Market evolution: Siliceous fossil meals (CN 2512) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report analyses the evolution of EU trade in CN 2512 — siliceous fossil meals, including kieselguhr, tripolite, and diatomite — over the period 2015 to 2025. These industrial minerals are used primarily as filtration aids, fillers, and insulating materials across sectors such as food and beverage processing, pharmaceuticals, and construction. The EU is both a major producer and a significant net importer of these products. Over the decade examined, EU trade in this product has been shaped by three dominant dynamics: a pronounced rise in unit prices that has reconfigured the value picture despite declining volumes; a realignment of trading partners driven in part by geopolitical developments; and a structural shift in the EU's position toward greater production resilience and reduced import dependence. The overview dashboard provides the underlying data for all findings discussed below.

A Decade of Rising Prices and Shrinking Volumes

The most striking feature of EU trade in CN 2512 over 2015–2025 is the divergence between values and volumes. While trade values — both on the import and export side — have grown substantially, the underlying physical quantities have either stagnated or declined. This points to a market where unit prices have roughly doubled over the decade, fundamentally reshaping the economics of diatomite trade.

Export values grew while volumes nearly halved

EU exports of CN 2512 to non-EU countries rose in value from €19.4 million in 2015 to €23.2 million in 2025, an increase of 19.2%. Yet over the same period, export volumes fell from 46,101 tonnes to just 26,174 tonnes, a decline of 43.2%. This is explained by a steep rise in the average export unit price, which climbed from €421 per tonne in 2015 to €885 per tonne in 2025 — an increase of 109.9%. In other words, the EU now exports nearly half the physical quantity it did a decade ago, but earns more revenue doing so.

Import values surged even as volumes barely moved

On the import side, the pattern is even more pronounced in value terms. EU imports from non-EU countries grew from €22.3 million to €34.6 million (+54.9%), while import volumes were essentially flat: 36,100 tonnes in 2015 versus 35,926 tonnes in 2025 (−0.5%). The average import unit price rose from €618 per tonne to €962 per tonne (+55.6%). The EU thus imports roughly the same physical quantity as a decade ago, but at a markedly higher cost.

The trade deficit widened significantly

Because import values grew much faster than export values, the EU's trade deficit in CN 2512 expanded from −€2.9 million in 2015 to −€11.4 million in 2025, a deterioration of 294.7% (see trade balance data). This widening gap is almost entirely price-driven: the EU's import bill grew by €12.3 million while its export receipts grew by only €3.7 million. Despite this, the EU's net import reliance actually declined from 37.6% to 24.5%, reflecting the growing weight of domestic production relative to net imports — a point explored further in the third section.

Shifting Partnerships: Geopolitical Realignment in EU Diatomite Trade

Beyond the price-volume story, the period 2015–2025 saw notable shifts in the EU's trading partners for CN 2512. While the United States consolidated its position as the dominant supplier, several other patterns emerged: the collapse of trade with Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the rapid growth of China as an export destination, and the emergence of new smaller suppliers.

The United States dominates EU imports by a wide margin

The United States has been, and remains, by far the largest extra-EU supplier of diatomite. In 2025, US-origin imports reached €23.6 million, representing approximately 68% of total extra-EU import value. This share has remained dominant throughout the period, with the US accounting for between 57% and 68% of imports in any given year. Mexico is the second-largest supplier at €6.1 million in 2025 (up 53.0% from 2015), likely reflecting production by major diatomite companies with operations in both North American countries. Together, the US and Mexico supply the vast majority of the EU's diatomite imports, a pattern consistent with the geological concentration of high-quality diatomite deposits in North America.

The import concentration on the import side is correspondingly high, with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of approximately 5,018 in 2025 — well above the 2,500 threshold typically considered "highly concentrated." This reflects the structural dependence on North American supply.

China became the EU's top export destination

On the export side, the most dramatic shift has been the rise of China. EU diatomite exports to China grew from €1.6 million in 2015 to €5.0 million in 2025, an increase of 205.1%, making China the single largest destination for EU diatomite exports. This likely reflects growing Chinese industrial demand for high-grade filtration-grade diatomite, where EU producers (particularly German and French firms) enjoy quality advantages.

Geopolitical disruptions reshaped specific bilateral flows

Two partner-level collapses stand out. EU exports to the Russian Federation fell from €1.2 million to €290,257 (−76.0%), almost certainly linked to EU sanctions imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The volatility data show that Russia was already a volatile export partner (coefficient of variation of 0.37), and the collapse confirms the risk of geopolitical dependence. Similarly, EU exports to Israel fell by 95.6%, from €1.2 million to just €53,067, with an exceptionally high volatility coefficient of 2.03 — the most volatile of all tracked export partners.

