Market evolution: Silicon metal (CN 280469) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of European Union trade in silicon metal classified under Combined Nomenclature code 280469, which covers silicon containing less than 99.99% by weight of silicon. This product serves as a critical input for the aluminium, chemical, and increasingly the solar photovoltaic industries. The analysis covers the period from 2015 to 2025 and draws on EU trade data with non-EU countries. Over this decade, the EU market underwent significant structural transformation, characterised by a substantial expansion of domestic production, a reconfiguration of import sourcing away from geopolitical risk, and major price shocks linked to the 2021–2022 energy crisis.
1. The EU's Strategic Pivot Toward Domestic Production and Reduced Import Dependence
1.1 Domestic production expanded nearly fourfold
The most striking structural development over the 2015–2025 period was the dramatic scaling-up of EU silicon metal production. In volume terms, output grew from 31,419 tonnes in the first available year to 125,633 tonnes in 2025—an increase of approximately 300%. In value terms, production rose from €117 million to €455 million (+289%). This expansion reflects sustained investment in European smelting capacity, likely driven by supply chain security concerns and the growing demand from the solar PV sector.
1.2 Net import reliance fell sharply
The surge in domestic output translated directly into a significant decline in import dependency. The EU's net import reliance ratio dropped from 82.8% in 2015 to 56.9% in 2025—a reduction of 31 percentage points. At its lowest point, the ratio reached 51.4%, meaning that domestic production nearly matched half of apparent consumption. This represents a fundamental shift in the EU's supply posture for a strategic raw material.
1.3 Trade intensity and export propensity evolved in parallel
The trade intensity of silicon metal in the EU market declined from 89.2% to 77.7%, indicating that a growing share of domestic demand was being met by EU-based production rather than cross-border flows. Meanwhile, export propensity increased from 33.5% to 39.5%, suggesting that the expanded production base allowed the EU to serve not only its own needs but also external markets more actively.
2. Import Sourcing Shifted Dramatically Away from Geopolitically Risky Partners
2.1 Norway consolidated its position as the dominant supplier
Among EU import partners, Norway stood out as the most stable and increasingly important source. Norwegian imports grew from €324 million (2015) to €366 million (2025), a 13.1% increase. Norway's position is underpinned by its abundant hydroelectric power, which supports low-carbon silicon production—a feature that aligns with the EU's sustainability objectives. Norway's import volatility was the lowest among all major partners, with a coefficient of variation of just 0.13, confirming its reliability.
| Partner | 2015 (€M) | 2025 (€M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Norway | 323.6 | 366.1 | +13.1% |
| China | 198.7 | 84.3 | −57.6% |
| Brazil | 22.6 | 75.1 | +232.7% |
| Iceland | 11.3 | 23.6 | +109.3% |
| Australia | 41.5 | 26.9 | −35.3% |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | 41.3 | 7.8 | −81.0% |
| Russian Federation | 43.5 | 5.1 | −88.2% |
2.2 China's share collapsed
Chinese silicon metal imports fell from €199 million in 2015 to just €84 million in 2025, a decline of 57.6%. This reduction reflects multiple factors: EU trade defence measures (anti-dumping duties on Chinese silicon metal have been in place since the mid-2000s), the broader push for supply chain diversification, and growing competition from EU domestic production. China's import volatility was also notably high (CV of 0.44), making it an increasingly unreliable source.
2.3 Russian and Bosnian supplies were curtailed after geopolitical disruptions
Imports from the Russian Federation plummeted from €43.5 million to €5.1 million (−88.2%), with most of the decline occurring after 2022. Similarly, imports from Bosnia and Herzegovina fell from €41.3 million to €7.8 million (−81.0%). Both countries had high volatility coefficients (0.57 and 0.41, respectively). The sharp decline in Russian imports is consistent with EU sanctions and trade restrictions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, while the Bosnian decline may reflect production disruptions or supply re-routing.
2.4 Brazil and Iceland emerged as alternative suppliers
Partially offsetting these declines, imports from Brazil surged by 233% (from €23 million to €75 million), and those from Iceland more than doubled (from €11 million to €24 million). Both countries offer hydroelectric-powered production, aligning with the EU's climate and supply security priorities. Brazil's emergence is particularly notable, as it now ranks as the EU's third-largest silicon metal supplier.
3. A Turbulent Price Cycle Peaked in 2022 Before Stabilising
3.1 Import volumes declined moderately while export volumes fell more steeply
Over the 2015–2025 period, EU import quantities decreased from 352,072 tonnes to 327,801 tonnes (−6.9%), while export quantities fell from 23,947 tonnes to 18,624 tonnes (−22.2%). The relative stability of import volumes, despite the rise in domestic production, suggests that EU demand for silicon metal remained robust—likely driven by the expansion of solar PV manufacturing and aluminium alloying.
3.2 Import and export prices moved in opposite directions
A striking divergence emerged in pricing dynamics. Import unit values declined slightly, from €2,081/t in 2015 to €1,973/t in 2025 (−5.2%), while export unit values rose from €2,308/t to €2,590/t (+12.2%). This suggests that the EU's export mix may have shifted toward higher-value-added or specialty silicon products, while import competition—particularly from Norway and Brazil—helped moderate inbound prices.
3.3 The 2022 energy crisis triggered severe price shocks
The volatility and shock analysis reveals that 2022 was the most turbulent year for silicon metal trade. Three major price shocks were detected:
| Shock event | Type | Abnormality score | Price shift | Value share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norway imports, 2022 | Price | 34.5 | +101.0% | 63.5% |
| UK exports, 2022 | Price | 28.5 | +208.5% | 57.1% |
| Brazil imports, 2022 | Price | 18.7 | +148.6% | 14.3% |
These shocks are consistent with the European energy crisis of 2021–2022, when electricity prices surged due to reduced Russian gas flows. Silicon metal smelting is extremely energy-intensive, and several European producers temporarily curtailed production, tightening supply and driving prices to record levels. The maximum EU import price reached €3,678/t in 2022, nearly double the 2015 level, while the import value spiked to €1.4 billion in that year—the highest of the entire period.
3.4 The trade balance improved as the market normalised
The EU's silicon metal trade deficit narrowed from €677 million in 2015 to €599 million in 2025, an improvement of 11.6%. At its narrowest, the deficit stood at €498 million. This trend reflects both the growth in domestic production and the recalibration of import flows. By 2025, the market had largely stabilised, with import prices retreating from their 2022 highs and supply chains adapting to the post-2022 geopolitical landscape.
Conclusion
The EU silicon metal market (CN 280469) underwent a profound transformation between 2015 and 2025. Domestic production quadrupled, reducing net import reliance from over 80% to below 57%. Import sourcing was reshaped by geopolitical upheaval: Russian and Bosnian supplies were sharply curtailed, Chinese imports were roughly halved, and hydroelectric-powered producers in Norway, Brazil, and Iceland gained market share. The 2022 energy crisis represented the single most disruptive event, triggering price shocks exceeding 100% for major trade flows. By 2025, the market had entered a new equilibrium characterised by greater EU self-sufficiency, more diversified and lower-risk supply chains, and a narrowing trade deficit. These trends are likely to intensify as the EU's Critical Raw Materials Act and clean energy ambitions continue to drive investment in domestic strategic metal production.