Market evolution: Stainless steel scrap (CN 72042110) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in stainless steel scrap containing at least 8 % nickel (CN 72042110) over the period 2015–2025. The product occupies a strategic position in the circular economy: it is a high-value secondary raw material whose nickel and chromium content makes it a critical input for stainless steel production. The EU is both a major producer and a significant trading bloc for this scrap, with domestic production volumes in the range of 32–36 billion kg over the period.

The decade was characterised by a broad contraction of trade volumes, major geopolitical disruptions that reshaped sourcing and destination patterns, and a structural shift in the EU's net trade position. The following sections detail each of these dynamics.

1. A decade of declining volumes and rising unit values

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is a sustained contraction in both the quantity and value traded, accompanied by a pronounced increase in unit prices.

1.1 Export contraction outpaced import decline

Source: General Overview — trade

Export volumes fell by nearly two-thirds between 2015 and 2025 — far more steeply than import volumes (−43.2 %). Both flows peaked at some point during the decade (imports reached a maximum of 395,727 t and exports a maximum of 257,611 t), but by 2025 both had settled at their decade lows.

1.2 Unit prices diverged

While both import and export prices bottomed out near €1,050/t (likely around 2015–2016, a period of depressed nickel and stainless steel markets), they recovered sharply and diverged in the second half of the decade. By 2025, export unit values stood at €1,681/t versus €1,401/t for imports — a gap that reflects both compositional shifts (higher-grade scrap moving through export channels) and the growing bargaining power of EU sellers in a tightening global scrap market. Import prices briefly reached a maximum of €2,185/t during the commodity price spike around 2021–2022.

1.3 The trade balance remained structurally negative but narrowed

The EU has been a net importer of high-nickel stainless steel scrap throughout the period, with a trade deficit peaking at approximately −€505 M in an intermediate year before narrowing to −€178 M in 2025 (a 23.7 % improvement from the initial −€234 M). Domestic production edged down from 36 billion kg to 33.6 billion kg (−6.7 %), while production value fell more modestly from €9.1 billion to €8.78 billion (−3.5 %), consistent with rising scrap and metal prices partially offsetting lower physical throughput.

2. Geopolitical shocks and the reconfiguration of trade corridors

The period 2015–2025 saw a dramatic reshuffling of the EU's main trading partners for stainless steel scrap, driven by geopolitical events, sanctions regimes, and the redirection of global scrap flows.

2.1 The collapse of Russia as a sourcing partner

Source: Top partners — imports

Russia was the EU's single largest import source in 2015 at €117.6 M. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent rounds of EU sanctions, Russian imports collapsed to just €3.0 M by 2025 — a near-total cessation. The coefficient of variation for Russian import flows stands at 0.70, reflecting this structural break rather than ordinary market volatility.

2.2 Kazakhstan's rise as an alternative route

The most dramatic growth among import partners came from Kazakhstan, which surged from €4.1 M to €29.5 M (+626.3 %), with a peak of €81.4 M in an intermediate year. Kazakhstan's extremely high volatility coefficient (1.29) suggests this flow is itself unstable, and the pattern is consistent with scrap being re-routed through Central Asia following the closure of direct Russia–EU trade channels. Egypt and the United Kingdom, by contrast, both saw moderate declines.

2.3 Asian destinations collapsed while South and Southeast Asian markets grew

On the export side, the traditional destinations of Taiwan and China experienced near-total collapse:

Taiwan's share fell from €38.5 M to €212 thousand, and China's from €20.1 M to €2.0 M. Both declines are likely related to tightening Chinese import restrictions on scrap metals (China's "National Sword" policy and subsequent solid-waste import bans), which reduced the appetite for foreign-origin scrap across Greater China. India, while still the EU's largest export destination at €59.8 M, lost roughly half its share. Thailand emerged as a notable new destination, growing from negligible levels to €16.4 M, absorbing some of the volume that previously flowed to China and Taiwan.

2.4 2021: A year of price shocks across the market

The volatility analysis identifies 2021 as the epicentre of the most significant price disruptions:

• EU exports to India: a +53.2 % price shift with an abnormality score of 33.5 — the single largest shock by value share (69.6 % of export value).
• EU imports from Colombia: a +93.5 % price shift (abnormality 48.3).
• EU imports from Norway: a +39.7 % price shift (abnormality 14.0).

These shocks are consistent with the global commodity price surge of 2021 driven by post-COVID demand recovery, energy cost inflation, and speculative pressures on nickel and stainless steel markets. The fact that India — accounting for nearly 70 % of EU export value — experienced such a pronounced shock underscores the concentration risk in the EU's export profile.

3. Shifting concentration, intra-EU specialisation, and strategic implications

3.1 Import sources diversified; export destinations consolidated

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) tells two contrasting stories:

Import-side concentration declined, moving from a moderately concentrated market to a more diversified one. This reflects the loss of Russia's dominant share and the emergence of multiple alternative suppliers (Kazakhstan, Egypt, and others). Export-side concentration, however, increased and remained firmly in the "highly concentrated" territory (above 2,500), driven by India's outsized and growing share of EU export value. This asymmetry creates a structural vulnerability: while the EU has successfully diversified its scrap supply, it remains heavily dependent on a small number of destination markets — principally India — to absorb its surplus.

3.2 Intra-EU trade hubs shifted

Within the EU, the geography of scrap trade shifted markedly:

Top importers (by value):

Source: Top reporters — imports

The Netherlands, historically the EU's dominant scrap import gateway, saw its share fall by 61 %. Poland experienced an even steeper proportional decline (−83.2 %). Spain was the only major importer to grow, gaining share as other ports lost volume.

Top exporters:

The Netherlands' role as the EU's main re-export hub essentially evaporated (−98 %). Germany, Sweden, and Belgium all gained share, with Germany's specialisation in this product ranking among the highest in the EU (RSCA of 0.41). The Baltic states — Estonia (RSCA 0.68) and Latvia (RSCA 0.56) — display the highest revealed comparative advantage, though their absolute trade volumes remain small.

3.3 Strategic takeaways

The EU's export propensity (exports as a share of production) fell from 31.4 % to 23.5 % over the period, and trade intensity declined from 40.2 % to 35.0 %. These trends point to a gradual "internalisation" of the scrap cycle: more stainless steel scrap generated in the EU is being consumed domestically rather than exported. This is consistent with the expansion of EU electric-arc furnace (EAF) stainless steelmaking capacity and with policy efforts (including the EU Critical Raw Materials Act) to retain strategic secondary materials within European supply chains.

Conclusion

The EU market for high-nickel stainless steel scrap (CN 72042110) underwent a profound structural transformation between 2015 and 2025. Trade volumes contracted sharply — exports by 63 % and imports by 43 % — while unit prices rose by 11–30 %, reflecting both global commodity inflation and tightening scrap availability. The most consequential disruption was the near-total loss of Russia as an import source (−97.5 %), which triggered a partial re-routing through Kazakhstan and a broader diversification of supply. On the export side, the collapse of traditional Asian markets (Taiwan, China) was partly offset by the rapid emergence of Thailand, though India remained the overwhelmingly dominant destination. The resulting increase in export-side concentration is the market's principal vulnerability: should Indian demand falter, the EU would face limited alternative outlets for its scrap surplus. Overall, the data points toward a market that is becoming more regionally self-contained, more geographically fragmented, and more sensitive to geopolitical risk than it was at the start of the decade.