Market evolution: Munitions (CN 930690) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in bombs, grenades, torpedos, mines, missiles, and other ammunition and projectiles, and parts thereof (CN 930690) over the period 2015–2025. This residual heading covers military-purpose munitions (93069010) and non-military ammunition and projectiles (93069090), excluding shotgun cartridges. Over the decade, EU trade in this product category underwent a dramatic transformation: export values grew by 1,188% and import values by 1,818%, driven overwhelmingly by the military sub-segment. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 acted as the central inflection point, fundamentally reorienting both export destinations and import sourcing. Against this backdrop of surging trade volumes, EU domestic production declined markedly, raising questions about industrial capacity and strategic autonomy.

1. An Unprecedented Expansion of EU Munitions Trade

Overall trade volumes surged to historically unprecedented levels

Between 2015 and 2025, EU exports of CN 930690 products rose from €140.2 million to €1.81 billion, while imports grew from €87.2 million to €1.67 billion. The general trade overview reveals that the expansion was not gradual but concentrated in distinct phases:

The EU maintained an overall trade surplus throughout most of the period, peaking at approximately €1.82 billion — likely in 2024 — before moderating to €133 million in 2025. A brief period of net import reliance (balance dipping to −€25.4 million) likely occurred around 2020–2021, coinciding with COVID-era disruptions and a temporary dip in export activity.

The military sub-segment accounts for the entirety of the growth

The product segment breakdown reveals that the growth was driven entirely by military-purpose munitions (93069010), while non-military ammunition (93069090) stagnated or declined:

Military exports in volume terms expanded from 2,049 tonnes in 2015 to a peak of 40,755 tonnes in 2024 before easing to 32,074 tonnes in 2025. Non-military export volumes, by contrast, fell from 2,027 tonnes to 1,231 tonnes over the same period. On the import side, military volumes surged from 2,890 tonnes to 13,009 tonnes, while non-military imports remained broadly stable at around 4,500 tonnes.

Unit prices escalated sharply, especially for military imports

Price per tonne rose substantially across both segments, reflecting a shift toward higher-value items (missiles, precision-guided munitions) and broader inflationary pressures in the defence sector:

Military import prices spiked dramatically to €293,293/t in 2020, likely reflecting a shift in the product mix toward high-value systems and reduced volumes. The overall export price rose from €34,196/t to €54,207/t (+59%), while the import price increased from €10,673/t to €95,357/t (+793%).

2. Geopolitical Reorientation: Ukraine and the Redrawing of Trade Partners

Ukraine became the EU's overwhelmingly dominant export destination

The most striking feature of the period is the transformation of EU–Ukraine trade in munitions. EU exports to Ukraine surged from €104,234 in 2015 to a peak of approximately €2.48 billion (likely in 2024), before settling at €1.49 billion in 2025. This represents an increase of over 1,400,000%. Ukraine accounted for such a large share of EU exports that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for export concentration by value rose from 1,799 in 2015 to 6,880 in 2025 (and a peak of 8,168), placing the EU's export profile firmly in the "highly concentrated" range.

Other key export partners include:

Traditional Middle Eastern markets (Iraq, Saudi Arabia) declined in relative importance as European defence priorities shifted eastward.

Import sources diversified with the United States and Türkiye emerging as key suppliers

EU imports were transformed by two major developments: the rise of the United States and Türkiye as dominant suppliers, and the emergence of Ukraine as an import source.

The US share of EU imports surged, likely reflecting both direct military procurement and re-export channels associated with NATO reinforcement. Türkiye's extraordinary growth (+18,330%) suggests it has become a significant munitions supplier to the EU, consistent with its expanding defence-industrial base. Russia's share remained negligible and flat, while Canada's imports collapsed by 91%.

EU member states along the eastern flank emerged as the dominant traders

The member-state breakdown reveals a pronounced shift toward Eastern European member states:

Poland's emergence as the EU's largest munitions exporter (from €51.6M to over €1 billion) is the single most significant member-state development, closely linked to its role as a logistics hub for military assistance to Ukraine. Romania and Bulgaria maintained large absolute volumes but Romania's exports actually declined from their 2015 level. France, by contrast, saw its exports collapse by 92%.

On the import side, Poland again leads (€869M in 2025, up from €37M), followed by Romania (€216M), Estonia (€182M), and Spain (€105M). The Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania) and the Netherlands showed explosive import growth, consistent with broader NATO rearmament trends.

Trade volatility intensified, with notable price shocks from Türkiye and Israel

The volatility analysis reveals high coefficients of variation (CV > 1.0) for most major partners on both the export and import side. Export volatility was highest for Serbia (CV 2.63) and Türkiye (CV 2.62), reflecting episodic, large-volume shipments rather than steady flows.

Three major price shock events were detected:

The Türkiye and Israel shocks likely reflect procurement of high-value items (missile systems, guided munitions) in specific years rather than sustained price inflation.

3. Structural Strains: Declining Production, Rising Exposure

EU domestic production declined sharply even as trade volumes exploded

The production data for the broader CN 930690 scope shows a stark contraction in EU manufacturing capacity:

Production volumes fell by nearly 79% and values by 45%, even as export and import values grew by an order of magnitude. This divergence implies that the EU increasingly relies on international supply chains — both for sourcing munitions it re-exports and for procuring items it cannot produce domestically at sufficient scale. The steeper decline in volume than value suggests a shift toward higher-value, more complex systems in the remaining production base.

Export specialisation is concentrated in a handful of member states

The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals highly uneven export capabilities across the EU:

Slovakia shows the highest relative comparative advantage (RSCA 0.87), while Spain has the highest product concentration in its export basket (45.5%). At the other end, Portugal, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Sweden, and the Netherlands show no meaningful specialisation (RSCA close to −1.0). This extreme polarisation raises questions about the resilience and replicability of EU munitions export capacity.

The EU remains a net exporter but trade intensity and export propensity have risen dramatically

The vulnerability indicators paint a nuanced picture of EU autonomy:

Negative net import reliance indicates the EU is a net exporter; the deepening of this figure from −3.2% to −16.8% confirms that export growth outpaced import growth in relative terms. However, the surge in trade intensity (from 12.8% to 41.7%) and export propensity (from 8.3% to 31.7%) means the EU's munitions sector has become far more exposed to international demand fluctuations. Export propensity, the most salient indicator (salience score: 301.5), underscores how dependent the sector has become on a single geopolitical driver — military assistance to Ukraine.

Import concentration by value (HHI) also rose from 1,704 to 2,346, suggesting that while import sources remain more diversified than exports, the growing weight of the US and Türkiye creates new supplier-dependence risks.

Conclusion

The period 2015–2025 represents a fundamental transformation of EU trade in munitions under CN 930690. What was a relatively modest and balanced trade flow became a multi-billion-euro channel shaped overwhelmingly by the conflict in Ukraine. The military sub-segment (93069010) accounts for the entirety of the growth, while non-military ammunition trade has declined. The EU's export profile is now highly concentrated on a single destination (Ukraine), creating a degree of geographic dependence that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. Simultaneously, EU domestic production has contracted significantly, while import reliance on the United States and Türkiye has grown. Poland has emerged as the linchpin of EU munitions trade — both as the largest exporter and importer — reflecting its strategic position as a logistics corridor. Looking ahead, the sustainability of this trade pattern depends critically on the evolution of the conflict, EU defence procurement commitments, and the ability of European industry to rebuild production capacity that has eroded over the past decade.