Market evolution: Wire rod coils (CN 72171039) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in wire of iron or non-alloy steel in coils (CN 72171039) over the period 2015–2025. This product—uncoated steel wire with less than 0.25% carbon and a cross-section of at least 0.8 mm—belongs to the broader category of iron and steel wire (HS 7217) and is widely used in construction, manufacturing, and industrial applications. The analysis draws on EU trade data with non-EU countries and covers flows, partners, market structure, and supply-side vulnerabilities. Three main dynamics emerge from the decade under review: a persistent and widening trade deficit, a dramatic re-orientation of import sources away from Russia and Belarus toward Ukraine and, increasingly, Asian suppliers, and a significant rise in unit values on both sides of the trade balance that reflects the price shock cycle of 2021–2022.

1. A Widening Deficit Driven by Shrinking Exports and Rising Import Values

The EU shifted from a near-balanced position to a structural deficit

At the start of the period (2015), the EU's trade balance in CN 72171039 was essentially in equilibrium, recording a small deficit of –€4.3 million. By 2025, this had ballooned to –€57.3 million, a deterioration of over 1,200%. The deficit widened because two trends moved in opposite directions: export values fell by 19.3% (from €76.7 million to €62.0 million), while import values rose by 47.3% (from €81.0 million to €119.3 million). The trajectory was not linear—the import value peaked at €138.6 million (likely in 2022 during the commodity price surge) before retreating slightly.

Export volumes collapsed even as export unit values climbed sharply

The most striking feature of the EU's export side is the divergence between volume and value. Export quantity fell by 51.8%, from 90,635 tonnes in 2015 to just 43,726 tonnes in 2025—the lowest value in the entire series. Meanwhile, the export unit price rose by 67.4%, from €847/t to €1,417/t, peaking at €1,708/t. This pattern suggests that EU exporters progressively lost market share in volume terms, possibly due to competition from lower-cost producers abroad, while the remaining exports were sold at higher (or premium) price points. The EU's export propensity (exports as a share of production) did nonetheless rise from 8.3% to 12.6%, reflecting that domestic production also contracted.

Import volumes were more resilient, cushioning the blow of price increases

On the import side, volumes declined by 13.3% (from 157,334 tonnes to 136,456 tonnes)—a far milder drop than the 51.8% loss in exports. Import unit values, however, surged by 69.8%, from €515/t to €874/t, reaching a peak of €1,253/t. The price differential between EU exports and imports narrowed over the decade but remained substantial: in 2025, EU exporters fetched €1,417/t while imports arrived at €874/t on average, indicating that the EU continues to specialise in higher-value wire products while sourcing basic grades externally.

2. A Strategic Re-Orientation of Import Sources Amid Geopolitical Disruption

Russia and Belarus were dominant suppliers that saw dramatic collapses

In 2015, the Russian Federation was the EU's single largest import source by value at €23.4 million, followed by Belarus at €16.7 million. Together, they accounted for roughly half of all EU imports. By 2025, Russian imports had fallen by 85.6% to €3.4 million, and Belarusian imports had declined by 15.6% to €14.1 million. The volatility data confirms the abruptness: Russia recorded a coefficient of variation of 0.55 (high), and Belarus 0.25.

The 2022–2023 sanctions shock is the defining event of the decade

The shock analysis identifies two major supply shocks centred on 2023:

• Belarus: A –100% shift (complete cessation), with an abnormality score of 4.0 and a value share of 18.6%.
• Russian Federation: A –98.3% shift, with an abnormality of 2.5 and a value share of 23.6%.

These are clearly linked to the EU sanctions regime imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The sanctions progressively restricted imports of Russian steel products, and Belarus was covered by parallel measures. The scale of the disruption—nearly 42% of import value wiped out between these two suppliers alone—forced a rapid restructuring of EU supply chains.

Ukraine, Thailand, and Türkiye filled the vacuum

The suppliers that replaced Russia and Belarus tell a story of diversification:

Ukraine became the EU's top supplier by 2025 (€51.2 million), up from €14.7 million in 2015—a remarkable trajectory given the disruption caused by the war on its own territory. Ukraine's import volatility (CV = 0.33) is moderate, suggesting that despite the conflict, supply proved relatively stable—likely supported by EU trade facilitation measures and Ukraine's EU candidacy status.

Thailand's rise from virtually zero (€34,266) to €22.1 million is extraordinary but also extremely volatile (CV = 0.92), suggesting this may be a niche or opportunistic supplier rather than a structural partner. China and Türkiye both grew steadily, with China becoming the fourth-largest supplier.

Import concentration increased, signalling reduced supplier diversification

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports rose from 1,933 to 2,617 (+35.4%). While the HHI remained below 2,500 for most of the period (the conventional "moderately concentrated" threshold), it crossed that threshold by 2025. This is a counterintuitive result: the loss of two major suppliers (Russia and Belarus) did not diversify the market but instead concentrated it, as Ukraine's share surged to fill the gap. By contrast, the export HHI fell slightly (from 1,561 to 1,406), indicating that EU exports became marginally more diversified.

3. Domestic Production Contraction and Growing External Dependence

EU production volumes fell while values rose—a structural shift

EU production of this product declined by 23.2% by quantity (from 3.85 billion kg to 2.96 billion kg), yet production value rose by 38.6% (from €2.02 billion to €2.80 billion). This implies that EU producers shifted toward higher-value output—a pattern consistent with the steel industry's broader move up the value chain in response to import competition. The most specialised EU producers (by Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage) are Portugal (RSCA = 0.60), Czechia (0.53), and Latvia (0.49), while Finland (–1.00), Denmark (–0.97), and Hungary (–0.96) are the least specialised.

The EU's net import reliance shifted from slight self-sufficiency to modest dependence

The net import reliance indicator moved from –0.2% (slight net exporter status) in 2015 to +2.2% in 2025. While the absolute level remains low, the swing of over 1,100% is significant. The indicator peaked at 5.7% at some point during the period (likely during the 2021–2022 price shock), suggesting that the EU's exposure to import dependency, though moderate, became structurally positive.

Trade intensity and export propensity both increased, reflecting an increasingly open market

The trade intensity (imports + exports as a share of production + imports) rose from 15.1% to 23.8%, and export propensity (exports as a share of production) increased from 8.3% to 12.6%. Both indicators point to a market that has become more internationally integrated over the decade, even as the balance of that integration shifted toward greater import dependence.

Key EU member states showed divergent trajectories

Among EU importing countries, the Netherlands saw the most dramatic growth (+599% to €30.2 million), likely reflecting its role as a logistics hub. Among exporting countries, Germany remained the largest EU exporter (€21.7 million) but saw a decline of 16.2%, while France nearly doubled its exports (+97.4% to €8.3 million).

Conclusion

The EU market for wire rod coils (CN 72171039) underwent a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. What began as a near-balanced trade position in 2015 deteriorated into a €57 million deficit by 2025, driven by a halving of export volumes and a persistent rise in import values. The sanctions against Russia and Belarus after 2022 were the decade's defining shock, abruptly removing nearly 42% of the EU's import base and triggering a rapid—though not fully diversified—reorientation toward Ukraine, China, and new entrants like Thailand. EU domestic production contracted in volume but shifted toward higher-value output, and the market became structurally more import-reliant. Looking forward, the concentration of imports in a smaller number of suppliers (with Ukraine alone now accounting for the largest share) raises questions about supply-chain resilience, particularly given the ongoing geopolitical instability in Eastern Europe.