Market evolution: Small turbojets (CN 841111) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the trade dynamics of turbojets with a thrust not exceeding 25 kN (customs code 841111) within the European Union over the period 2015–2025. The analysis draws on official trade data covering imports, exports, partner concentration, production volumes, and trade vulnerability indicators. The period under review captures significant structural shifts: the commercial aerospace boom of the late 2010s, the COVID-19 shock of 2020, and the subsequent recovery — all set against a backdrop of intensifying geopolitical and supply-chain considerations in European aerospace policy.
The report is structured in three analytical sections. First, we describe the headline evolution of trade flows and the erosion of the EU's trade surplus. Second, we examine the geographic reconfiguration of trade partners and internal EU specialisation patterns. Third, we assess price volatility, supply shocks, and the EU's evolving strategic autonomy in this segment.
1. From Trade Surplus to Near Balance: The Divergence Between Value and Volume Growth
1.1. EU exports grew substantially in value but only modestly in mass
Between the first and last observed years, EU exports of small turbojets rose from €151.6 million to €211.0 million, representing a gain of 39.1%. Over the same period, exported mass increased by a far more modest 4.1%, from 158.9 tonnes to 165.3 tonnes. The implied unit price (value per tonne) climbed from approximately €954,000 to approximately €1,276,000 — a 33.7% increase. This divergence indicates that the EU is exporting fewer but more expensive, higher-value-added turbojet units over time, consistent with a shift toward premium military or advanced civil applications.
| Metric | First Year | Last Year | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (€ million) | 151.6 | 211.0 | +39.1% |
| Export quantity (tonnes) | 158.9 | 165.3 | +4.1% |
| Implied price (€/t) | 954,465 | 1,275,966 | +33.7% |
1.2. EU imports grew even faster, driven by a surge in unit count and value
Imports showed even more pronounced growth than exports. The value of EU imports rose 69.3%, from €121.5 million to €205.7 million, while imported mass grew 25.6%. Most strikingly, the supplementary quantity (number of pieces) surged by 690.8%, from 271 units to 2,143 units. Simultaneously, the per-unit import price collapsed from €448,271 to just €95,992 (−78.6%). This pattern suggests a structural shift in the composition of imports: the EU is now importing a much larger volume of smaller, lower-thrust turbojets (likely for target drones, cruise missiles, or light unmanned aerial systems), whereas earlier imports were dominated by fewer, more expensive units.
| Metric | First Year | Last Year | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import value (€ million) | 121.5 | 205.7 | +69.3% |
| Import quantity (tonnes) | 104.6 | 131.4 | +25.6% |
| Import supplementary quantity (pieces) | 271 | 2,143 | +690.8% |
| Implied price per piece (€) | 448,271 | 95,992 | −78.6% |
1.3. The EU's trade surplus nearly vanished by 2025
The combined effect of faster import growth and shifting composition eroded the EU's once-healthy trade surplus. The balance moved from +€30.1 million in the first observed year to just +€5.3 million in the last — a decline of 82.5%. At its trough, the balance even turned negative (−€127.9 million), indicating a period in which the EU was a net importer. Net import reliance shifted from +14.2% to approximately −0.9%, confirming that the EU moved from net dependence on foreign supply to a near-balanced — though no longer surplus — position.
2. Geographic Concentration Persists as New Partners Emerge
2.1. The United States and Canada remain the EU's dominant trading partners
Throughout the period, North America has dominated both sides of the EU's small-turbojet trade. On the import side, the United States accounted for €133.2 million (up 72.3% from €77.3 million), while Canada contributed €62.2 million (up 53.1%). Together, these two partners represented the vast majority of EU imports by value, reflecting the dominance of American engine manufacturers such as Pratt & Whitney and General Electric, as well as Canada's engine maintenance and aftermarket ecosystem.
On the export side, the United States was also the largest single destination, growing from €60.6 million to €79.0 million (+30.3%). Canada was the third-largest export market at €16.5 million (+101%).
| Partner | Imports (first → last, €M) | Exports (first → last, €M) |
|---|---|---|
| United States | 77.3 → 133.2 | 60.6 → 79.0 |
| Canada | 40.6 → 62.2 | 8.2 → 16.5 |
| United Kingdom | 0.7 → 0.2 | 0.003 → 10.3 |
| Türkiye | 0.001 → 0.008 | 0.014 → 0.44 |
2.2. New export destinations reflect defence-industry and geopolitical shifts
Several partners that were marginal in 2015 grew into significant export destinations by 2025. Most notably:
- United Kingdom: EU exports to the UK surged from a negligible €2,886 to €10.3 million — a dramatic reorientation likely linked to post-Brexit defence procurement and re-alignment of supply chains.
- Türkiye: Exports grew from €14,016 to €441,160 (+3,048%). While the absolute figures remain modest, the direction of growth aligns with Türkiye's expanding indigenous defence manufacturing, notably its Bayraktar drone programme which relies on small jet engines.
- Norway: Exports grew 672%, from €599,402 to €4.6 million, possibly linked to NATO-related defence procurement and Nordic military cooperation.
- Switzerland: Conversely, exports to Switzerland collapsed by 91.7%, from €44.8 million to €3.7 million, indicating a significant loss or relocation of a formerly dominant trading relationship — possibly reflecting shifts in the helicopter and business-aviation supply chain.