Conversely, Ukraine experienced a price shock in 2022, with an abnormality score of 35.0 and a unit-price shift of +81.7%, likely linked to wartime disruption of logistics and supply chains. Angola also registered a notable price shock in 2023 (abnormality 68.9, shift +48.1%).

EU imports show modest geographic diversification on the margins

While the core import structure has remained stable (US + Mexico dominant), smaller suppliers have exhibited notable swings. Costa Rica emerged as a growing supplier, with imports surging from €34,174 in 2015 to €444,293 in 2025 (+1,200%). Armenia, by contrast, saw imports decline from €276,846 to €200,225 (−27.7%), with high volatility (CV 0.62). The United Kingdom doubled its import value to the EU from €553,906 to €1,115,171 (+101.3%), though from a low base — a flow that may partly reflect post-Brexit trade reorientation. These shifts are detailed in the partner-level data.

EU Production Resilience and Declining Import Dependence

The third major dynamic of the decade concerns the EU's own production structure and its implications for trade autonomy. Despite declining physical output, the EU's production base has held up well in value terms, and key indicators of import dependence have moved favourably.

Domestic production volumes fell but values rose

According to production data, EU production of CN 2512 declined from 13,600,000 kg in 2015 to 11,602,716 kg in 2025 (−14.7%). However, production value rose from €1.20 billion to €1.32 billion (+10.2%). This mirrors the broader price dynamic observed in trade data: EU producers are extracting and selling less material, but at significantly higher prices — consistent with global diatomite price inflation and possible shifts toward higher-value processed grades.

Germany and France anchor EU production and exports

Within the EU, Germany and France are the dominant producers and exporters of diatomite. In 2025, Germany accounted for €12.5 million in exports (+46.8% from 2015) and France for €5.0 million (+8.3%). Together they represented roughly 75% of total extra-EU export value. Germany is also the largest importer among EU Member States at €6.8 million, though this declined by 33.4% from 2015 — suggesting a possible substitution of imports with domestic or intra-EU supply. By contrast, Belgium and Italy saw explosive import growth (Belgium: +355.5% to €11.3 million; Italy: +337.6% to €8.1 million), as shown in the reporter-level data. These increases may reflect the relocation or expansion of processing capacity (e.g., filtration aid manufacturing) in these countries.

Specialisation is concentrated in a few Member States

The specialisation data for 2025 reveal a highly uneven landscape:

Portugal exhibits the highest revealed comparative advantage (RCA of 6.06), though it represents only 8.4% of EU production volume. France and Germany together account for over 52% of production. Several Member States — including Ireland, Greece, Slovakia, and Romania — show no meaningful specialisation in this product.

The EU's structural position improved over the decade

Despite the widening trade deficit in value terms, the EU's net import reliance fell from 37.6% in 2015 to 24.5% in 2025 (−34.8%). Trade intensity also declined from 57.9% to 48.2%, and export propensity edged down from 22.9% to 20.7%. These trends suggest that the EU's domestic production base has become relatively more important, partially insulating the bloc from external supply risks — even though in absolute value terms the import bill has grown.

On the export side, concentration has increased moderately: the export HHI rose from 539 in 2015 to 772 in 2025 (+43.4%), reflecting the growing weight of China as a destination. On the import side, the HHI remained very high but broadly stable at around 5,000, confirming the persistent dominance of US supply. These concentration metrics are available on the concentration dashboard.

Conclusion

The EU market for siliceous fossil meals (CN 2512) over 2015–2025 has been defined by three converging trends. First, a near-doubling of unit prices has masked significant volume declines on the export side and kept import volumes flat, resulting in a much larger trade deficit in value terms. Second, the EU's trading geography has shifted: the United States and Mexico remain overwhelmingly dominant as suppliers, but China has risen sharply as an export destination, while geopolitical shocks — principally the Russia-Ukraine conflict — have sharply curtailed certain bilateral flows. Third, despite lower production volumes, the EU's domestic industry has proven resilient in value terms, and key vulnerability indicators have improved. The structural concentration of imports from North America remains the most significant supply-side risk, but the declining net import reliance suggests that the EU's own production base has provided a meaningful buffer. Looking ahead, the persistence of elevated prices, the evolution of Chinese demand, and the potential for further supply-chain disruptions will be the key variables to monitor.