Market evolution: Silencers and exhaust pipes (CN 87089235) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the European Union's external trade in silencers (mufflers) and exhaust pipes classified under CN 87089235 over the period 2015–2025. This product category covers exhaust components for a wide range of motor vehicles, including tractors, buses, passenger cars, goods vehicles, and special purpose vehicles, excluding those destined for industrial assembly of certain motor vehicles under subheading 8708.92.20. The sector sits at the intersection of the automotive supply chain and aftermarket demand, and is closely linked to broader trends in vehicle production, emissions regulation, and electric vehicle adoption.

Over the decade under review, the EU has evolved from a strong net exporter with a trade surplus of €262 million (2015) to a more balanced position with a surplus of only €91 million (2025) — a 65.4% erosion of the trade balance. This contraction occurred despite stable export values (–1.1%), driven by surging imports (+79.1%) and a sharp decline in export volumes (–29.4%). The following sections unpack these dynamics, examine the geographic and structural shifts behind them, and assess the EU's evolving exposure to external supply volatility.

1. From volume exporter to price-driven exporter: a structural transformation in EU trade

1.1 Export volumes have fallen sharply while import volumes have grown

The most striking structural shift in the EU's trade profile over this decade is the divergence in export and import volumes. Between 2015 and 2025, export quantities fell by 29.4% — from 39,457 tonnes to 27,846 tonnes — hitting their lowest level in the entire dataset. Meanwhile, import quantities rose by 36.0%, from 21,331 tonnes to 29,019 tonnes. By 2025, imports by weight had actually surpassed exports, marking a fundamental reversal in the EU's physical trade position for this product.

1.2 Rising unit prices have masked the decline in EU competitiveness by volume

One key reason the headline export value has remained nearly flat (–1.1%) while volumes collapsed is the sustained increase in export unit prices. Average export prices climbed 40.2%, from €11,966/tonne in 2015 to €16,772/tonne in 2025, reaching a peak of €16,912/tonne during the period. Import prices also rose, but more moderately (+31.7%, from €9,856/tonne to €12,975/tonne). This widening price gap — with exports now priced 29% above imports — is consistent with the EU exporting higher-value, more technologically complex exhaust systems while sourcing more commoditised or standardised components from lower-cost origins.

1.3 Production value growth signals a pivot toward higher-value output

EU domestic production data reinforces the picture of a sector transforming rather than simply declining. While production volume fell 7.9% — from 1,332 million kg to 1,227 million kg — production value surged 103%, rising from €4.68 billion to €9.50 billion and peaking at €15 billion in an intermediate year. This doubling of value on a roughly stable volume base points to significant value-added growth within the EU — likely driven by the increasing complexity of exhaust systems to meet tightening emissions standards, the integration of advanced catalytic and filtration technologies, and inflationary pressures on input costs.

2. A dramatic reconfiguration of trade partners

2.1 Imports: the rise of Serbia, Türkiye, and the Western Balkans

The import side has undergone a radical geographic restructuring. Serbia's transformation is the most striking: EU imports from Serbia for this product grew by an extraordinary 5,511%, from just €2 million in 2015 to €111 million in 2025. This makes Serbia the single largest source of imports by value in the final year — surpassing even the United Kingdom. The Western Balkan dimension is equally visible in the growth of Bosnia and Herzegovina (+193.5% to €24 million) and Ukraine (+1,288% to €11 million), both countries benefiting from EU trade facilitation agreements and proximity advantages.

The simultaneous decline of the United Kingdom as an import source (–31.5%) is largely a consequence of Brexit: the UK moved from being the EU's dominant import partner to third place, as trade friction and rules-of-origin considerations restructured supply chains. China also more than doubled its share, consistent with broader trends of growing Chinese participation in automotive components.

2.2 Exports: the collapse of Russia, the surge of Brazil, and the UK's resilience

On the export side, the dominant story is the near-total disappearance of exports to Russia — from €24 million in 2015 to just €1.5 million in 2025 (–93.8%). This dramatic decline reflects the cumulative impact of EU sanctions imposed following the escalation of the Russia–Ukraine conflict from 2022 onward. Brazil, conversely, emerged as a major growth destination, surging 335% from €11 million to €47 million, making it the EU's fourth-largest export market by 2025. The United Kingdom remained the largest single destination (€157 million), though its share declined 12% from the 2015 baseline. China also contracted sharply as an export destination (–56.1%), possibly reflecting both increasing local Chinese production capacity and the broader trend of the EU importing more from (rather than exporting to) China.

