a modest narrowing of the EU's competitive edge on world markets.
| Year | Trade balance (EUR bn) | Net import reliance (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 1.46 | −12.9 |
| 2018 | 1.51 | −14.6 |
| 2020 | 0.88 | −7.4 |
| 2022 | 1.35 | −14.7 |
| 2025 | 1.00 | −10.6 |
A reshuffling of partners: Geopolitics and competitiveness reshape trade flows
Türkiye and China surged as import suppliers, while Ukraine collapsed
The composition of the EU's import sources shifted markedly over the decade. The partner data shows that Türkiye consolidated its position as the EU's primary extra-EU supplier, with imports rising from EUR 93 million to EUR 232 million (+148.4 %) and reaching a peak of EUR 318 million in 2022. China's share expanded even faster in proportional terms: from EUR 32 million in 2015 to EUR 153 million in 2025 (+376.5 %), with an especially sharp acceleration from 2021 onward, likely linked to China's export competitiveness during a period of elevated European energy costs. South Korea also emerged as a notable supplier, growing from EUR 9 million to EUR 25 million (+180.5 %).
| Partner | Imports 2015 (EUR M) | Imports 2025 (EUR M) | Change (%) | CV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Türkiye | 93 | 232 | +148.4 | 0.23 |
| United Kingdom | 112 | 129 | +14.6 | 0.22 |
| Ukraine | 52 | 5 | −91.3 | 0.89 |
| China | 32 | 153 | +376.5 | 0.96 |
| Switzerland | 42 | 36 | −15.5 | 0.26 |
| Korea, Republic of | 9 | 25 | +180.5 | 0.57 |
| North Macedonia | 0.2 | 15 | +6,313 | 0.54 |
Conversely, Ukrainian supply — which stood at EUR 52 million in 2015, representing nearly 14 % of all extra-EU imports — virtually disappeared to EUR 5 million in 2025 (−91.3 %). This collapse is consistent with the disruption of Ukraine's steelmaking capacity following the Russian invasion in 2022, compounded by the earlier closure of the Azovstal plant in Mariupol. The volatility analysis confirms Ukraine's extreme import instability (coefficient of variation: 0.89). North Macedonia, though still a small partner in absolute terms, exhibited the fastest proportional growth, rising from EUR 0.2 million to EUR 15 million (+6,313 %), reflecting the development of steel processing capacity in the Western Balkans.
Import concentration increased, signalling growing supplier dependency
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports rose from 1,993 to 2,382 (+19.5 %) over the period, moving the EU's import structure from a moderate-concentration zone towards a more concentrated profile. By 2025, the top three suppliers — Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and China — accounted for an increasingly dominant share of import value. As shown in the concentration data, this concentration trend raises questions about the EU's exposure to supplier-specific risks, particularly given the high volatility of Chinese import flows (CV: 0.96) and the geopolitical sensitivities surrounding Turkish and Chinese trade policy.
Export destinations shifted away from North Africa towards North America and the UK
On the export side, the United Kingdom remained the EU's largest single customer, with exports rising from EUR 358 million to EUR 390 million (+9.0 %), demonstrating the resilience of cross-Channel steel trade post-Brexit. However, several traditional markets contracted sharply: exports to Algeria fell from EUR 205 million to EUR 106 million (−48.3 %), and those to Türkiye dropped from EUR 155 million to EUR 96 million (−38.0 %) — the latter partly reflecting Türkiye's own growing production capacity and its shift from import customer to import competitor. Meanwhile, exports to Canada grew from EUR 93 million to EUR 153 million (+63.9 %) and those to the United States remained broadly stable at EUR 189 million, supported by higher unit values. Switzerland also proved a stable outlet, growing from EUR 108 million to EUR 154 million (+42.8 %), with the lowest volatility among all major export partners (CV: 0.05). A notable supply shock was detected for Russia, where EU export flows collapsed by 98.8 % in 2025, consistent with the progressive tightening of EU sanctions regimes.
