Market evolution: Steel wire coils uncoated (CN 721710) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the EU's external trade in uncoated steel wire coils (CN 721710) over the 2015–2025 period. The product covers iron or non-alloy steel wire in coils that is neither plated nor coated, encompassing a range of carbon-content and dimensional sub-segments. It is an intermediate industrial good used widely in construction, automotive, and manufacturing supply chains.
Over the decade, the EU has remained a net exporter in value terms throughout, with a trade surplus growing from €112 million in 2015 to €133 million in 2025 (+18.4%). However, the underlying volumes tell a different story: export quantities fell by 14.3% and import quantities fell even more sharply, by 38.7%. The defining feature of the period is a structural shift toward fewer tonnes traded at substantially higher unit values — a trend driven by successive price shocks, geopolitical disruptions, and a reorientation of both sourcing and destination markets.
The general overview provides additional visual context for the dynamics discussed below.
1. Volume Decline, Value Stability: A Decade of Rising Unit Prices
Export volumes contracted while export values held firm
EU exports of CN 721710 fell from 385,193 tonnes in 2015 to 330,243 tonnes in 2025, a decline of 14.3%. Yet the total export value barely changed, moving from €326 million to €342 million (+4.9%). This apparent paradox is explained by a sustained increase in export unit values, which rose from €846/t to €1,036/t (+22.4%) over the period. The peak year for export prices was 2022, when the average unit value reached €1,343/t — a level that reflects the global steel price spike triggered by post-pandemic demand recovery and energy cost inflation.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (€ million) | 325.9 | 342.0 | +4.9% |
| Export quantity (kt) | 385.2 | 330.2 | −14.3% |
| Export unit value (€/t) | 846 | 1,036 | +22.4% |
Import volumes declined far more steeply than values
Imports tell an even more dramatic story. Import volumes fell from 361,028 tonnes in 2015 to 221,384 tonnes in 2025 — a drop of 38.7% — while the import value only decreased by 2.2%, from €213 million to €209 million. The average import price rose from €591/t to €943/t (+59.5%), nearly doubling over the decade. This implies that the EU is importing substantially less wire in physical terms, but paying roughly the same total price because of higher unit costs.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import value (€ million) | 213.4 | 208.8 | −2.2% |
| Import quantity (kt) | 361.0 | 221.4 | −38.7% |
| Import unit value (€/t) | 591 | 943 | +59.5% |
EU production shifted toward higher-value output
Data from the production volumes dashboard shows that EU domestic production of CN 721710 declined from 5.62 billion kg in 2015 to 4.52 billion kg in 2025 (−19.6%), yet production value rose from €3.22 billion to €4.77 billion (+47.9%). This mirrors the trade-side dynamics: less tonnage, significantly higher value per unit. The production-price increase outpaces the trade-price increase, suggesting that EU producers may have shifted toward higher-value-added product grades or captured more domestic margin during the period.
2. Geopolitical Shocks and the Reconfiguration of Trade Partners
Import sourcing was reshaped by war and sanctions
The most striking change in the import partner landscape concerns the EU's eastern neighbours. Ukraine, previously a minor supplier (€16 million in 2015), surged to become the second-largest import source at €68 million by 2025 — an increase of 329.6%. This dramatic growth, visible in the top partners data, likely reflects Ukraine's intensified need to redirect its steel exports toward the EU market following the disruption of its traditional trading routes and the EU's facilitation of trade access. Meanwhile, Belarus — historically a significant supplier at €61 million in 2015 — saw its share decline to €48 million (−20.9%), a trajectory consistent with the EU sanctions regime imposed from 2022 onwards.
Russia's position remained relatively stable in value terms (from €28 million to €34 million), though the data likely reflects pre-sanction flows in earlier years. South Korean imports halved from €22 million to €13 million (−39.8%), while UK imports collapsed from €23 million to just €4 million (−81.1%) — the latter reflecting the trade friction introduced by Brexit.
| Top import partners | 2015 (€M) | 2025 (€M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belarus | 61.1 | 48.3 | −20.9% |
| Ukraine | 15.8 | 67.8 | +329.6% |
| Russian Federation | 28.3 | 34.1 | +20.7% |
| China | 28.5 | 39.2 | +37.5% |
| Türkiye | 13.6 | 29.4 | +115.1% |
| Korea, Republic of | 21.9 | 13.2 | −39.8% |
| United Kingdom | 22.6 | 4.3 | −81.1% |
Turkey and China gained ground as European and traditional suppliers retreated
Turkey (+115.1%) and China (+37.5%) both increased their EU market share significantly. Turkey's growth reflects its expanding steelmaking capacity and geographic proximity, while China's continued presence underscores its cost competitiveness despite EU trade defence measures on broader steel categories. These two suppliers partially filled the gap left by the contraction in Belarusian, South Korean, and British volumes.
Sub-segment data reveals the scale of the Ukrainian import shock
The product segment breakdown provides granular detail by carbon content and dimension. The most volatile sub-segment is 72171031 (low-carbon wire ≥0.8 mm with deformations), where imports collapsed from 120,690 tonnes in 2015 to just 15,145 tonnes in 2025. This sub-segment was historically dominated by Ukrainian and Belarusian supply; its near-total import decline — from €49 million to €10 million in value — reflects the direct impact of the 2022 war and subsequent supply chain disruption.
By contrast, sub-segment 72171039 (low-carbon wire ≥0.8 mm, smooth) proved more resilient, declining only from 157,334 to 136,456 tonnes. This segment draws on a more diversified supplier base and serves different downstream applications.