2.3 Geographic diversification has reduced partner concentration

Both import and export concentration levels (HHI) have declined over the period. The import-side HHI fell by 24.6% (from 2,108 to 1,590), and the export-side HHI fell by 19.4% (from 1,817 to 1,465). This indicates that the EU's trade in this product category has become more geographically diversified, reducing dependency on any single partner. In particular, the emergence of Serbia, the growth of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine on the import side, and the rise of Brazil and Mexico on the export side have spread risk across a wider base — a welcome development from a supply-chain resilience perspective.

3. Shocks, volatility, and the EU's evolving strategic exposure

3.1 High-volatility partners highlight supply-chain risks

The coefficient of variation for individual trade flows reveals significant instability for certain partners. On the import side, South Africa (CV = 1.48) and Serbia (CV = 1.12) stand out as highly volatile sources. On the export side, Algeria (CV = 0.60) and Russia (CV = 0.66) exhibit notable instability — though in the case of Russia, this volatility reflects the deliberate policy-driven curtailment of trade rather than market fluctuation. Brazil (CV = 0.38) and Mexico (CV = 0.58), despite their growth, also show meaningful year-to-year variability on the export side, suggesting these newer markets are not yet stabilised.

3.2 Detectable shocks: Serbia's 2020 price anomaly and the UK's 2021 price correction

Two distinct shock events stand out in the data. First, in 2020, EU imports from Serbia experienced an extreme price shock: unit prices surged by 163.4% with an abnormality score of 307.9, while Serbia's share of EU import value reached 14.4%. This spike likely reflects the emergence of a major Serbian supplier entering the EU market — possibly a greenfield automotive investment or a re-routing of supply chains as manufacturers sought alternatives within the EU's preferential trade and proximity frameworks. Second, in 2021, import prices from the United Kingdom fell by 42.2% (abnormality: 3.4) even as the UK still accounted for 37.2% of import value. This correction is consistent with the immediate post-Brexit adjustment period, during which pricing and volumes were recalibrated to new customs and regulatory realities.

3.3 The EU remains a net exporter but its structural vulnerability is rising

The EU's net import reliance has moved from –3.6% in 2015 to –1.1% in 2025 (where negative values indicate net export status). While the EU still exports more than it imports, the margin has narrowed considerably, and the trajectory is clear: the EU is becoming more dependent on external supply for this product category. Concurrently, trade intensity — the sum of imports and exports as a share of production value — rose from 11.9% to 17.4% (+45.5%). This increasing openness means the EU's silencer and exhaust pipe sector is more exposed to global supply disruptions, exchange rate fluctuations, and geopolitical shifts than it was a decade ago.

The EU still exhibits a comparative advantage in this product, with Czechia (RSCA = 0.76) and Poland (RSCA = 0.56) leading in specialisation. Austria, Slovenia, and Latvia also show strong positive specialisation indices, confirming the Central European automotive cluster's role as the backbone of EU production in this segment. However, the least specialised members — Malta, Ireland, Bulgaria, and Luxembourg — show near-zero or negative RSCA values, indicating that production in this sector is highly concentrated among a subset of EU Member States.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in silencers and exhaust pipes (CN 87089235) over the 2015–2025 period tells the story of a sector in transition. The EU has preserved its net exporter status and nearly maintained its export value in nominal terms, but this apparent stability masks profound structural shifts underneath: a 29% collapse in export volumes offset by a 40% rise in unit prices; a 79% surge in import value driven by new suppliers in the Western Balkans and Asia; and a dramatic reorientation of trade partners following Brexit, sanctions on Russia, and the rise of emerging economies like Brazil.

The most consequential development is the rapid emergence of Serbia as the EU's largest import partner for this product — a shift of over 5,500% in value terms — which signals a deepelecting wider reshaping of automotive supply chains toward EU-proximate, EU-accession, and preferential-trade-partner countries. Meanwhile, the EU's rising trade intensity and narrowing net export surplus suggest that its self-sufficiency in exhaust components is gradually eroding.

Looking ahead, two countervailing forces will shape this market. On one hand, tightening emissions regulations and the increasing complexity of exhaust systems for hybrid vehicles (which still require exhaust components) support the EU's competitive positioning in high-value segments. On the other hand, the accelerating transition to battery-electric vehicles — which require no exhaust system at all — poses a fundamental long-term threat to the entire product category, potentially rendering the current trade dynamics obsolete within the next decade.