| Partner | Exports 2015 (EUR M) | Exports 2025 (EUR M) | Change (%) | CV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 358 | 390 | +9.0 | 0.17 |
| Algeria | 205 | 106 | −48.3 | 0.66 |
| Türkiye | 155 | 96 | −38.0 | 0.33 |
| United States | 185 | 189 | +2.3 | 0.37 |
| Canada | 93 | 153 | +63.9 | 0.17 |
| Switzerland | 108 | 154 | +42.8 | 0.05 |
| Mexico | 60 | 39 | −34.2 | 0.41 |
Product-level shifts and production resilience within the EU
Large-section H and I beams dominated exports but lost ground; small L sections nearly vanished
The product segment breakdown reveals that EU exports are overwhelmingly concentrated in heavy structural profiles: H sections (CN 721633) and I sections (CN 721632) together accounted for roughly two-thirds of exported tonnage throughout the period. Both segments, however, experienced significant volume declines:
| Sub-heading | Description | Exports 2015 (kt) | Exports 2025 (kt) | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 721633 | H sections ≥ 80 mm | 1,123 | 720 | −35.9 |
| 721632 | I sections ≥ 80 mm | 976 | 691 | −29.2 |
| 721631 | U sections ≥ 80 mm | 227 | 146 | −35.6 |
| 721621 | L sections < 80 mm | 237 | 40 | −82.9 |
| 721640 | L sections ≥ 80 mm | 164 | 41 | −75.0 |
| 721661 | Cold-formed sections | 105 | 97 | −6.9 |
| 721650 | Other hot-rolled sections | 68 | 54 | −20.6 |
The most dramatic collapse occurred in L (angle) sections: sub-heading 721621 (small L sections under 80 mm) fell by 82.9 % in volume, and 721640 (large L sections) by 75.0 %. This suggests a structural loss of competitiveness in lower-value-added angle products, likely displaced by Turkish and Chinese suppliers. Cold-formed sections (721661) proved the most resilient, declining only 6.9 % in volume and actually increasing in value from EUR 129 million to EUR 184 million, reflecting the higher value-added of these processed products.
Import composition shifted towards H and I beams, while U-section imports collapsed
On the import side, the product mix evolved in a strikingly different direction from the export profile:
| Sub-heading | Description | Imports 2015 (kt) | Imports 2025 (kt) | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 721633 | H sections ≥ 80 mm | 65 | 162 | +150.4 |
| 721632 | I sections ≥ 80 mm | 58 | 142 | +145.0 |
| 721631 | U sections ≥ 80 mm | 150 | 53 | −64.7 |
| 721650 | Other hot-rolled sections | 73 | 66 | −10.1 |
| 721621 | L sections < 80 mm | 67 | 89 | +31.8 |
| 721640 | L sections ≥ 80 mm | 95 | 93 | −2.1 |
| 721661 | Cold-formed sections | 28 | 39 | +39.8 |
H-section imports more than doubled (65 kt to 162 kt, +150 %), as did I-section imports (58 kt to 142 kt, +145 %). Meanwhile, U-section imports fell by 64.7 %, from 150 kt to 53 kt. These divergent trajectories suggest that while the EU has maintained or even strengthened its domestic capacity in U sections, it has become increasingly reliant on extra-EU sources for H and I beams — precisely the product categories that also form the backbone of its exports. The price data confirms that import and export unit values in these categories converged significantly over the period, eroding the price differential that may have previously discouraged imports.
EU production volumes and values rose, but largely through price inflation
According to the production data, EU domestic production of CN 7216 products grew from 10.8 billion kg (2015) to 12.7 billion kg (2025), an increase of 17.9 % in volume. Production value, however, surged from EUR 4.9 billion to EUR 13.5 billion (+174.6 %), with a peak of EUR 16.3 billion in 2022. This divergence highlights the dominant role of steel price inflation — driven by raw material costs, energy prices, and carbon costs — in shaping the apparent size of the sector. Spain was by far the largest EU exporter (EUR 625 million in 2025, despite a 15.4 % decline), followed by Germany (EUR 356 million, +12.5 %) and Luxembourg (EUR 205 million, −23.6 %). Among EU importers, Romania (EUR 99 million, +227.6 %) and Italy (EUR 48 million, +228.9 %) showed the fastest growth, reflecting construction booms and domestic capacity gaps in Southern and Eastern Europe, as seen in the reporters data.
Specialisation and competitiveness remain uneven across Member States
The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals a pronounced geographic concentration of export competitiveness. Luxembourg displayed the highest Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA: 0.95) with an RCA of 41.6, reflecting its ArcelorMittal-dominated steel sector. Spain (RSCA: 0.49) and Poland (RSCA: 0.38) also showed clear specialisation. At the other end, Ireland (RSCA: −0.86), Malta (−0.95), and Hungary (−0.77) were the most import-dependent, consistent with limited domestic steelmaking capacity. This intra-EU asymmetry means that the aggregate EU trade balance conceals wide divergences in Member States' exposure to global steel market dynamics.
Conclusion
The EU's trade in steel angles and shapes (CN 7216) between 2015 and 2025 was shaped by three converging forces: a secular decline in export competitiveness by volume, a rapid expansion of imports — particularly from Türkiye and China — and a pronounced price cycle that temporarily inflated trade values before partially unwinding. The EU maintained its status as a net exporter throughout, but its trade surplus shrank by nearly a third, and the sector's export profile shifted away from lower-value angle sections towards higher-value H and I beams. Import concentration increased, and geopolitical disruptions — from the conflict in Ukraine to EU sanctions on Russia — materially altered supply chains. Looking ahead, the erosion of the EU's volume advantage, the growing import penetration in core structural products, and the increasing reliance on a small number of extra-EU suppliers represent structural challenges that trade defence instruments and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) may only partly address.