Export destinations shifted westward and toward emerging markets
On the export side, Switzerland remained the EU's largest market, growing from €105 million to €149 million (+41.8%) with relatively low volatility (coefficient of variation: 0.15). Brazil emerged as a strong growth market, rising from €37 million to €50 million (+35.8%), and Serbia surged from €4 million to €14 million (+233.3%). In contrast, UK-bound exports fell sharply from €41 million to €19 million (−55.3%), mirroring the import-side Brexit effect. Spain, once a significant exporter at €34 million, saw its external exports collapse to just €1.5 million (−95.4%), indicating a potential reallocation of production to intra-EU or domestic markets.
| Top export partners | 2015 (€M) | 2025 (€M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Switzerland | 105.1 | 149.0 | +41.8% |
| United Kingdom | 41.4 | 18.5 | −55.3% |
| United States | 26.7 | 29.2 | +9.2% |
| Brazil | 36.7 | 49.9 | +35.8% |
| Serbia | 4.2 | 14.2 | +233.3% |
| Canada | 5.9 | 6.7 | +13.2% |
| Morocco | 7.1 | 3.5 | −50.6% |
3. Shifting Internal Dynamics: Specialisation, Concentration, and Intra-EU Redistribution
Italy emerged as the dominant EU exporter; Austria grew the fastest
The reporter-level data reveals a significant redistribution of export activity within the EU. Italy's external exports surged from €55 million to €146 million (+167.1%), making it the EU's largest exporter of CN 721710 by 2025 — overtaking Germany (€80 million → €58 million, −27.2%) and France (€72 million → €30 million, −57.9%). Austria's exports grew from €12 million to €44 million (+257.1%), the fastest rate among major exporters. This Italian-Austrian ascendancy is consistent with the specialisation data, which shows Italy with the highest revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA of 0.55) and Austria with an RSCA of 0.34.
| Top EU exporters | 2015 (€M) | 2025 (€M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Italy | 54.8 | 146.4 | +167.1% |
| Germany | 79.7 | 58.0 | −27.2% |
| France | 71.7 | 30.1 | −57.9% |
| Austria | 12.3 | 44.1 | +257.1% |
| Portugal | 13.6 | 15.5 | +14.2% |
| Sweden | 13.1 | 13.3 | +1.5% |
| Spain | 33.6 | 1.5 | −95.4% |
Import concentration increased, reflecting supplier consolidation
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value rose from 1,522 to 1,864 (+22.5%), indicating that the EU's import base has become more concentrated. This is a direct consequence of the collapse in volumes from previously important suppliers (UK, South Korea, Belarus) and the growing reliance on fewer countries — principally Ukraine, Turkey, and China. Export concentration rose even more sharply, from an HHI of 1,508 to 2,270 (+50.6%), driven by the growing dominance of Switzerland and Brazil as destination markets. Higher export concentration increases vulnerability to demand-side shocks in key partner economies.
The EU's net export position strengthened but remains modest
The EU maintained a positive trade balance throughout the period — peaking at €227 million in 2022 (a year of exceptional steel prices) and settling at €133 million in 2025. The net import reliance indicator confirms this: the EU was a net exporter throughout (negative values), though the margin narrowed slightly from −2.8% to −0.9% of apparent consumption. Trade intensity — the share of trade in total production — rose from 16.6% to 23.8%, and export propensity increased from 10.3% to 13.9%, indicating that EU producers are increasingly reliant on external markets for demand.
Price shock events were concentrated in 2022
The shock detection analysis identified significant price anomalies in 2022, notably for exports to Brazil (+55.2% shift, abnormality score of 20.5) and the United States (+51.3% shift, abnormality score of 8.4). These are consistent with the global commodity price surge of 2021–2022, which saw steel raw material and energy costs spike in the wake of post-COVID demand recovery and the energy crisis triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Morocco experienced an earlier price shock in 2021 (+50.4% shift), potentially linked to supply tightness in the Mediterranean basin.
Conclusion
Over the 2015–2025 decade, the EU's trade in uncoated steel wire coils has undergone a fundamental transformation. The headline story is one of fewer tonnes, higher prices, and reconfigured partnerships. Import volumes fell by nearly 40% while prices rose by 60%; export volumes declined by 14% while prices rose by 22%. The EU's net exporter status was maintained, but the margin is slim and increasingly dependent on a concentrated set of destination markets.
The most consequential external factor was geopolitical disruption. The Russia-Ukraine war reshaped import sourcing: Ukraine became the EU's second-largest supplier (driven partly by redirected trade flows and EU market access facilitation), while Belarus and Russia saw their positions eroded by sanctions and trade friction. Brexit similarly depressed UK trade flows in both directions. Turkey and China stepped into the gap, increasing import concentration and potential dependency risks.
Internally, a redistribution of production and export capacity is evident. Italy and Austria have grown rapidly as exporters, while traditional powerhouses like Germany, France, and Spain have seen their external shipments decline sharply. This may reflect differences in energy cost exposure, product-mix strategy, or intra-EU supply chain reorganisation.
Looking ahead, the elevated trade intensity (23.8%) and export propensity (13.9%) suggest that EU producers are more exposed to global market conditions than they were a decade ago. Combined with rising import and export concentration, this creates a market that is more efficient but also more vulnerable to future supply or demand shocks — whether from geopolitical conflict, trade policy changes, or commodity price volatility.