Market evolution: Primary aluminium (CN 76011090) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report analyses the trade dynamics of unwrought, non-alloyed aluminium (excluding slabs), classified under EU Combined Nomenclature code 76011090, for the European Union with external partners from 2015 to 2025. Primary aluminium is a critical industrial metal, essential for sectors such as transportation, construction, and packaging. The EU is a major consumer but has historically been a net importer. By examining trends in trade values, volumes, partner concentration, and production, this report identifies key structural shifts in the EU's external trade, particularly regarding supply chain diversification, changing trade relationships, and strategic vulnerabilities.

1. A Widening Trade Deficit and Persistent Import Dependence

The EU's trade in primary aluminium is characterised by a consistently large deficit, which has widened over the observed period, underscoring a deep and growing reliance on external suppliers to meet domestic demand.

1.1 The EU remains a major net importer of primary aluminium

The General Overview reveals a stark imbalance between the EU's imports and exports. In the latest year of data (2025), imports stood at approximately 7.51 billion EUR in value and 3.02 million tonnes in quantity, while exports were minimal at 71.6 million EUR and 24,585 tonnes. This resulted in a significant net import reliance of 83.9% in 2025, meaning that over 80% of the EU's apparent consumption was met by imports. The trade deficit, measured in EUR, increased from 6.93 billion EUR in 2023 to 7.44 billion EUR in 2025.

1.2 Import volumes grew while prices increased moderately

Between 2023 and 2025, the volume of imports into the EU grew by 2.6%, while the value increased by 7.2%. This indicates a rise in the average unit price from 2,375 EUR per tonne to 2,482 EUR per tonne, a 4.5% increase. This price movement likely reflects global market trends, including energy costs and supply-demand balances, rather than a dramatic supply squeeze within this specific period.

1.3 Export activity is marginal and declining

EU exports of this product are negligible in volume and value relative to imports. The export propensity—the ratio of exports to production—fell sharply from 8.98% in 2023 to just 3.62% in 2025. This suggests that whatever primary aluminium the EU produces is increasingly destined for its own internal market or re-exports within the bloc, rather than for global markets.

2. Significant Reconfiguration of Supply Chains and Trade Partners

The period witnessed a major reshuffling of the EU's primary aluminium suppliers, moving away from some traditional sources toward a more diversified but still concentrated set of partners.

2.1 A shift away from India and Russia, toward Canada and Mozambique

The top import partners by value show dramatic changes between 2023 and 2025:

• India saw a precipitous decline (-61.0%), dropping from the top supplier (1.24 billion EUR) to a value of 483 million EUR.
• Russian Federation imports also fell significantly (-48.7%), from 651 million EUR to 334 million EUR, a likely consequence of geopolitical tensions and sanctions.
• In contrast, Canada's exports to the EU surged by 350%, growing from 309 million EUR to 1.39 billion EUR, making it the top supplier by value in 2025.
• Mozambique consolidated its position, with its exports to the EU growing by 34.7% to reach 1.43 billion EUR.

2.2 Import supply became slightly more concentrated

Despite the diversification away from India and Russia, the overall concentration of imports by value increased slightly. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports rose from 1,010 in 2023 to 1,064 in 2025. This indicates that while the top suppliers changed, the new top tier (Canada, Mozambique, Iceland) still represents a large share of the total, maintaining a moderately concentrated market structure.

2.3 Export markets became more fragmented and geographically scattered

The HHI for exports fell sharply from 3,715 to 2,514, indicating a move toward less concentration. Traditional export destinations like Norway and Switzerland saw major declines (-59.9% and -89.1% respectively). New significant destinations emerged, including the United States (value increased 682% to 30.8 million EUR) and Serbia (value grew from negligible to 3.2 million EUR). This suggests EU exporters of this niche product are finding new and more scattered markets.

3. Domestic Production Contraction and Strategic Vulnerabilities

Underlying the trade data is a story of declining EU domestic production for primary aluminium, creating a strategic challenge for the bloc's industrial autonomy.

3.1 EU production volumes have fallen dramatically

The data on EU production shows a stark decline. Between the first and last periods available, production volume (in kg) fell by 49.2%, from 590 million kg to 300 million kg. This is a severe contraction, likely driven by high European energy costs, making primary aluminium smelting uneconomical compared to producers in regions with cheaper energy.

3.2 Production value declined less than volume, suggesting a shift in output mix

Interestingly, while the volume of production nearly halved, the value of production decreased by a much smaller margin (7.1%). This implies that the remaining EU production has shifted toward higher-value or more specialised forms of non-alloyed aluminium, or that producers are better at capturing value despite lower volumes. The most specialised producers within the EU are the Netherlands and Italy, which also happen to be the top importers, highlighting their role as major processing and transhipment hubs.

3.3 Supply chain volatility is a persistent feature

The volatility of imports, measured by the coefficient of variation (CV), was high for several key partners. Canada (CV=0.88) and Russia (CV=0.48) showed very high volatility, reflecting the supply uncertainties discussed earlier. Even more stable suppliers like Iceland (CV=0.10) and South Africa (CV=0.07) are not immune. This persistent volatility underscores the EU's vulnerability to external supply shocks in a critical raw material.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in primary aluminium (CN 76011090) from 2015 to 2025 is a narrative of strategic vulnerability and reactive adaptation. The bloc has become more, not less, reliant on imports to sustain its industrial base, with the net import reliance rate remaining stubbornly above 80%. A dramatic decline in domestic production, driven by economic and energy factors, has underpinned this dependency.

The most dynamic trend has been the violent restructuring of supply chains. The EU has successfully diversified away from unstable or geopolitically problematic suppliers like India and Russia, pivoting decisively toward Canada and solidifying ties with Mozambique. However, this diversification has not reduced overall concentration, as the new top suppliers now command a similarly large market share. For exports, the EU plays a negligible role in global markets, with its limited outbound trade becoming more fragmented. The data paints a picture of an import-dependent, production-weak bloc that is actively seeking to secure its supply but remains structurally exposed to global market forces and geopolitical shifts in the aluminium sector.