2.3. Germany anchors EU exports; Czechia and Spain emerge as new production hubs
Within the EU, member-state specialisation in 2025 was dominated by Germany (RCA of 3.07, the highest in the bloc), followed by Czechia (RCA of 2.07) and the Netherlands (RCA of 1.55). Germany's exports fluctuated but remained the largest in absolute terms (€59.5 million in the last year), underpinned by manufacturers such as MTU Aero Engines.
The most dramatic growth, however, came from two newer entrants:
- Czechia: Exports exploded from €5.2 million to €74.0 million (+1,322%), making it the EU's single largest exporter of small turbojets by value in the final year. This is consistent with Czechia's expanding role in light trainer and unmanned-aerial-vehicle (UAV) engine production, anchored by companies like PBS Group.
- Spain: Exports surged from €167,314 to €23.7 million (+14,044%), reflecting growing defence-industry capacity, likely linked to Spain's participation in European UAV and missile programmes.
On the import side, Germany (€90.3 million) and France (€46.5 million) were the largest importers, reflecting their status as assembly hubs for larger aircraft programmes that incorporate small turbojets (e.g., for auxiliary power or missile applications).
2.4. Export concentration decreased while import concentration remained stable
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for exports by value fell by 30.0%, from 2,721 to 1,905, indicating that the EU's export base has become meaningfully more diversified. This is consistent with the emergence of Czechia, Spain, and Norway as new or expanded export destinations. By contrast, the import HHI remained essentially flat at approximately 5,300, reflecting the continued dominance of US and Canadian suppliers. The moderate import HHI suggests a "tight oligopoly" structure — not critically concentrated, but with limited supplier diversification.
3. Supply Shocks, Price Volatility, and Strategic Autonomy
3.1. Export price shocks were concentrated in a handful of partner-country episodes
The volatility analysis reveals that export price volatility was generally moderate for the EU's largest partners (US coefficient of variation at 0.60), but extreme for smaller or newer partners. Three detected supply-shock events stand out:
| Event | Year | Flow | Price Shift (%) | Value Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Türkiye export price spike | 2019 | Exports | +5,963% | 2.4% |
| Brazil export price spike | 2023 | Exports | +7,124% | 1.5% |
| China export price spike | 2017 | Exports | +249% | 4.2% |
These episodes are consistent with the intermittent, high-value nature of defence-related turbojet deliveries — a single fighter-trainer engine delivery or a batch of cruise-missile turbojets can cause extreme year-on-year price movements in small-volume relationships. They do not necessarily indicate systemic supply disruption but rather the inherent lumpiness of military and dual-use aerospace trade.
3.2. Import volatility was highest for non-traditional suppliers
On the import side, Türkiye showed the highest coefficient of variation (2.59), followed by Norway (2.14) and Taiwan (2.01). The US, by contrast, had a CV of just 0.48, confirming its role as a stable, high-volume supplier. Canada — the second-largest import partner — showed elevated volatility (CV of 1.53), reflecting its own fluctuating deliveries. The stability of US supply underscores the deep integration of American turbojet manufacturers into EU defence and aerospace programmes, but also the concentration risk this entails.
3.3. EU production surged, suggesting a deliberate effort to build autonomous capacity
Perhaps the most strategically significant finding concerns EU domestic production volumes. Over the period:
| Metric | First Year | Last Year | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Production quantity (pieces) | 2,610 | 3,686 | +41.2% |
| Production value (€ billion) | 2.16 | 5.29 | +144.6% |
Production value grew more than twice as fast as quantity, implying that the average value per unit nearly doubled. This pattern is consistent with a shift toward more sophisticated, higher-thrust-class turbojets (closer to the 25 kN ceiling) and/or with the integration of more expensive materials and digital engine-control systems.
The strong growth in export propensity — from 221% to 301% — indicates that the EU is increasingly oriented toward external markets. Meanwhile, trade intensity also rose from 136% to 150%, confirming that this sector remains deeply integrated into global value chains rather than being self-contained. The EU is simultaneously a major producer, a major exporter, and a significant importer — characteristic of a sector where international specialisation and intra-industry trade are the norm.
Conclusion
The EU's small turbojet market (CN 841111) underwent a structural transformation over 2015–2025. Export values grew robustly, but import values grew even faster, driven by a dramatic increase in the number of lower-cost imported units — a pattern consistent with the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems and expendable munitions. The EU's trade surplus narrowed sharply, though domestic production more than doubled in value, suggesting that European manufacturers are capturing more of the value chain even as import volumes rise.
Geographically, the United States and Canada continued to dominate trade flows, but the EU's export base diversified notably: Czechia and Spain emerged as major new exporters, while the United Kingdom and Türkiye became important new destinations. Defence-industry dynamics — including the post-Brexit reorientation of supply chains and the global spread of UAV technology — appear to be the main drivers of this reconfiguration.
Price volatility remained moderate for traditional partners but extreme for smaller or newer trading relationships, reflecting the lumpiness inherent in military aerospace trade. Strategically, the simultaneous growth in production, export propensity, and trade intensity suggests that the EU is pursuing a dual strategy: expanding its autonomous production capacity while remaining deeply embedded in global supply chains. The near-disappearance of the net import surplus, however, warrants continued monitoring to ensure that rising import dependence in specific sub-segments (particularly for drone and missile engines) does not create new vulnerabilities.